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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the role of sibling kinship in shaping the poetry, 
drama, and fiction of English Romanticism (1789-1832). While critics have long 
associated Romanticism with a myth of solitary authorship and an archetype of isolated 
genius, I demonstrate that Romantic authors imagined subjectivity in the plural, curating 
a vision of identity-formation that is collective, shared, multiple, and relational. Embodied 
in the portrayal of sibling relationships, this inter-subjective paradigm delivers new 
frameworks for understanding the Romantic self as situated within networks of others—
networks of those who are not quite the same yet not quite different; those who are both 
familiar and yet unknown. My study is the first to present a sustained consideration of the 
way Romantic writers invoked literary siblinghood as a model for the collaborative and 
collective nature of selfhood, and I propose that this focus on lateral sibling kinship offers 
alternatives to the conventional reproductive lenses through which the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth-century family has been previously understood.  
 viii 
Drawing from recent work in feminist and queer theory, psychology and 
psychoanalysis, and sociocultural histories of kinship, this dissertation contributes new 
readings of canonical texts by Percy Bysshe Shelley, Joanna Baillie, William Wordsworth, 
Jane Austen, and Mary Shelley. Chapter One considers two stage dramas by P. B. 
Shelley and Baillie as rewritings of Sophocles’s Antigone. In both plays, sisters use their 
fraternal-sororal relations to redefine familial systems of reproduction via horizontal 
means of transmission rather than through vertical lines of biological inheritance. In 
Chapter Two, I extend this discussion of sibling networks to Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads, 
where, I suggest, we find trans-subjective inter-relations that define the poet’s vision well 
beyond autobiographical references to his sister Dorothy. Austen’s novels serve as the 
focus of Chapter Three, which argues that the self-contained “I” of the Bildungsroman 
genre, as Austen incorporates it, in fact depends upon intimate epistemological exchanges 
between sororal characters who undergo a mutually influential process of development. 
Chapter Four concludes with a discussion of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. I suggest that the 
author critiques her central male protagonist for his failures to recognize how the 
reciprocity of male-female sibling sympathies underlies homosocial bonds. Taken 
together, these readings advance a version of Romantic subjectivity based upon lateral 
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From Solitude to Sorority: Re-Imagining the Romantic Self 
 
If Romantic poets and novelists had sought a visual avatar for their conception of 
creative subjectivity—a creative self that is isolated, solitary, independent, and 
exceptional—then surely Caspar David Friedrich’s 
Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog (fig. 1) would have served 
that purpose. William Wordsworth, for one, would 
have identified this image of spiritual and meditative 
introspection with his own pensive pauses amongst 
the peaks of the Alps; Percy Bysshe Shelley could 
have visualized the ravine of the Arve lurking under 
such cloudy mists. Literary critics can likewise 
recognize in Friedrich’s portrait a familiar rendition 
of the Romantic ego. The Wanderer resembles the kind 
of “solitary musing” that, for William Hazlitt, distinguished Wordsworth as “the most 
original poet now living” and which later led Geoffrey Hartman to define Romanticism’s 
zeitgeist as “consciousness of self raised to apocalyptic pitch.”1 Friedrich’s distinctive 
Rückenfigur,2 which now ornaments the fronts of so many Romantic texts,3 thus seems to 
                                                
1 Hazlitt, “Mr. Wordsworth,” from The Spirit of the Age (1825), in Selected Writings, ed. Jon Cook 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 350, 351; Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry, 1787-1814 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 17. 
2 German artistic term for a turned figure seen from the back. For discussions of Friedrich’s 
Wanderer as Rückenfigur, see Joseph Leo Koerner, Caspar David Friedrich and the Subject of Landscape 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2009); William Vaughan, Friedrich (London and New York: Phaidon 
Figure 1. Wanderer above the Sea of Fog,  
or The Wanderer above the Mists,  




have been adopted as the ur-figure for the Romantic soul: a contemplative, solipsistic, 
Kantian—and distinctly male—subject who imagines, as much as he observes, the 
sublimely inscrutable landscape before him. He is solitary genius incarnate.  
 The Wanderer, in other words, exemplifies Romanticism’s enduring myths of 
egotistical sublimity and of “autoproduction”4—what Susan Wolfson describes as its 
literature of “single perspectives, solitary converse, stark differentiation of self and world, 
[and] highly signaled subjective agency” and what Jack Stillinger first called attention to 
as the universalized “romantic notion of solitary authorship.”5 Yet, as we know, all good 
myths invite debunking. And while the ubiquity of Friedrich’s Wanderer as a Romantic 
poster-child has unconsciously prolonged our “uncritical absorption” of the Romantics’ 
own curated stylization of solitary genius,6 scholars like Stillinger, Wolfson, and others 
have begun challenging this longstanding mythos by pointing to the coteries and 
communities that surrounded these authors.7 Close friends, family members, fellow 
                                                                                                                                            
Press, 2004); and Sabine Rewald, Caspar David Friedrich: Moonwatchers (New York: Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, 2001). 
3 See, for instance, recent book covers for editions of Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (Wordsworth 
Classics, 2004) and Frankenstein (Dover, 1994), as well as literary anthologies and criticism, 
including Romanticism (Cambridge Contexts in Literature series, 2004), Romanticism (Phaidon Press 
Arts and Ideas series, 2001), Alan Richardson’s The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic 
Texts (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), and the first edition of Paul Johnson’s The Birth of the 
Modern: World Society, 1815-1830 (HarperCollins, 1991). Wanderer also appears as the primary 
image on Wikipedia’s Romanticism page, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanticism, accessed 
November 1, 2014. 
4 Koerner, Friedrich and the Subject of Landscape, 59. 
5 Wolfson, Romantic Interactions: Social Being and the Turns of Literary Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2010), 1; Stillinger, Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 183. 
6 Jerome McGann famously warns against accepting Romanticism’s self-constructed myths in The 
Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 1.  
7 See for instance coterie studies such as Jeffrey Cox’s Poetry and Politics in the Cockney School: Keats, 




writers, not to mention editors, publishers, and booksellers: all of these men and women 
influenced the conception, composition, and execution of literary works. Rather than 
being a self-contained, solitary project, then, Romantic authorship was far more 
communal and collaborative—and domestic—than once assumed. Writing frequently 
involved the input of social and familial cohorts in the development of creative works, 
whether that was through the shared activities of reading and thinking, through a 
collective heritage of philosophical and literary tracts, or through the joint mechanical 
labor of producing manuscripts. One need only consider, for instance, the daily 
interactions between Wordsworth and his intimate network of companions, from his sister 
Dorothy and close friend Samuel Taylor Coleridge to his wife Mary Hutchinson and 
publisher Joseph Cottle, to recognize that literary works were rarely conceived or created 
in isolation.   
 Within this critical shift towards collaborations and coteries, Romanticism’s 
writerly family circles have garnered increasing scholarly attention. As Michelle Levy 
observes in Family Authorship and Romantic Print Culture, the role of the family has been “little 
acknowledged and so little understood in most accounts of the field” up to this point, yet 
the phenomenon of “family authorship” was, she claims, intrinsic to Romantic print 
culture.8 Tracing this sociable system across the period’s most well-known families, from 
the Aikins and Coleridges to the Shelleys and Godwins, Levy argues that the domestic 
practices of dialogic exchange and mutual influence between family members preserved 
                                                                                                                                            
studies such as Marjorie Stone and Judith Thompson’s Literary Couplings: Writing Couples, 
Collaborators, and the Construction of Authorship (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). 




the interactive features of collaborative manuscript culture well into the age of print 
media—and the age of original genius. In Romantic Literary Families, Scott Krawczyk 
concurs with Levy that collaboration stood as the rule rather than the exception. 
Examining family members’ writings side by side, he suggests, leads to a more thorough 
understanding of how this “collaborative consciousness” characterized literary authorship 
of the period.9 While Levy focuses on the material practices of manuscript production 
and Krawczyk on the social interactions behind authors’ inter-related texts, both critics 
highlight the dominant role that the so-called “literary family” played as a constituent of 
the Romantic writing world.10   
 As rebuttals to the myth of solitary authorship, these studies importantly redefine 
the critical conversation by conceptualizing groups and cohorts to be authoring bodies—
as Krawczyk refers to them, “nascent corporation[s]” (x). Distinguishing between 
particular kinds of familial connections, however, has remained of far less pressing 
concern. Levy’s discussion, for instance, touches upon variously constituted kinship 
systems, from the sister-brother pair Anna Barbauld and John Aikin’s collective 
educational writings to the multi-generational Wordsworth household (William, sister 
Dorothy, wife Mary, and daughter Dora) and their communal projects of travel writing. 
Similarly, Krawczyk highlights a range of family dynamics, including both the inter-
generational influences within the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley clan as well as the 
                                                
9 Scott Krawczyk, Romantic Literary Families (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 19. 
10 Krawczyk, Romantic Literary Families, x. These studies follow the trend of several earlier 
monographs that consider the phenomenon within singular family units; see, for instance, Julie 
Carlson, England’s First Family of Writers: Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, Mary Shelley (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Richard Matlak, The Poetry of Relationship: The Wordsworths 
and Coleridge, 1797-1800 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); and Elizabeth Fay, Becoming 




brother-sister correspondences of Barbauld and Aikin. In yet another exploration of 
Romanticism’s ideological investment in the family, Jane Spencer equates numerous 
kinship metaphors as being potential structures underlying authorial relationships, from 
“generative literary fatherhood” to “mythical literary motherhood” to “competitive and 
co-operative literary brotherhood and sisterhood.”11 Family authorship can, it seems, be 
found almost anywhere, once one starts looking. For the most part, however, this 
scholarship tends to flatten differentiations within the spectrum of kinship while also 
retaining a predominantly biographical angle. They have sought to redefine our 
understanding of collective and collaborative writing practices rather than to reinvent our 
readings of Romantic writing itself.  
This dissertation reconsiders familial paradigms to suggest that one specific mode 
of kinship—siblinghood—uniquely infiltrated Romanticism’s literary consciousness. 
Instead of focusing upon real-life sororal and fraternal relations, as Levy, Krawczyk, and 
others have inventively done, I step aside from this authorial-oriented scholarship in order 
to examine how Romantic writers used siblinghood as a thematic and structural element 
in their literature. Sisters and brothers appear, after all, in a wide range of roles across 
Romantic texts. There are, for instance, far-flung and absent figures who consistently pull 
on characters’ heartstrings, such as Fanny Price’s naval brother William in Austen’s 
Mansfield Park or the dead and ghostly half-sister Astarte in Byron’s Manfred. There are 
intimate arrangements in which siblings reciprocally inform one another’s pathways 
through life, such as the close bond between sisters Elizabeth and Jane Bennet in Austen’s 
                                                





Pride and Prejudice, the indivisible childhood partnership of James and Leonard in 
Wordsworth’s “The Brothers,” or the long-held connection between Jane and De 
Monfort in Joanna Baillie’s De Monfort (originally portrayed on stage by real-life siblings 
Sarah Siddons and John Kemble). There is dependent and paternalistic caretaking, such 
as that between Lorenzo and Flora Mancini in Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s short story 
“The Brother and Sister: An Italian Story.” And there are wider networks of relations 
surrounding or complementing such representative one-on-one pairings, including the 
seven varied siblings that constitute the groups depicted in Wordsworth’s “We are Seven” 
or “The Seven Sisters”; the orphaned clan represented in Dorothy Wordsworth’s Narrative 
of George and Sarah Green; and the myriad families of three, four, and five siblings and near-
siblings contained within each of Austen’s major novels.  
Examining constructions of siblinghood in representative texts from across the 
genres—poetry, fiction, drama—as well as from across the generations and genders of 
Romantic writing—from Joanna Baillie and William Wordsworth in the 1790s to Percy 
Shelley, Jane Austen, and Mary Shelley in the 1810s—I argue that Romantic authors 
deployed instances of sibling kinship in order to articulate a specific vision of subjectivity 
that has been previously overlooked in criticism: a vision of networked rather than of 
individualized selfhood. Romantic writers portrayed this networked and sibling-based 
subjectivity as an integrated state of being—one that is bound to, constructed with, 
evolving alongside, and intimately tied up with the minds and bodies of others. The 
appearance of siblings throughout Romantic literature is thus far from incidental; rather, 




used to conceive not only themselves but also their literary subjects.  
 This reorientation towards “sibling-ed” rather than solitary selfhood requires a 
shift in perception—perhaps even literally. Critics’ selection of visual representation, for 
one, has been unnecessarily misleading. Having taken the iconography of Friedrich’s 
solitary Wanderer for granted, literary scholars have missed the fact that such isolated 
figures were not the painter’s primary subject. The Wanderer is an anomaly. Friedrich 
preferred, rather, “pensive pairs of figures,”12 and it is those pairings for which he is most 
well known in the history of art—and which he even reproduced in multiple versions (figs. 
2 and 3). With these couples, Friedrich brings together interconnected individuals who 
enjoy a split but shared perspective and a collective experience of the natural world. 
Stationed slightly off-center within a given composition, these pairs welcome a 
triangulated perception from the viewer outside the canvas as well. As Friedrich’s artistic 
signature, these close companions observe the natural sublime from a position that is not 
quite the same but not quite different. Their simultaneous and overlapping contemplation 
                                                
12 Rewald, Moonwatchers, 12, emphasis mine. In comparison to his few Rückenfigur images, Friedrich 
painted nearly two dozen works with this paired motif, particularly during the height of his 
popularity from 1817 to 1823 (Vaughan, Friedrich, 178).  
Figure 2. Two Men Contemplating the Moon,  
c. 1819-20, Gemäldegalerie Neue Meister, 
Dresden 
Figure 3.  Man and Woman Contemplating the 
Moon, c. 1824, Nationalgalerie, Staatliche 




Figure 4. Sisters on the Harbor-View Terrace (Harbor 
by Night) ca. 1820, State Hermitage Museum, 
St. Petersburg.   
presents a visual correlative to the intersecting and interrelated nature of their subjective 
experiences. We, too, might perceive the Romantic world differently, if only we could 
train ourselves to see through multiple pairs of eyes.  
Instead of memorializing Friedrich’s Wanderer as the Romantic symbol, then, we 
could as easily elect an image like his Sisters on the Harbor-View Terrace (fig. 4), in which two 
nearly identical women appear, clad in the same 
clothing, adorned with similar hairstyles, their 
bodies drawn almost in duplicate. With rigid, 
upright stances, depicted from the rear and 
occupying the middle ground of the composition, 
these two figures resemble the dominating 
Rückenfigur of The Wanderer, but they also combine 
this independent, solitary positioning with the 
twinned and conjoined composition of the two 
figures in a Man and Woman Contemplating the Moon. 
Their stringent verticality distinguishes their bodies 
from one another, yet their gently extending arms reach across the space between them—
and across the canvas’s center—to produce intimate contact that mimics their parallel 
gazes. The urban scene reinforces the women’s dualities: the doubled architectural 
elements of statues, spires, and masts echo their repetition with a difference.13 United in 
                                                
13 Though the statues are difficult to see in this dark-toned painting, a monument to the right of 
the women features a cross with two figures who overlook the harbor. See Rewald (Moonwatchers, 




their companionable tête-à-tête, made almost interchangeable through their near-identical 
appearances, the two sisters invoke an inter-related, collective experience that I suggest 
structures the Romantic imagination. Simultaneously independent yet identical, the 
women of Sisters are separate yet enmeshed. One cannot be understood without the other.  
* * * 
 This vision of sibling subjectivity replaces Romanticism’s egotistical sublime with 
selfhood in context: individuals intrinsically bound within a network of others whose 
perspectives are not quite the same but not quite distinct either. In theorizing this sibling 
framework, I draw on Stefani Engelstein’s recent PMLA article “Sibling Logic; or, 
Antigone Again.” Recognizing the intricate web of kin surrounding Antigone in 
Sophocles’s Greek drama, Engelstein advances “sibling logic” to address the complex 
interplay of relationality embodied by lateral kinship networks. Within Antigone, she 
claims, we cannot find a distinct individual because characters cannot “pluck themselves 
out of each other’s being.”14 The siblings are too enmeshed to be entirely differentiated. 
Antigone cannot be understood—nor can she understand herself—without the siblings to 
whom she is physically, affectively, and psychologically attached (including not only 
Ismene, Polyneices, and Eteocles, but also her father-brother Oedipus).  
Focusing not on the sole character of Antigone, but rather on the system of 
siblings surrounding and encompassing her, Engelstein articulates the psychoanalytic and 
ideological valences of such sibling expansiveness:  
The sibling as a model, I argue, allows us to move beyond both self-other dualisms 
and the mother-child dyad as the only grounds for intersubjectivity, and 
recognizes the subject as instead embedded in a network of partial others, whose 
                                                




subjectivities are nonetheless partially, though differentially, shared… [This] logic 
of differential degrees of likeness provides the foundation for less confrontational 
formulations of belonging, identity, and agency. (40, original emphasis) 
 
As Engelstein indicates here, the newly-imagined possibility of psychoanalytic sibling 
networks might serve to replace the dominant Freudian theories that have almost 
exclusively conceived of familial, cultural, and political paradigms in dichotomous, 
binary, and specifically vertical terms—in “self-other dualisms” and in the “mother-child 
dyad.” Aiming to redress this tendency towards replacement and substitution in 
psychoanalytic models, those built upon vertical kinship hierarchies and conflicted 
relationships between parents and children, Engelstein suggests instead a lateral and 
horizontal platform of trans-subjective identities, whereby relations within a generation 
define subjecthood rather than those between generations. In this, she follows a thought 
experiment articulated previously by Judith Butler in her Antigone’s Claim: “What would 
have happened if psychoanalysis had chosen Antigone rather than Oedipus?”15  
 What indeed? In contrast to Freud’s Oedipal models, Antigone’s sibling kinship 
offers a fluid system of multiple and partial connections, in which each child shares 
inherent similarities to her siblings, yet is simultaneously defined by her differences from 
them as well. Overturning Freud’s inter-generational rivalries, Engelstein’s sibling logic 
presents intra-generational “differentials,” an array of shared likenesses and contrasts that 
constitute one’s self-conception. Engelstein explains this multiplicity as follows: 
… the tie between siblings [is] always in excess of either the mother-child or the 
father-child relationship. The sibling relationship is multiply mediated through a 
set of nuanced differentials: resemblance between siblings, differential 
                                                
15 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 




resemblance to each shared parent (biological or otherwise), and not-quite-
duplicated positionality. The relationship with the sibling in turn mediates and 
refracts relations both within and beyond the family from a perspective not quite 
same and not quite other. (41) 
 
Sprouted from identical parentage, biological siblings in any given nuclear unit may 
occupy the “same” place within the family tree, yet this “not-quite-duplicated 
positionality” means that each sibling occupies that branch from an ever-so-slightly 
skewed position. Their unique positions, however, generate meaning only in relation to 
one another. As Engelstein suggests, sibling logic thus resists an ideology of individualism 
and autonomy—and, we might add, an ideology of Romantic egoism—because no 
sibling can exist in true independence or separation from her kin.  
 Following Butler and Engelstein, I wish to spark a similar thought experiment: 
what would have happened if Romantic criticism had chosen siblings instead of solitaries? 
Indeed, the omission of siblings and other intra-generational groups not only from the 
legacy of Romanticism but also from the cultural record as a whole has become strikingly 
apparent across fields ranging from psychology to biology to history. As sociologist 
Leonore Davidoff remarks, siblings have remained, mysteriously, an “absent presence” in 
both academic analysis and in professional applications, raising the question as to “why 
the networks formed by siblings and their place in the development of modern capitalist, 
class society have been neglected.”16 Even though our own cultural moment may be 
making full birth siblings harder to come by, what with the ubiquity of reconstituted step-
families and reproductive technologies redefining kinship connections, siblings, biological 
                                                
16 Davidoff, Thicker than Water: Siblings and Their Relations, 1780-1920 (Oxford: Oxford University 




or otherwise, still maintain a material and psychic draw throughout our entire lives. They 
are, after all, “life’s longest relationship.”17 Siblings have a unique status: they are there 
from our very beginning (or relatively close to it); they tend to outlast parents; their 
presence will cover more of our lifetime than friends, children, spouses, or any other 
relatives; we share a range of experiences with them over the course of life; they are 
assigned rather than earned; we can never choose them nor divorce them. Despite their 
exceptional importance in our lives, however, until quite recently siblings rarely featured 
as a source for theories of the inner life, since, as Prophecy Coles puts it, Freud’s stress on 
parent-child relations within the family romance so thoroughly convinced us, more than a 
century ago, that “we do not need siblings.”18    
 And yet early-nineteenth-century writers and thinkers were keenly aware of their 
need for siblings. In their daily realities, many Romantic brothers and sisters shared a 
domestic household throughout adulthood: Jane and Cassandra Austen resided together 
with their mother until Jane’s death in 1817; from 1795 on, William and Dorothy 
Wordsworth sustained a lifelong domestic companionship even after William married and 
had children; Joanna Baillie occupied a common house in London with her sister Agnes 
for a half-century of their unmarried lives, while their brother Matthew resided just a few 
miles away; Charles and Mary Lamb shared a home when Mary was not confined in an 
insane asylum. Other sibling relations stimulated ongoing material and financial bonds, 
                                                
17 Davidoff, Thicker than Water, 2. 
18 Prophecy Coles, The Importance of Sibling Relationships in Psychoanalysis (New York: Karnac, 2003), 
2. Other recent psychological work on the topic of siblings includes Coles, ed., Sibling Relationships 
(New York: Karnac, 2006); and Frank Sulloway, Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics, and 




such as Edward Austen’s support of his sisters after their father’s death. Even when 
separated by geography, siblings maintained psychological connections. John Keats, for 
one, wrote frequently to his brother and sister-in-law in America, and he imagined that 
their sympathetic attachments might be strong enough to generate a kind of transatlantic 
telepathy, if only they could engage in simultaneous reading practices—what one critic 
playfully refers to as “Shakespearean Skype.”19 This was an age, after all, when kinship 
nomenclature dissolved apparent distances between in-laws, when married partners 
would refer to their spouse’s siblings as their own, using the terms “brother” and “sister” 
interchangeably to refer to those with whom they had no blood relation at all.20 
 Writers’ own autobiographical relationships were not the only sibling bonds to 
feature in Romantic writing, yet scholarship has conventionally aligned them by 
collapsing Romantic siblinghood into the motif of Romantic incest. Thus far, the critical 
tradition has been dominated by psycho-biographical readings of what appear to be 
quasi-sexual intimacies between brothers and sisters in literary texts. According to this 
traditional line of thinking, the focus should be on heterosexual brother-sister relations in, 
predominantly, Romantic poetry. Within this framework, the love and intimacy between 
a brother and a sister verges on the illicit, thereby becoming a sign of the male author’s 
repressed sexual desire for his own sibling. Moreover, this interpretation of sibling love as 
sibling incest reinforces an ideology of egotistical selfhood: according to Peter Thorslev, 
James Twitchell, and Alan Richardson, sibling longing symbolizes the male writer’s quest 
                                                
19 Yohei Igarashi, “Keats’s Ways: The Dark Passages of Mediation and Why He Gives Up 
Hyperion,” Studies in Romanticism 53 (Summer 2014): 172. 
20 Naomi Tadmor, Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship, and Patronage 




to incorporate the female as part of his own narcissistic and self-perpetuating “love affair 
with self.”21 Brother-sister near-incest is both exonerated and idealized by these poets 
because, in literary form, it can incarnate the self-obsession that defines the solipsistic 
Romantic project. Yet this tendency to equate sibling love with sibling desire—and thus 
to solidify Freudian readings of these tabooed longings—is unwarranted. 
 What such psychoanalytic readings have omitted are the myriad ways in which 
siblings function in Romantic literature beyond this reductive paradigm. For every 
Byronic Manfred yearning for his Astarte, there are numerous poems imagining the 
affective and psychological allure of sibling groups (not just heterosexual pairings). Such 
portrayals emerge, for instance, in a longing to reconstitute expansive networks that have 
been rent apart by the realities of work, war, and death, such as that in Felicia Hemans’s 
“The Graves of a Household” or Wordsworth’s “We are Seven.” For every forbidden 
love affair between a Laon and Cythna, there are pre-sexual siblings listening attentively 
to family lore, as in Lambs’s “Dream Children: A Revery.” Furthermore, in Romantic 
culture at large, siblinghood functioned as a paradigm not just for intimacy, love, and 
affection, but also for political schemes on a broader scale. While Coleridge and Robert 
Southey hoped that marrying the Fricker sisters would secure a fraternal foundation for 
their utopian Pantisocracy, for instance, larger political movements in both America and 
Europe were launching their own metaphors of siblinghood as the new basis for 
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meritocratic societies. French revolutionaries, for one, leveraged the term “fraternité” in 
order to break with the ancient monarchical governments, in which patriarchal authority 
and the patriarchal family went hand in hand. They imagined themselves banding 
together as a collective of sons overturning the absolute rule of their despotic father.22 As 
Mary Wollstonecraft saw it, part of the problem had been that rank and age interceded 
between family members because patriarchal systems had so favored hierarchies over 
equality. “Property,” she exclaims in A Vindication of the Rights of Men, should be “more 
equally divided amongst all the children of a family,” since no sibling—no eldest male, in 
other words—should be set apart from the others in any manner that would allow him to 
lord it over his kin.23 Her proposed remedy in Rights of Woman is that “to improve both 
sexes they ought, not only in private families, but in public schools, to be educated 
together.”24 They should, in other words, be treated like siblings. Egalitarian ideals of 
brotherhood and sisterhood came to emblematize all that the period’s radical fervor 
espoused. 
* * * 
By examining literary siblinghood in light of these historical and theoretical 
contexts, I aim to uncover the ways in which “sibling logic” was always already shaping 
Romantic literature. In doing so, I propose a departure from the hegemony of theories 
based in binaries, dichotomies, polarities, and rivalries—including sibling rivalry. 
Diverging from platforms that define individualism to be a solipsistic enterprise of 
                                                
22 Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
23 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men with A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. 
Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 23.  




differentiation and alterity, I seek, instead, the ways in which Romantic literature uses 
siblings to present individuality as an ideology of multiples, trans-subjective identities, and 
networked, collective encounters. In doing so, I offer sibling logic as one possible answer 
to the kind of ideological breaks that queer theorists such as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick have 
previously called for. In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick points to how “our most prized 
constructs of individual identity, truth, and knowledge” have been restricted to paradigms 
of contrast and opposition.25 The possibility for thinking outside of these binary 
frameworks—of thinking, for instance, in multiples or in pluralities—remains 
epistemologically inaccessible. By reducing Western culture to discourses of self/other 
paradigms, Sedgwick laments, “every single theoretically and politically interesting 
project of postwar thought has finally had the effect of delegitimating our space for asking 
or thinking in detail about the multiple, unstable ways in which people may be like or 
different from each other” (23). This impulse towards dual categorizations—divisions like 
masculine/feminine, hetero/homo, normative/deviant—obscures other frameworks for 
personal and cultural identification. We are stuck in a world of twos. What would 
happen, then, if we could think in varied ranges of, say, sevens and nines and sixes—or 
infinities? What if we registered, as Sedgwick suggests, that an innumerable number of 
axiomatic relations both connect and distinguish us at any given moment, rather than 
continue to reify the reductive sex-gender system with its simplified binaries of me and 
not-me?  
Without drawing explicit methodological connections to Sedgwick, Engelstein’s 
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“sibling logic” gestures towards such a possibility. With the omission of siblings from 
psychoanalytic theory, Engelstein reflects, “we have lost…a notion of shared subjectivity, 
interconnectedness, similarity in difference, and group belonging outside the stark terms 
of otherness versus introjection.”26 Theories of substitution and replacement, such as 
Freud’s Oedipal complex, have obscured arenas for more complex arrangements of 
interpersonal identifications. But sibling logic could rectify this omission. Sibling logic 
frees us from the constraints of self/other differentiation, for siblings allow us to think in 
multiples—in threes and fours and fives; in combinations of age, gender, and personality; 
in simultaneous communion and competition; in the additions and subtractions and the 
constant evolutions of a horizontal network. By spreading the range of identification 
across spectrums and contingencies rather than reducing difference to mere alterity, 
sibling logic would, in Engelstein’s words, “make possible a politics that discards 
dichotomies in favor of differentials, one that recognizes the subject within networks and 
vice versa” (50). Networks, by definition, resist simplistic reduction to you versus me, self 
versus other, father versus child. Networks, in essence, make possible both the one in the 
many and the many in the one—the sibling in and as the self.  
I would like to suggest, then, that sibling logic not only opens horizons for 
psychoanalytic and queer theory, but that it may also address some of the key heuristic 
conundrums with which Romantic criticism has been grappling. Take, for instance, Anne 
Mellor’s artificial but necessary binary between “masculine” and “feminine” 
romanticisms. Although Mellor herself acknowledged that establishing such a schema 
                                                




would be “theoretically dubious,” it was a necessary first step to recovering the plethora of 
women writers who had long been ignored by scholarship but who nevertheless had 
historically shaped Romantic reading and writing culture. They did so, however, as 
Mellor’s binary proposes, according to a different ethos. Where men favored the 
“development of an autonomous self” via the imagination, women favored a vision of 
community based on “a cooperative rather than possessive interaction” with Nature. 
Masculine Romantics (i.e., the big six male poets) adhered to “oppositional polarity” as 
their founding truth, whereas feminine Romantics drew upon a model “based on 
sympathy and likeness.”27 And although Mellor flagged the limitations of these discursive 
and epistemological distinctions, the self/other, male/female divisions have been 
nonetheless instrumental in informing much subsequent work—even if that work aims to 
invert such gender-based binaries.  
I propose that sibling logic offers a new solution entirely, mediating these two 
spaces of gendered romanticism by helping us to see that the divide was artificial all 
along. Siblinghood, along with sibling logic, dissolves binary thinking altogether. 
Moreover, it potentially combines the self-oriented subjectivity of so-called masculine 
romanticism with the other-oriented features of feminine writing. As a structural 
paradigm, literary siblinghood embodies both. Engelstein suggests such a blending when 
she remarks that the “trans-subjective world” of sibling logic supports “a paradoxical 
cleaving of union and difference” whereby affiliation and foreignness, mirroring and 
variation, exist simultaneously in the space between self and other (42). Self and other are 
                                                




one, but they are also plural. “Sibling love,” she explains, “thus both evokes and revokes 
the narcissism onto which it is so frequently read” (42). Sibling logic sustains the viability 
of understanding the self as a simultaneous rendering of sameness out of otherness and 
otherness out of sameness, interchangeably, thereby undermining any methodological 
classifications that might distinguish one mode of opposition (masculine romanticism) 
from another of sympathy and likeness (feminine romanticism). From the perspective of 
this trans-subjective sibling logic, both male and female Romantic writers may have been 
conceptualizing the “Self” in similar terms to begin with.  
Furthermore, what distinguishes sibling logic from other epistemological and 
psychoanalytic paradigms is not only these variable matrixes of self-other differentials that 
Engelstein illuminates, but rather (or, also), I suggest, the complex complementarities of 
both vertical and horizontal relations that constitute sibling networks. As an archetypal 
model, the sibling network contains an infinite permutation of possible arrangements and 
variations between siblings of different ages, age gaps, genders, personalities, and 
intimacies. As Engelstein explains, lateral differentials position each sibling in a slightly 
unique orientation not only to one another but also to the prior generation of parents to 
which the group belongs. I wish to point out, however, that sibling logic naturally 
contains both of the supposedly exclusive categories of inter-generational and intra-
generational kinship. Sibling logic, in other words, does not only introduce lateral 
thinking. Rather, it embodies both horizontal and vertical orientations. Sibling networks 
orient themselves not only around egalitarian sameness, as equals and peers, but also 




various birth positions. Thus, on the one hand, sibling logic instantiates ways to think 
across a singular generation, shifting our attention to frameworks of interconnectedness 
between and among related kin as well as invoking dispersive spatial metaphors based 
upon such horizontal kinship—spreading, diffusing, and intersecting. But sibling logic 
also includes elements of inter-generational, hierarchical, and vertical paradigms: 
differences in birth order; older siblings who act as pseudo-parents for their youngest kin; 
emotional relationships that involve replacement and competition and rivalry; and, 
ultimately, temporal metaphors of growth and change over time. In such “constellations,” 
as one psychologist names it,28 sibling logic contains features of both vertical and 
horizontal arrangements.  
With this ability to embrace models of both intra- and inter-generationality, as I 
will explore in this project, the logic and kinship of siblinghood intersects with some of the 
largest inquiries informing our current social and literary histories: namely, theories 
regarding certain transformations in paradigms of the family. Some time during the 
course of the eighteenth century, English culture evolved from its medieval patriarchal 
structures towards new, modern models of nuclear households and affectively-bonded 
conjugal families. This transition—along with its precise timing, nature, and effects—has 
been strenuously debated among historians. Stemming from Lawrence Stone’s theory of 
companionate marriage and its concomitant affective individualism,29 such debates have 
contested whether, in fact, there was any definitive break between old family forms and 
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new ones, and, if so, how and when that break may have taken place. Most recently, 
Ruth Perry adopts Stone’s premises to suggest that this “seismic shift” indeed transformed 
British culture from the predominance of one primary kinship set to another: from “the 
axis of kinship based on consanguineal ties or blood lineage” to “an axis based on 
conjugal and affinal ties of the married couple”—from, in other words, the parental home 
to the spousal.30 In her feminist response to Stone, Perry suggests that this transformation 
had adverse effects on women, leaving them struggling to find their place within changing 
systems, unsure of which power structures would provide them the financial, material, 
and emotional support they required. Perry describes the distinction this way: 
In a kinship system based on the conjugal bond, the obligations of spouses to each 
other are stressed above and against their ties of filiation. In a consanguineal 
kinship system, bonds of filiation and siblinghood are stressed above and against 
the conjugal tie. … From the evidence of these [eighteenth-century] novels I 
believe that this shift from a consanguineal to a conjugal system had very different 
consequences for women than for men… Suffice it to say here that it was a mixed 
blessing for women to exchange whatever power and status they had in their 
families of origin for the power and status of women in conjugal families. (2) 
 
The eighteenth-century novel, she explains, dramatized these confusions over where 
women could place their allegiances, whether their home was to be with their fathers or 
with their husbands. Here, however, Perry groups “siblinghood” with filial bonds and the 
consanguineal, biological relations that constitute the parental family. Yet I would argue 
that, more often than not, siblings in Romantic literature serve as testing grounds for 
future marital relationships; they are as closely aligned with the emotions and psychology 
behind the choice of an affinal partner as they are aligned to the memories and 
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experiences associated with the childhood home and the obligations of the paternal, 
lineage clan. As such, siblinghood uniquely mediates between and inhabits both of these 
shifting paradigms, both the consanguineal and the conjugal, thereby generating a space 
where these two competing systems might coexist—and where their incompatibilities 
become, perhaps, even more thoroughly pronounced. 
* * * 
My first chapter, “Queer(ing) Kinship on Stage: Sororal-Fraternal Reproduction 
in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s The Cenci and Joanna Baillie’s De Monfort,” explores two 
Romantic-era verse-dramas that, despite being conceived as closet dramas throughout 
their early reception history, in fact depend actively on visual forms of communication 
and transmission—in other words, on both the performance and materiality of the stage. 
By using these physical registers, I argue, Shelley’s and Baillie’s dramas problematize 
their patriarchal society’s accepted heteronormative systems, including not only 
biological, sexual reproduction but also the linguistic, political, and cultural forms of 
heredity that follow directly from these vertical structures. Placing these maneuvers in the 
context of cultural discourses that relied particularly on visual communication, such as 
physiognomy and phrenology, I suggest that these plays capitalize on the theatricality and 
materiality of observation in order to define new modes of transference between bodies. 
In both plays, the transmission of likeness and mirroring between siblings enables a non-
biological mode of reproduction. Specifically, at the end of both works, a female 
protagonist/sister is given the final words; and, in both, she imagines a new framework 




creates a space for alternative queer kinship that sidesteps the mandates of sexual 
procreation in favor of other forms of bodily reproduction, overturning the procreative 
strictures of marriage and motherhood in favor of sibling—sideways—reproduction.   
Chapter Two, “William Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads and the Spots of Sibling 
Time,” takes up this motif of sibling transference in order to consider the inter-relational 
paradigm of Wordsworth’s fictionalized sibling networks. A combination of vertical and 
horizontal relations shape each network’s constituent parts. Placing Wordsworth’s Lyrical 
Ballads and other contemporaneous poems in a historicized context of late-eighteenth-
century kinship, I suggest that Wordsworth’s poetry invests in a kind of inter-subjectivity 
that informs not only the relationship between and amongst sibling characters but also 
the consciousness of his poetic self-fashioning —a self that depends upon the trans-
subjective consciousness constructed by the sibling network. I examine how sibling bonds 
in, for instance, “We are Seven” reveal essential affective and psychoanalytic connections 
that, regardless of whether siblings are living or dead, must be maintained in a 
constellated family unit. By way of other works such as “The Seven Sisters” and “To My 
Sister,” I turn to “Tintern Abbey,” where, I suggest, we find the fullest ramifications of 
Wordsworth’s sibling logic as structuring a mode of multi-layered queer temporalities.  
After challenging the egotistical sublime of Wordsworth’s poetry, replacing it with 
this multidimensional subjectivity, I move to Jane Austen’s novels, where, I suggest, the 
self-contained “I” of the Bildungsroman is likewise challenged by a sororal framework. 
Chapter Three, “Building the Bildung of Sisterhood in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice and 




sisters undergo a shared, mutual Bildung evolution. Rethinking this genre’s emphasis on 
individual subjectivity, I explore how the sororal relationships between Elinor and 
Marianne Dashwood and Jane and Elizabeth Bennet foster a complementary process of 
education. In performing her natural character traits, each sister models for the other a 
different epistemological approach to the world that the other will eventually adopt, in 
part, as her own behavior changes along with her shifting self-understanding. These 
dynamics lead the protagonists to find balance between oppositional epistemological 
forces—between the extremes of logic and emotion, secrecy and exposure, introversion 
and extroversion. The slow growth of siblinghood—and not the precipitous courtship of 
male suitors—is what shapes these classic texts of female maturation.  
If Austen’s novels exploit the sororal combination of similarities and differences in 
order to forge a middle-way among epistemological extremes, settling upon a hybridity 
and balance between polarities, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein explores the consequences of 
ignoring such sibling complementarity. Tracing the source of homosocial bonds to the 
brother-sister relationships that sit at the heart of each male narrator’s story, I suggest that 
Shelley’s novel critiques one of these narrators, Victor Frankenstein, for his narcissistic 
inability to recognize these inter-relational and dual-gendered dynamics. Ignoring the 
pseudo-sisters in his life—or attempting to convert them into wives—Victor misinterprets 
the nature of non-reproductive human interdependence, thinking instead that he can 
supersede biological bonds with manufactured ones. In contrast, Walton and even the 
creature identify the affective core of brother-sister relations: at the root of these 




Felix De Lacey, lies a mode of sympathetic reciprocity that sustains their emotional, 
material, and psychological needs. Because he cannot understand this dynamic, Victor 
makes the greatest mistake of all: he thinks the creature asks him for a spouse, when in 
reality he asks him for a sister. Though Shelley’s novel demonstrates sibling reciprocity, 
Victor fails to embrace it—but the failure lies uniquely with him. Like Wordsworth, 
Austen, Baillie, and Percy Shelley, Mary Shelley recognizes the integrity of intimate and 
sympathetic sibling reciprocities, and the many possibilities that this brand of lateral 





Queer(ing) Kinship on Stage: Sororal-Fraternal Reproduction in  
Percy Bysshe Shelley’s The Cenci and Joanna Baillie’s De Monfort 
When Percy Bysshe Shelley sent his drama The Cenci back home from Italy, he 
suspected this new work might encounter some resistance. In a letter to Thomas Love 
Peacock, Shelley confessed that his “principal doubt” was “whether any such a thing as 
incest in this shape however treated [would] be admitted on the stage.”1 Featuring a 
scandalous father-daughter rape, The Cenci and its incestuous plotline were rejected by the 
literary reviewers. The Monthly Magazine, for one, recoiled with “sentiments of horror and 
disgust” from a play it deemed “overstepped the bounds of modesty and nature.”2 The 
Literary Gazette questioned whether to acknowledge this “noisome and noxious 
publication,” while The Edinburgh Monthly Review praised Shelley’s literary talent but 
condemned his immorality, declaring: “It is absolutely impossible that any man in his 
sober mind should believe that dwelling upon such scenes of unnatural crime and horror 
can be productive of any good to any one person in the world.” Protesting to Peacock 
that he was merely recording “facts” that were “matter of history,” Shelley was perhaps 
unprepared for these vehement objections. But once Covent Garden refused to perform 
the piece, it would remain obscured from public view for more than a century3—a closet 
drama too dangerous to be on stage, spurned by many as “not an acting drama at all.”4 
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Over the subsequent two centuries, accusations of the play’s moral 
reprehensibility—its “trash, filth, and poison”5—once leveled at Shelley’s not-so “sober 
mind” have been progressively transferred to the character of Count Cenci, who enacts 
the rape, and, ultimately (and with a hint of victim-blaming), to his daughter Beatrice. As 
the unapologetic orchestrator of her father’s murder, Beatrice has been censured by 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century readers alike for her ethically compromised stance. As 
one critic conclusively declares, “By taking what she thought to be the law of God into 
her own hands, she acted as a brave and desperate human being—but she was wrong.”6 
Beatrice’s repeated refusals to speak—to name Cenci’s crime, to express responsibility for 
his murder, to convey any sense of guilt at all—has led her to be castigated as despicably 
immoral. 
Recently, however, Beatrice’s silences have been gradually recuperated in more 
sympathetic terms, understood to be a positive emblem for Shelley’s political message. In 
such readings, her “wrongness” has been refashioned as critics begin imagining Beatrice 
to be the victim of religious, legal, and sexual forces.7 Her suffering reflects Shelley’s 
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atheistic disdain for his repressive patriarchal culture, validating her horrific actions by 
manifesting the stakes of such systemic institutional oppression. She has no option but to 
murder. As Sean Dempsey puts it, Shelley uses the dire situation of The Cenci to show his 
countrymen a mirror of their own ignorant “blockages”: 
Her refusal to take responsibility for her actions and her stubborn unwillingness to 
break from a social framework that has proven itself false is presented as a 
challenge to the audience’s own refusal to wake up from the subliminal ‘impulse’ 
that keeps them enslaved to the matrix of a discredited social framework.8 
 
Ashamed of his society’s shortcomings, Shelley dramatizes the drastic repercussions of 
silencing women and accepting the rule of a tyrant—a resonance perhaps not lost on his 
twenty-first-century readers.  
 While such scholarship has expanded the ethical import of Beatrice’s silences, I 
argue that Beatrice does in fact “speak” in several ways that these readings have 
overlooked: namely, in the non-verbal registers of bodily performance, visible disabilities, 
and non-reproductive reproduction—what I term “fraternal reproduction.” In a play 
centered on threats of father-daughter incest, Beatrice overcomes this familial trauma to 
engage with her brother in a way that restores order and sanity to their lives. She invokes 
her brother’s likeness as a means by which her own legacy might be continued, using 
their sibling relationship to bring about material continuity without the need for sexual, 
biological reproduction. With this phenomenon of fraternal-sororal transmission, Beatrice 
hands her legacy to her brother, fostering a paradigm of reproductive kinship that relies 
not on procreation or on linear generational progression but, rather, on physical modes of 
reflection between brother and sister in the present moment. This transmission enables 
                                                




Beatrice to conclude her life, and Shelley’s play, with a uniquely queer version of kinship: 
a non-normative, non-reproductive possibility for familial continuity and a propagation of 
the self.  
This fraternal reproduction counteracts Beatrice’s otherwise immoral deeds by 
offering a recuperative and reparative vision of hope. She overturns her father’s malicious 
methods of destruction and ethically redeems herself for less admirable acts. In this way, 
Cenci’s vicious rape—a “sad reality” perpetrated by one who “do[es] and think[s] 
evil”9—opens narrative space for alternative modes of kinship. Although the Count’s 
incestuous violence is a destructive signifier in itself, the rape introduces The Cenci’s 
interest in confronting normative cultural systems of reproduction, heredity, and 
heterosexuality. In the wake of this tabooed encounter, both Count Cenci and Beatrice 
leverage its results to imagine new realities. Beatrice’s recuperative vision clashes with her 
father’s anti-normative stance: while his brand of anti-familial and anti-social queerness 
seeks to overturn the kind of progressive futurity that is inherently enfolded within 
patriarchal systems, Beatrice similarly resists patrilineal inheritance—but she does so by 
operating without a bodily invasion of the other. Thus where Cenci disrupts his own 
lineage by destroying his male line and pursuing an inverted impregnation of his 
daughter, Beatrice, far more productively, invests her future in her brother without 
altering his physical wholeness. Beatrice’s reparative mode thus generates a new 
inheritance scheme out of lateral lines of transference—a queer futurity that embodies not 
destruction or perversion but creation: not in the child, but in the sibling.  
                                                
9 Shelley, “Dedication” to Leigh Hunt for The Cenci, in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, eds. Donald H. 




I. No Future: Count Cenci and the Death Drive 
By rejecting her father’s verbal discourse in favor of material and fraternal-sororal 
forms of communication, Beatrice Cenci introduces a “reparative” queerness—to borrow 
that term from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick—that embraces the physical, the bodily, the 
performed, and the visible. In Touching Feeling, Sedgwick offers “reparative reading” as an 
alternative to the tendency of literary criticism to favor a “hermeneutics of suspicion” and 
paranoid analytical practices. This reparative mode, she suggests, advances instead an 
epistemology of positive, generous, and creative critical maneuvers, rejecting those 
motivated by negative deconstruction—and destruction.10 In an almost parallel vein, 
Beatrice resists her father’s antisocial negativity—a particular brand of queerness that we 
might align more closely with Lee Edelman’s “sinthomosexuality,” to which I will return 
shortly. Within a reparative move, Beatrice sidesteps the mechanisms of conventional 
reproduction—both linguistic and biological—in order to replace the patrilineal order of 
her father with something far more enduring. In doing so, Beatrice espouses an affective 
commitment to positive reconstruction previously unimaginable in her father’s ethically 
binary—and biologically reproductive—world.  
In order for Beatrice’s material voices to, well, materialize, she must overturn the 
kind of anti-familial, anti-normative, and anti-social queerness that leads her father, 
Count Cenci, to desire the termination of his patrilineal family. As we learn from the 
play’s opening act, Count Cenci yearns to eliminate his male progeny and his current 
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(second) wife. The play begins with a dinner party held to celebrate the recent deaths of 
his two eldest sons, which Cenci believes his own prayers have actualized. This happy 
coincidence is, for Cenci, “a most desired event,” since these “disobedient and rebellious 
sons” will now need no more “food or raiment.”11 Ecstatic at no longer having to provide 
resources for these would-be inheritors, Cenci exclaims to his audience, “Rejoice with 
me, my heart is wondrous glad” (I.iii.50). While his guests—and perhaps even Shelley’s 
reader—doubt that this glorifying of his sons’ deaths could actually be the stimulus for the 
banquet, Cenci has already affirmed this truth, quite excitedly, prior to hosting the event. 
Before the dinner, he informs his servant Camillo that he had indeed prayed for God to 
enact this outcome, to “send some quick death upon them,” these “cursed sons,” and 
that, moreover, his remaining living kin, his wife Lucretia and son Bernardo, “could not 
be worse / If dead and damned” along with them (I.i.134, 130, 135-6). Cenci looks 
forward to ending his male line, even though his audience resists believing it. 
Desiring the annihilation of his reproductive clan, Count Cenci engages—and 
complicates—what queer theorist Lee Edelman brands “sinthomosexuality.” In No Future: 
Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Edelman presents this radical queer position as a means by 
which to oppose normative paradigms of cultural progression via the homosexual 
resistance to biological reproduction as a given social good. As a structural position of 
anti-social negativity, the sinthomosexual employs a destructive death drive to resist 
heteronormativity’s adherence to what Edelman terms “reproductive futurity” and its 
affiliation with politics qua politics: “this neologism,” Edelman suggests, “would assert 
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itself instead against futurity, against its propagation, insofar as it would designate an 
impasse in the passage to the future and, by doing so, would pass beyond, pass through, the 
saving fantasy futurity denotes.”12 In other words, sinthomosexuality combats the 
assumption that a future must take place at all. Instead, such antisocial queerness “names 
the side of those not ‘fighting for the children,’ the side outside the consensus by which all 
politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (3). Not fighting for the 
children means not assuming children must be birthed for social progress to be made. 
For Edelman, this sinthomosexuality can be a positive and affirmative mode: it 
retains an essential radicalism embodied by “queer” in its purest form, sustaining a 
necessary ideological contradiction to the normative and forward-moving impetus of 
Western culture. By abandoning reproductive futurity, we might imagine a better world 
for the now, rather than just for the unknown and unnamed future inhabited by our as-
yet-unconceived children. In light of today’s current movements to normalize same-sex 
marriage and the like, Edelman embraces anti-normativity to retain homosexuality’s 
originating resistance to the social impetus to reproduce—thus ensuring cultural legibility 
for those who have been written out of the heteronormative story. Sinthomosexuality 
resists creating a future for the figurative child upon which our hegemonic systems rest: 
the Child as emblem of a basic social value in progressive improvement for later days. 
As Shelley’s Cenci destroys his patrilineal and political futures, he is certainly not 
fighting for the children. But whereas Edelman celebrates the subversive nature of this 
antisocial radicalism, Shelley renders this queerness at a disturbing extreme, blending 
                                                





Cenci’s otherwise potentially fruitful desire to oppose normative kinship systems—he 
does, after all, successfully disconnect political futurity from its dependence on biological 
reproduction—with a much more destructive personal modus operandi; his malicious and 
murderous nature do not make him a fair representative of radical queerness. 
Nevertheless, Edelman’s theory of antisocial negativity may help us to register the impact 
of Cenci’s position, since both the historical and fictional versions of this disruptive Count 
attempt to abort his male inheritors—and with them his political futures. 
In Mary Shelley’s translation of the Cenci legend, “Relation of the Death of the 
Family of the Cenci,”13 the historical tale of Francesco Cenci fashions him as a sexual 
deviant. On the surface, he engaged in conventional heterosexual conjugality. He first 
married “an exceedingly rich lady who died after she had given birth to seven 
unfortunate children,” and then wedded Lucretia, “a lady of a noble Roman family but 
[having] no children by her.”14 Following this information, Mary assigns the underlying 
cause of Cenci’s “most wicked life” to his veiled homosexuality (174). “[S]odomy was the 
least and Atheism the greatest, of the vices of Francesco as is proved by the tenor of his 
life,” Mary records, “For he was three times accused of Sodomy and paid the sum of 
100,000 crowns to government in commutation of the punishment rightfully awarded to 
this crime” (175). Though the “Relation” does not document the specific punishments the 
Count endured, Mary does note that Cenci underwent at minimum a “third 
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imprisonment…for his accustomed crime of Sodomy” during the time that his eldest sons 
were banished from his home (175).  
Percy Shelley’s play alludes to these sexual crimes from the moment Cenci first 
walks onstage—disturbingly, crimes that are tied up with murder and bribery. As Camillo 
initiates the play’s dialogue, he informs Cenci that the “matter of the murder” will remain 
quiet as long as Cenci continues to pay off the Pope and his associates. This most recent 
occurrence, Camillo notes, merely extends a prior stream of “crimes like yours” (I.i.7) and 
“hideous…deeds” (13) for which Cenci has already purchased “impunity” (6), saving 
himself from both earthly punishment and everlasting damnation by “[e]nrich[ing] the 
Church” (8) with his “gold” (6). While Camillo, as a voice of moral rectitude, attempts to 
admonish Cenci for these horrendous acts, the Count commends himself for yet another 
victory, readily giving away a “third of [his] possessions” so that it can be “compounded,” 
i.e., settled with the Pope’s “nephew” (illegitimate child) so that Cenci is not legally 
prosecuted for said crimes. Like the historical Francesco Cenci, Percy Shelley’s Count 
pays a large sum of money in order to avoid his due punishment—though, on the surface, 
the drama masks these alleged crimes as murder rather than sodomy.  
As with these commuted crimes, the Count’s despicable hatred of his sons also 
stems from the historical Francesco. In the “Relation,” Mary records, “nothing would 
exceed his pleasure if all his children died and that when the grave should receive the last 
he would as a demonstration of joy make a bonfire of all that he possessed” (183). Along 
with the end of his family line, Francesco orchestrates the demise of his own rule, 




commodities, those remnants of his political powers. With his children die his reign. 
Francesco had even prepared a small chapel on his property for this very purpose: “his 
intention in so doing was to bury there all his children whom he cruelly hated” (177). 
Thus in both Mary’s translation and in Shelley’s dramatic invention, Francesco Cenci 
appears not only to have despised his own progeny but also to have yearned for—and 
planned for—their deaths. This murderous impulse mingles, disturbingly, with his 
penchant for defying the normative cultural constructs that uphold his political reign. 
Cenci’s homicidal desires contradict heteronormative culture’s dependence upon 
the figurative and literal Child. As Edelman posits, the symbolic Child represents the 
inevitable future towards which we constantly march, a fantasy that frames what is and is 
not legible in the realm of “political discourse as such.” The fantasy of the child, in other 
words, “render[s] unthinkable…a queer resistance to this organizing principle of 
communal relations” (2). Culture, kinship, politics—all of these rely upon the notion that 
we will propagate and prosper, that we will birth children and thus birth a future, and so 
the sinthomosexual exists outside this system entirely in order to contest it and make other 
possibilities legible. We need to be disabused of the myth of reproductive progression, 
Edelman urges; we need the sinthome as a symbolic alternate. 
In Shelley’s drama, Count Cenci revels in the antagonistic space of the sinthome, 
rejecting the futurity of a reproductive sexuality and embracing the Lacanian jouissance 
that Edelman suggests characterizes such a radical and deviant queerness. Cenci does not 
act according to heteronormative suppositions that “the body politic must survive” at all 




family unit and the political futures that they represent, as he declares proudly, 
contrasting himself to other men: 
All men delight in sensual luxury, 
All men enjoy revenge; and most exult  
Over the tortures they can never feel— 
Flattering their secret peace with others’ pain. 
But I delight in nothing else. I love 
The sight of agony, and the sense of joy,  
When this shall be another’s, and that mine.  
And I have no remorse and little fear,  
Which are, I think, the checks of other men. (I.i.77-85) 
In true Iago-like fashion, the villainous Cenci relishes his monomaniacal commitment to 
pure evil, exulting in the pain and terror that he inflicts upon others. He delights in 
nothing else. Cenci’s “embrace of queer negativity,” to invoke Edelman’s language once 
again, has “no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social 
value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus 
in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself” (6). Cenci’s desires carry no 
justification other than pure delight, without any aim towards a positive social good: they 
are simply self-pleasing. “I please my senses as I list,” he announces (I.i.69); “[a]ny design 
my captious fancy makes / The picture of its wish…Is as my natural food and rest 
debarred / Until it can be accomplished” (87-90). Cenci pursues the suffering of others 
for the simple reason that it brings him great joy. According to Edelman, “the sinthome, 
in its refusal of meaning, procures the determining relation to enjoyment by which the 
subject finds itself driven beyond the logic of fantasy or desire” (35). Cenci will never be 
satiated, for his appetites for destruction are unquenchable, beyond the logic or fantasy of 




This joyous resistance to the social good is what makes Cenci incomprehensible to 
his subjects and friends and illegible to his heteronormative audience. We witness this 
confusion when, for instance, the play’s opening scene juxtaposes Cenci’s revelatory glee 
against Camillo’s cautionary disbelief. Camillo reinforces what should be Cenci’s properly 
ordered relation to this family: “Your children should be sitting round you now… Where 
is your wife? Where is your gentle daughter?” (I.i.39-43). Camillo imagines Cenci as the 
paternal center of an idyllic family portrait. Moreover, Camillo cannot believe that Cenci 
does not find misery in his hunt for unadulterated evil: “I thank my God that I believe 
you not,” he exhales to deaf ears (I.i.120). And yet, believe him he inevitably must, for 
Cenci will continue his crusade on behalf of death and destruction.  
Cenci defies such incredulity when he perpetuates this morbid celebration, 
positioning himself as a proud father—but one whose pride stems from his sons’ deaths: 
It is indeed a most desired event. 
If, when a parent from a parent’s heart 
Lifts from this earth to the great father of all 
A prayer, both when he lays him down to sleep, 
And when he rises up from dreaming it; 
One supplication, one desire, one hope, 
That he would grant a wish for his two sons  
Even all that he demands in their regard— 
And suddenly beyond his dearest hope, 
It is accomplished, he should then rejoice, 
And call his friends and kinsmen to a feast,  
And task their love to grace his merriment, 
Then honour me thus far—for I am he. (I.iii.21-33) 
To everyone’s horror, Cenci parades his filicide in public. Quite ominously, he invokes a 
symbolic image of a father praying to the “great father” of heaven, morning and night, 




prayer—“[o]ne supplication, one desire, one hope”—for their deaths. With such 
sacrilege, Cenci calls upon his subjects to condone his actions by inviting them to 
“rejoice” and “feast” with “merriment.” Cenci celebrates what horrifies others.  
Cenci’s death drive is thus indiscernible to his attendees. His dinner guests refuse 
to believe that the sons’ deaths could truly be the reason for Cenci’s exuberance. The 
First Guest reacts to Cenci’s statements with jovial indifference: “In truth, my Lord, you 
seem too light of heart, / Too sprightly and companionable a man, / To act the deeds 
that rumor pins on you” (I.iii.14-16). Cenci’s demeanor cannot be reconciled with the 
Guest’s instinctive—heteronormative—worldview. Even once Cenci’s motives become 
more clear, his guests still linger in denial: “No, stay!” the third guest implores, “I do 
believe it is some jest; though faith! / ‘Tis mocking us somewhat too solemnly. / I think 
his son has married the Infanta, / Or found a mine of gold in El Dorado” (I.iii.70-74). 
Surely Cenci’s laudatory claims cannot be genuine, his guests surmise. Such malicious 
negativity is, for them, inscrutable, and they assume that Cenci must be preparing them 
to celebrate a marriage or a discovery of riches—certainly not death. They seek a reason 
for merriment more suitable within their reproductive culture, for Cenci’s aversion to 
kinship is rendered unthinkable. By killing off his children, or at least praying for their 
deaths, Cenci “names what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: 
the negativity opposed to every form of social viability” (Edelman 9).  
But while his filial death drive corrupts patrilineage, Count Cenci’s most 
disturbing move of all is to manipulate heterosexual reproduction to his own deviant 




imagines producing a future offspring in his daughter’s womb by the means of incestuous 
rape. This rape represents for Cenci a further corruption of normative linear hierarchies. 
Cenci considers defiling his daughter by impregnating her as retribution for her 
resistance, aiming at destroying all forms of normative kinship by having Beatrice 
conceive a progeny that will bear the imprints of his perverse desires. Cenci’s curse on 
Beatrice undermines conventional paradigms: 
[I]f she ever have a child; and thou, 
Quick Nature! I adjure thee by thy God, 
That thou be fruitful in her, and encrease 
And multiply, fulfilling his command, 
And my deep imprecation! May it be  
A hideous likeness of herself, that as  
From a distorting mirror, she may see  
Her image mixed with what she most abhors,   
Smiling upon her from her nursing breast. (IV.i.141-149) 
Cenci’s threat breeches the sexual impasse that should exist between himself and his 
daughter, and he uses this tabooed encounter to debase any prospective biological issue. 
Cenci would produce, both metaphorically and literally, a “mirror” that forever reminds 
Beatrice of her violator by resembling both of them in a tainted admixture of kinship 
connections: it would be both son and brother to its mother; both son and grandson to its 
father. This collapsing of kinship distinctions turns generations backwards and inwards 
upon themselves, obliterating the kind of reproductive futurity that, according to 
Edelman, underlies heteronormative politics. For Count Cenci, his vision of this future 
child culminates his mission: it disrupts normative lineage and blocks all generational 
progression. In Shelley’s vision, however, this mission is problematically tied up with 




II. Touching Feeling: Beatrice’s Sororal Transmission 
While Cenci embodies a problematically destructive brand of radical anti-
normative queerness, Shelley redeems the play’s ethical center with Beatrice: Cenci’s 
brand of queerness is not the one that succeeds. Indeed, the two characters’ contrasting 
relationships to anti-normativity illuminate the sort of ideological conflicts for which 
queer theory itself has come under scrutiny in recent times.15 Over the past few years, 
scholars have begun to re-examine queer theory’s commitments to anti-normativity, 
questioning how this theoretical methodology might continue to function today in the 
crosshairs between “queer” as an anti-social radicalism and “queer” as a real-life human 
rights movement through which LGBTQ individuals have been able to adopt 
mainstream heteronormative practices such as marriage and child-bearing. For queer 
theorists like Edelman, the annihilation of futurity defines queerness as an essential 
opposition to these fundamental normative practices. But with non-heterosexual 
parenting and alternative familiy construction now becoming legal, binding the ideology 
of queerness to a rejection of social norms has become increasingly problematic. As 
meanings for the term “queer” proliferate today, so too does Shelley’s The Cenci offer us 
competing examples of anti-heteronormativity.  
Count Cenci’s daughter Beatrice represents an anti-reproductive modality 
resembling that of her father, but her version of queer kinship proves to be reparative 
rather than destructively paranoid. While Count Cenci concocts a cursed progeny to be a 
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mirror image of himself and Beatrice, in the crucial final moments of the play Beatrice 
and her brother Bernardo re-appropriate this blasphemous metaphor. Instead of giving 
literal birth to the mirror-image with which Cenci curses her, Beatrice gives figurative 
birth to a different kind of mirroring: her own image as reflected in her brother. In a 
gesture of fraternal-sororal reproduction, Beatrice reconceives her future without the 
literal body of a child—but also without the destructive death drive of her father. 
Rebuking the sinthomosexual antagonism of Cenci, while simultaneously abdicating the 
normative compulsion to reproduce an heir from her own material body, Beatrice 
generates a queer form of non-reproductive reproduction that takes place through this 
sibling exchange, a sororal transmission of her future to her brother. Beatrice’s new 
orientation of kinship acts as a counterpoint to the kind of generational inbreeding 
imagined by her father, offering a reparative act to restore order after Cenci’s anti-social 
reign.  
Faced with her impending execution, Beatrice uses the penultimate speech of her 
life (and of the play) to turn over her legacy to her brother Bernardo—a speech that, 
importantly, emphasizes material mirroring and physical appearances as a means by 
which to preserve the individual through a sibling union. Her leave-taking follows:  
Farewell, my tender brother. Think 
Of our sad fate with gentleness, as now; 
And let mild, pitying thoughts lighten for thee 
Thy sorrow’s load. Err not in harsh despair, 
But tears and patience. One thing more, my child, 
For thine own sake be constant to the love 
Thou bearest us; and to the faith that I, 
Though wrapt in a strange cloud of crime and shame, 
Lived ever holy and unstained. And though  




Be as a mark stamped on thine innocent brow 
For men to point at as they pass, do thou 
Forbear, and never think a thought unkind 
Of those, who perhaps love thee in their graves. 
So mayest thou die as I do; fear and pain 
Being subdued. Farewell! Farewell! Farewell! (V.iv.141-156) 
Beatrice bids her younger brother adieu by asking him to preserve memories of her “fate” 
with gentleness, mildness, pity, and patience—he should not, in other words, in future 
years when he no more can hear her voice, wallow in sorrow, but, instead, should assuage 
his grief by recalling how Beatrice, now, in this present moment, conveyed ease and calm 
as she courageously approached death. She solicits Bernardo to carry on her lineage by 
representing her family throughout the region. He will do so, she reflects, through his 
own physical portrayal of that family—by literally re-presenting it: he cannot help wearing 
the clan’s physiognomy and carrying on the family name and history, after all, since it is 
inscribed upon his own face and body, as a “mark” stamped irrevocably on his “brow.” 
Beatrice implores him to wear this image proudly, retaining his affective connections to 
what will soon be his deceased kin. She fashions Bernardo’s body into a surrogate 
progeny that will enable her life to endure well after her death. 
This transposition takes place in two stages. At first, Beatrice speaks to Bernardo 
as her sibling and equal; then, phrased almost as an afterthought, Beatrice appends, “One 
thing more, my child” (145). With this second rhetorical plea, Beatrice strategically alters 
her address from “my tender brother” to “my child,” a pivotal segue in which Beatrice 
surreptitiously transfers Bernardo from one kinship structure to another, converting her 
fraternal and intra-generational siblinghood into one of inter-generational relations. Their 




rhetorical shift seems to position Beatrice in a new affective hierarchy with Bernardo. No 
longer seeing him as her brother, a lateral member of her kin and an equal, she adopts 
what might be considered condescending diction in order to reframe his position beneath 
her, as an inheritor of herself, as secondary on the generational chain of their hereditary 
familial system. Beatrice’s impulse to mark their relationship in this new language, 
however, coincides with another shift, what amounts to a momentary move in 
temporalities. While her speech to Bernardo lingers in a future rooted in her instructive, 
imperative tense (“Think…And let…Err not…Forbear”), when she speaks to him as “my 
child” she imagines, for a brief moment, a future tense comingled with reflections on the 
present and past: “I, / Though wrapt in a strange cloud of crime and shame / Lived ever 
holy and unstained.” With this vivid image of present-ness Beatrice attempts to 
memorialize herself, lending Bernardo a final portrait of her (“holy and unstained,” with 
“fear and pain / Being subdued”) that he can carry forward into his future memory, a 
future-anteriority that she herself will never experience—such a moment as the one we 
will see, in Chapter Two, being painted by William Wordsworth at the close of “Tintern 
Abbey,” when the poet makes a gift of his present self for Dorothy’s future memory and 
memorialization. 
Like Wordsworth with his sister, Beatrice proposes that Bernardo, her likeness, 
carry forward her legacy, not only in his mind but also in the material world. She 
reinforces the pseudo-reproductive nature of this transposition when she comingles the 
rhetoric of reflection with that of pregnancy: speaking to Bernardo of the love he “bear[s] 




dual tasks. Not only will he bear the burden of the Cenci name and body, but he will also 
give birth to it anew. Beatrice emphasizes the future, and its coinciding rhetoric of child-
bearing, to re-articulate her own yearning for an enduring incarnation of herself. This 
image need not be reproduced physically out of her material body as a byproduct of 
heterosexual union—a biological child of her own—but rather as a material reproduction 
of sibling transference, a new kind of generativity altogether.  
In his own final speeches, Bernardo highlights the reflexive quality of this sibling 
transference. He reworks the imagery of mirrors from Cenci’s earlier curse into a 
reparative construction of sibling unification. In an expression of love for his sister, the 
younger brother laments that he cannot stand “[t]o see / That perfect mirror of pure 
innocence / Wherein I gazed, and grew happy and good, / Shivered to dust!” (V.iv.129-
132). Beatrice has been the mirror through which Bernardo has come to recognize and 
define his own self and being, and Bernardo can barely move now for fright of his sister’s 
impending absence. In effect, this metaphorical and literalized mirroring—the shared 
resemblance between them—is what will enable him to prolong her life in a way no one 
else can. Only a sibling can be “that perfect mirror.”  
Imagining this mirroring in even more concrete terms, Beatrice not only requests 
that Bernardo should recall his sister and stepmother with cognitive and emotional 
fondness—to “[t]hink” on his family and “be constant” to their love hereafter—but also 
reminds him that he embodies the visual signifier of their connection: Bernardo wears 
their “common name” “as a mark stamped on [his] innocent brow.” So apparent is this 




Physically resembling Beatrice in this manner, Bernardo becomes the figurative and even 
literal child that she never had, generating a reproduced version of Beatrice through 
resemblance rather than through sexual reproduction. Beatrice delivers neither a 
reproduction of the body nor one of language: she does not ask Bernardo to tell the story 
of her family, after all, but to wear it. Instead, Beatrice’s bodies of transmission spawn 
new modes of material signification altogether.  
Bernardo’s ability to engender Beatrice’s image—and, as a result, her future—
emerges specifically through this bodily physiognomy. Yet such externalized projections 
are subject exclusively to observation and interpretation by others. Thus Bernardo retains 
little agency over perceptions of his “brow” and, thereby, his and his sister’s character. 
With this lack of authoritative control over the reception of Bernardo’s image and her 
own, it may seem odd that Beatrice would turn to this material method in order to defend 
her honor. For Beatrice, however, performed, physical, and bodily narratives have 
already become her lingua franca. Early in the play, Beatrice must come to terms with the 
ineffectiveness of words and political discourse, the signifying systems of her father and 
the patriarchal reign that have failed her. Beatrice abdicates these discursive schemes in 
favor of her own performative means of communication. This agentic voice emerges not, 
as other critics have suggested, in Beatrice’s silences and repressed verbal utterances, but 
rather, I suggest, in her bodily performance, which communicates specifically to an 
intimate and familial audience.  
The material replaces the verbal when the language of the patriarchy proves 




Acts II and III, Beatrice is outspoken about her father’s wrongs,” Colleen Fenno notes, 
“but following the offence…she begins Act III unable to directly explain herself.”16 In 
fact, Beatrice’s outspokenness is what drew her father’s ire. During Act I, as Count 
Cenci’s guests depart from the banquet, Beatrice beseeches them not to go, not to ignore 
the “tyranny, and impious hate” that has been unfolding before their very eyes (I.iii.100). 
Her speech implores them to empathize with her own fate, asking them to imagine 
themselves in her position, as if they were, indeed, communal members of the same race: 
“What, if we, / The desolate and the dead, were his own flesh, / His children and his 
wife, whom he is bound / To love and shelter?” (I.iii.103-106). Invoking this sympathetic 
resonance as Cenci’s long-suffering kin, Beatrice uses her rhetorical flourishes to solicit 
their support. Yet this verbal effort fails and Cenci becomes enraged. He threatens his 
dinner attendees, using similar appeals to kinship status—“I hope my good friends here / 
Will think of their own daughters—or perhaps / Of their own throats—before they lend 
an ear / To this wild girl” (129-132)—and then turns to Beatrice with equal bile, 
threatening, “Retire to your chamber, insolent girl!” (145). In this first act of Shelley’s 
play, Beatrice still believes in the power of rhetoric to bring about change; shortly 
thereafter, she will abandon this strategy for material means of expression, since Cenci’s 
patriarchal language serves not her needs. 
After the alleged rape between Acts II and III, Beatrice struggles to put words to 
deeds. Her increasing instability is conveyed through broken speech patterns, 
exclamations, confused questions, and hesitant pauses—linguistic slippages that reveal her 
                                                




destabilized state. Words do not suffice, however, to express the horror that has been 
experienced, and she announces this insufficiency directly: “If I try to speak / I shall go 
mad” (84-85); “What are the words which you would have me speak? (107); “Of all 
words, / That minister to mortal intercourse, / Which wouldst thou hear? For there is 
none to tell / My misery” (111-114). Beatrice recognizes her own instability and attempts 
to cease this linguistic confusion: “I have talked some wild words, but will no more” (66). 
Despite knowing that her mother and Orsino desire to understand her predicament, she 
refuses to translate events into words: “Ask me not what it is, for there are deeds / Which 
have no form, sufferings which have no tongue” (141-142). Beatrice speaks again and 
again about her inability to speak, thus depriving her verbal communication of its 
communicative force. She depletes words of their capacity for reference, portraying, as 
Fenno suggests, the impossibility of “remembering and giving voice” to sexual violation.17  
While Fenno and others point, justifiably, to how Beatrice’s verbal incapacities, 
her “fragmented and metaphoric manner,” reflect her increasing inability to “verbalize 
her experience” of trauma,18 I suggest that Beatrice’s disability in fact becomes the 
compensatory means by which she achieves affirmative communication. Although 
Beatrice becomes unintelligible, even silent, she achieves communication by privileging 
the material over the verbal. Letting go of linguistic signification, Beatrice refuses 
famously to repeat that “one word,” “one little word” of Count Cenci’s that threatens to 
destroy her (II.i.63), declaring that “the thing that I have suffered” (III.i.88) will remain 
“without a name” (116). As she does so, Beatrice consciously rejects the kind of discursive 
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exploitation that, as Michel Foucault reminds us, would result from being compelled to 
speak of one’s sexual deeds for a public, and judging, audience.19 Opting out of such a 
repeated violation against her own fragile body, Beatrice embodies rather than verbalizes 
her meaning.  
After the rape, situated within her domestic space and with her family as witness, 
Beatrice conveys her message through visible disabilities, translating her defiance into 
bodily performance. When she comes onstage, Shelley’s stage directions instruct the 
actress to enter “staggering”; as the scene unfolds, she should at first “speak wildly,” then 
“more wildly,” then “franticly,” then “doubtfully.” Beatrice’s stepmother Lucretia 
translates Beatrice’s changed demeanor. She compares Beatrice’s historical patterns with 
her present manifestation, determining that “Thou art unlike thyself; thine eyes shoot 
forth / A wandering and strange spirit” (III.i.81-82). Beatrice’s physical appearance 
continues to fall apart: her hair comes undone; her eyes are full of blood; she sees the 
walls spinning and imagines a black mist dissolving her flesh. As Beatrice’s visceral 
performance portrays her suffering, Lucretia registers the change, but this “strange spirit” 
appears legible only to the woman who knows Beatrice best, who can tell that she is now, 
indeed, quite “unlike” her prior self. As she begins to adopt bodily communication, this 
interpretive act requires an intimate relationship between the observer and the observed, 
an audience for her visible display. 
Lucretia recognizes these alterations specifically through Beatrice’s changing 
physiognomy: “My sweet child, / You have no wound; ’tis only a cold dew / That starts 
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from your dear brow” (III.i.3-5). Emphasizing Beatrice’s brow, Lucretia corrects her 
daughter’s exaggerated complaint that her “brain is hurt” (1). Beatrice marks her 
damaged internal state as a pain in her mind, which her stepmother interprets in physical, 
outward manifestations. This metaphorical connection between brain and brow echoes 
what later, in the final sibling interaction of Shelley’s play, will become an essential 
signifier of family character, as we have already seen—that mark which Bernardo wears 
upon his brow of the eternal family resemblance. As with Bernardo’s infamous “mark,” 
which will be recognized by the townspeople around him, Beatrice’s brow and body 
communicate by finding a recipient who can register, observe, and interpret that material 
element as it reflects Beatrice’s affected interiority. In this domestic environment, the girl’s 
embodied performance signifies for those who know how to interpret it properly—a 
private, rather than public, audience.  
III. The Materiality of Performance 
As the receiver of Beatrice’s material performance, Lucretia plays the role of 
interpretive viewer, acting in turn as surrogate for us, the play’s audience members, who 
similarly observe the performance unfolding on stage. Far from being mental theater or 
closet drama, then, The Cenci relies upon elements of enacted performativity. The visual 
interchange between observer and observed—between Lucretia and Beatrice or between 
audience and actors—structures an important shift in signification out of which Beatrice’s 
sororal-fraternal reproduction can emerge: material mirroring that replaces biological 
and linguistic modes of meaning.  




discourse that was rapidly becoming embedded in popular consciousness. During the 
early nineteenth century, the burgeoning and complementary studies of physiognomy, 
pathognomy, and phrenology theorized ways in which to read the human figure, turning 
the formerly impenetrable surface of the body into something more legible. An outside 
observer, scientists conjectured, could indeed read another person’s physical appearance 
in order to discern that other’s internal and mental constitution. Faces and bodies were 
thus becoming seen as devices of communication. German physiognomist Johann Caspar 
Lavater, for one, claimed this visually-oriented field to be “the proper study of man.”20 
Since “[a]ll the knowledge we can obtain of man must be gained through the medium of 
our senses” (7), Lavater suggests, the empirical study of externalized countenance was the 
most adequate system for interpreting human character. Conflating internal and external 
worlds, Lavater argues that the “invisible contents” of a person’s makeup can be detected 
through his “visible superficies” (11): “The eye, the look, the cheeks, the mouth, the 
forehead…whatever is understood by physiognomy, are the most expressive, the most 
convincing picture of interior sensation, desires, passions, will” (8-9). While the related 
pseudo-science of pathognomy traced ephemeral facial movements and expressions as 
signs of changing internal moods, phrenology focused on the unchanging bone structures 
of the skull. In Elements of Phrenology (1824), George Combe describes this methodical 
practice as an analysis of “the cranium” via “anatomical and metaphysical modes of 
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research” to discern the “form of the brain” and its “manifestations of mental power.”21 
In all of these interconnected studies, details of the human face and head were believed to 
register features of the personality inside: the ghost that could be read both in and 
through the shell. Quite literally, the visible “brow” was to be analyzed in order to 
understand the invisible “brain” underneath. 
Together, these related pseudo-sciences of physiognomy, pathognomy, and 
phrenology turned facial appearances, expressions, and cranial measurements, 
respectively, into interpretive tools. Whether one was reading the work of these 
physiognomists directly or not, their ideas infiltrated the cultural zeitgeist. As John 
Graham observes, Lavater’s essays were so frequently “reprinted, abridged, summarized, 
pirated, quoted, parodied, imitated, and reviewed”—with at least 55 editions appearing 
in more than seven languages between 1772 and 1810—that any educated person would 
have been, at the very least, familiar with his widely-circulating theories.22 In the Godwin-
Shelley family, this familiarity went beyond a mere acquaintance. Mary Wollstonecraft 
wrote a shortened translation of Lavater’s Essays in 1788, and William Godwin would 
later claim, in his Thoughts on Man (1831), that “nothing can be more certain than that 
there is a science of physiognomy.”23 Godwin believed in the discipline so much that, 
upon the birth of Mary Godwin (later Shelley) in 1797, he employed a student of Lavater 
to “write up a lengthy report on the significance of the infant’s features.”24  
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Physiognomy turned the human figure into a legible material object—thus 
Beatrice’s faith in the visual realm and its capacity for communication finds its foundation 
in this broader discourse. In kind, physiognomy supported the notion that all of us are 
equally, and naturally, equipped to act as interpretive analyzers: “Man endowed with 
these faculties,” Lavater writes, “is in himself the most worthy subject of observation, as 
he is likewise himself the most worthy observer” (7). Perhaps because of its apparent 
accessibility, physiognomy expanded beyond the natural sciences and into everyday life. 
As Sharrona Pearl notes, by 1820 the practice had become part of London’s urban 
consciousness, allowing perambulating city-dwellers a sense that in this dense and 
crowded environment they could read the faces of strangers for evidence of the character 
inside.25 As Londoners became physiognomically literate, self-presentation was 
increasingly associated with the material and the visual, rather than the linguistic and the 
verbal—both off and on the stage. Placing Lucretia in the position of recipient for 
Beatrice’s visible performance, Shelley reminds his audience of their own interpretive 
responsibility, but also differentiates Lucretia’s familial perceptions: knowing someone in 
the past represents a different kind of physiognomic interpretation than that applied to 
strangers. 
Due to the rapidly growing public expectation of physiognomic accuracy on stage, 
the experience of the theater itself began to evolve in the early nineteenth century. In 
essence, actors had to “look” the part, either naturally or through artificial assistance such 
as makeup and costuming: “regardless of his or her skill in various cosmetic and 
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prosthetic techniques,” Pearl explains, stage-acting manuals “warned actors against 
straying too far from their own physiognomic boundaries” (69). In addition, the 
audience’s role in inspecting and translating these appearances shifted noticeably. While 
the newly realistic theater demanded that the actor carry a likeness, in addition to a 
talent, in order to play specific characters, it also required its audiences to become more 
active in shaping that connection. This shaping was done in silence, however. Whereas 
theater audiences had once raucously partaken in the onstage action of a dramatic 
performance, they were now learning to engage in silent observation, and interpretation, 
rather than participation. Their silence, however, was still active: they were 
simultaneously “thinking, making decisions, learning, and moving with and sometimes 
against the actors and what they were trying to communicate.”26 In some ways, the on-
stage Romantic theater was, indeed, always a mental one.  
Lucretia’s reception of Beatrice’s performance is, unlike an audience’s perception 
of stage-actors, based upon her knowledge in the moment of performance combined with 
her knowledge of Beatrice in the past. In this interchange, Shelley registers the active 
contribution of the observer to understanding the performer—like the public audience 
that will read the mark on Bernardo’s brow—but he also protects Beatrice by allowing 
her to perform for a much more intimate, familiar audience, and thereby demonstrates 
how physiognomic reading takes place differently in more private environments. Instead 
of exposing Beatrice to strangers, as in both the dinner scene of Act I and the courtroom 
sequence of Act V, Shelley here offers Beatrice a respite from the public eye during the 
                                                




climax of the play, immediately after her father has violated her body. She performs for a 
secure, intimate, and personal audience of one: her stepmother. In their shared, secure 
domestic setting, Beatrice can communicate the devastating effects of her father’s acts by 
allowing herself to fall apart. Requiring maternal nurturing in this particular moment, 
Beatrice will turn afterwards to her brother and his fraternal comfort. In both instances, 
physiognomic interpretation is not imposed from an outside, alien observer; rather, a 
close kin member reads the other in close proximity. This exchange creates a more 
nuanced and intimate mode of communication between observer and observed, for the 
observer accesses not just the other’s self-presentation in the moment, but also contributes 
his or her own knowledge from the past: they invoke a shared history of both observing 
and being observed by the other—thereby constituting a model of intimacy and reflection 
that might be embodied by long-term observant siblings. 
In his “Preface” to the play, Shelley links this observer/observed relationship that 
constitutes the study of physiognomy with his understanding of sympathy. Reading the 
painting that inspired him to write this drama—Guido Reni’s portrait of Beatrice, a 
portrait that has since been proven to be neither of the historical Beatrice Cenci nor done 
by Reni—Shelley parses the individual compartments of Beatrice’s face in order to 
construct a character study of her in miniature: 
There is a fixed and pale composure upon the features: she seems sad and stricken 
down in spirit, yet the despair thus expressed is lightened by the patience of 
gentleness…. The moulding of her face is exquisitely delicate; the eyebrows are 
distinct and arched: the lips have that permanent meaning of imagination and 
sensibility which suffering has not repressed and which it seems as if death scarcely 
could extinguish. Her forehead is large and clear; her eyes which we are told were 
remarkable for their vivacity, are swollen with weeping and lustreless, but 




This ekphrastic description elucidates the objective stylization of Beatrice’s physical 
countenance, such as the paleness, delicateness, and archness of her distinct facial 
features. In addition, alongside these notes on shape and color, Shelley applies 
interpretive language to translate these elements into character descriptions: he claims 
that Beatrice is sad, stricken in spirit, full of imagination and sensibility, at once vivacious 
and serene.  
Alongside this breakdown of Reni’s portrait, Shelley illustrates the relationship 
between physical performance and the motivations of sympathy that tragedies of the stage 
were intended to elicit. According to Shelley, the theater maintains a unique cultural role: 
it acts as conduit for building sympathetic bonds between audience and actor, observer 
and observed. Shelley adjoins the physical “cloth[ing]” of physiognomic registers with the 
affective sympathy necessary for effective dramatic performance. Describing the story of 
the Cenci family and his reasons for selecting this legend, Shelley remarks: 
In fact it is a tragedy which has already received, from its capacity of awakening 
and sustaining the sympathy of men, approbation and success. Nothing remained 
as I imagined, but to clothe it to the apprehensions of my countrymen in such 
language and action as would bring it home to their hearts. The deepest and the 
sublimest tragic compositions, King Lear and the two plays in which the tale of 
Oedipus is told, were stories which already existed in tradition, as matters of 
popular belief and interest, before Shakespeare and Sophocles made them familiar 
to the sympathy of all succeeding generations of mankind. (142) 
 
Visuality is, of course, intrinsic to the archetypal plays that Shelley draws upon—so much 
so that both Lear and Oedipus include explicit acts of blinding. Moreover, Shelley draws 
attention to the interplay between observer and observed in the production of what he 
terms “the sympathy of men.” He further claims that this production of sympathy is, 




The highest moral purpose aimed at in the highest species of the drama is the 
teaching the human heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge 
of itself; in proportion to the possession of which knowledge every human being is 
wise, just, sincere, tolerant and kind. If dogmas can do more, it is well: but a 
drama is no fit place for the enforcement of them. (142) 
 
Shelley’s notion of sympathy—that central term of the Romantic period—cannot be 
created solely on the blank page; it requires performance on a material stage—or, at the 
very least, a domestic one. 
IV. Baillie’s “Sympathetick Curiosity” and  
De Monfort’s Sympathetic Siblings 
 
Percy Shelley was, of course, not the only poet or dramatist of the day to connect 
physiognomy with sympathy, nor was he the only one to question these new material 
frameworks regarding the extrinsic legibility of the human body. Drawing together 
physical science with the current practices of theatrical stage productions, for instance, 
physiognomist George Combe uses an example of two celebrity actors, Sarah Siddons 
and John Kemble, to illustrate his ideas about how one might discern the mental 
characteristics of a person through the veil of the physical body’s surface. He writes: 
On the stage, Mrs. Siddons senior and Mr. John Kemble were remarkable for the 
solemn deliberation of their manner, both in declamation and action, and yet they 
were splendidly gifted in power. They carried captive at once the sympathies and 
understanding of the audience, and made every man feel his faculties expanding, 
and his whole mind becoming greater under the influence of their energies.27 
 
Importantly, these two actors—real-life sister and brother—were cast to perform the title 
roles in Joanna Baillie’s 1798 play De Monfort. Perhaps not coincidentally, they were, 
according to Combe, powerful actors who could convey a particular “deliberation 
of…manner” with “declamation and action” on the stage—their material bodies, in other 
                                                




words, could move in such a way that particular emotions would be communicated to the 
audience. Such an audience, Combe reflects, felt both “sympathies and understanding” 
as a result of this affective transference. This spark of sympathetic union impressed an 
observing audience so much so that each person took on the emotions and feelings of the 
actors himself; as Combe puts it, each audience member could “feel his faculties 
expanding, and his whole mind becoming greater.” The audience, in other words, 
responded in kind, embodying the emotions of the characters in the drama through the 
communicative power of the actors’ material bodies.  
 This association between observation and sympathy was indeed becoming 
increasingly prevalent in contemporary dramatic theory. As the era’s most well-known 
playwright, Baillie articulated similar premises in her “Introductory Discourse,” which 
served as prefatory material to her first volume of Plays on the Passions (1798). Like Shelley, 
Baillie contemplated this performative link between observer and observed as it related to 
the creation of sympathy. Rejecting the excesses of melodrama—those “outrageous” 
stage productions that Wordsworth famously dismissed as the “sickly and stupid German 
tragedies”28—Baillie abandoned surface sensationalism in favor of deeper character 
studies of individual affects. For Baillie, such affects were generated through material 
performances. The dramatic project relies on a one-way interchange between observer 
and observed. Terming this project “sympathetick [sic] curiosity,” Baillie theorized that 
the stage creates a kind of empathetic bond between souls; she hoped to educate the mass 
public by encouraging the observer to identify with the other as if he were oneself, 
                                                
28 William Wordsworth, “Preface,” Lyrical Ballads (1800), eds. R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones, 2nd ed. 




producing a more measured and tempered set of responses to both victims and 
perpetrators of heightened emotional events, even crimes. “In examining others,” she 
proclaims, “we know ourselves”: “The highest pleasures we receive from poetry, as well as 
from the real objects which surround us in the world, are derived from the sympathetick 
[sic] interest we all take in beings like ourselves.”29 Baillie emphasizes here not a 
reciprocal back-and-forth but a unidirectional interpretive relationship by which the 
observer sees, registers, and feels the emotions of the other, the performer—much like the 
role of the physiognomist observing her subject. 
 Due to its one-directional nature, however, Baillie questioned the interpretive 
accuracy of such formulas—perhaps as Shelley seems also to question what might make 
for the proper inter-relational audience for these observational interactions. As Frederick 
Burwick has noted, while Joanna Baillie was busy contemplating the link between actors’ 
performances and audience members’ reactions, her scientist brother Matthew—future 
physician to George III—was likewise exploring a similar phenomenon of what was then 
called “aberrational psychology.”30 Thus both siblings were mired in investigating the 
correlation between outward empirical symptoms and internal cognitive or emotional 
responses. Joanna may have been somewhat anxious about these parallels, however, as 
Nathan Elliot suggests: medical diagnoses based on exterior appearances were not always 
accurate, after all—a reality that the Baillie family knew well, after Matthew corrected a 
misdiagnosis that his uncle John Hunter had made of the newborn George Gordon, 
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future Lord Byron, eleven years earlier.31 While her drama partook in the larger scientific 
discourses of the time, Baillie possessed some strong “interpretive doubts” as to the 
certainty with which diagnoses based upon external examinations of the body could be 
made. Using the “small-scale aesthetic” of the performer’s body—“gesture, tone of voice, 
and facial expression”—to foster the audience’s “sympathetic identification,”32 Baillie 
experimented with just how legitimately were correlations between interior and exterior.     
Both Shelley’s and Baillie’s statements on dramatic theory rely upon a 
physiognomic understanding of external character legibility: the observer reads the other 
and produces an internalized sympathetic attachment by sensing in himself the feelings 
and emotions beneath the material performance or appearance. Yet both dramatists also 
troubled this one-way dynamic. Testing out this theory of material performance, Baillie 
incorporates allusions to physiognomy throughout her plays. Her 1798 tragedy De 
Monfort, for instance, reverberates with references to this study of surface features. In the 
drama’s opening sequence, the title character complains of a servant’s “ill-favour’d 
visage” (I.ii.69).33 A few lines later, Freberg mocks De Monfort’s false transparency by 
telling him that “something in thy face / Tells me another tale” (I.ii.82-83). Where De 
Monfort says one thing, Freberg thinks that he, as observer of De Monfort’s external 
features, can interpret an entirely different meaning. De Monfort’s legible facial 
expressions apparently give him away. Later, Lady Freberg asks a messenger about a 
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stranger’s physical appearance before determining whether to admit him, querying, 
“How looks his countenance?” (II.i.19). Interpreting characters by their physical traits 
allows others to judge what may be happening inside. 
The tragedy of De Monfort is concerned, as Baillie explains in the “Introductory 
Discourse,” with tracing the affect of hatred. Its plot focuses on the spiteful relationship 
between two male protagonists, De Monfort and his long-time nemesis Rezenvelt, and 
watches the slow turning of De Monfort into a murderous felon. The impetus for De 
Monfort’s destructive rampage comes from a subplot in which Countess Freberg jealously 
spreads a rumor that De Monfort’s sister, Jane, has become secretly affianced to 
Rezenvelt. Despite Jane’s protestations of her love for and loyalty to her brother, De 
Monfort fights and later kills Rezenvelt. The play ends with Jane mourning the body of 
her dead brother who has, in turn, now died from his own self-berating guilt over the 
jealous murder.   
In later editions of the play, after 1798, Baillie would retract her drama’s closing 
scene, explaining that the play could probably conclude with De Monfort’s self-inflicted 
death. Because the actions of retribution cease thereafter, Baillie thought, further 
performances should omit the final sequence: “Should this play ever again be acted, 
perhaps it would be better that the curtain should drop here; since here the story may be 
considered as complete, and what comes after, prolongs the piece too much when our 
interest for the fate of De Monfort is at an end.”34 What comes after, however, is pivotal, I 
argue, for it is in the aftermath of De Monfort’s death that Baillie articulates the stakes of 
                                                




De Monfort’s destructive hatred according to her trademark “sympathetic curiosity.” 
These stakes are manifested through the figure of Jane, his sister.  
As in The Cenci, the concluding speech of De Monfort is reserved for the sororal 
protagonist. After De Monfort’s death, Jane performs the role of her brother’s sole 
mourner, echoing Beatrice Cenci’s desire to honor and be buried with her brothers. Jane 
placates the officers who have arrived to condemn De Monfort, not knowing the man has 
already died, and in an attempt to preserve her brother’s legacy she rewrites his 
lamentable actions as heroic. Yet her revision of De Monfort’s demise is a contorted one, 
for she must abandon her community’s morality. As Victoria Myers explains, the play’s 
audience would certainly have registered De Monfort’s actions to be both morally and 
legally reprehensible. Since he had an opportunity to calm down after his confrontation 
with Rezenvelt, Myers explains, legal experts like Blackstone would have designated De 
Monfort a murderer: the killing was rational, pre-meditated, and intentional—it was not 
sprung from a moment of insanity, passion, or self-defense.35 Jane’s attempt to reframe 
her brother’s deeds as heroic, and then to consecrate him despite the murder, “resonates 
with the question whether murder-guilt could have been palliated despite the rigor of the 
law.”36 Most legal consensus, Myers claims, would say no.   
This verbal reconstruction of De Monfort’s life story, however, is not the only 
preservation for the future that Jane attempts to install. Perhaps even more importantly, 
she hopes to encapsulate his life and his memory into the worthiest of material tombs: her 
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own body. Jane concludes Baillie’s play with a request to the convent that she not only 
bury her brother here on their grounds but that she also commemorate his life with a 
material marker of his heroism: 
And now, I have a sad request to make, 
Nor will these holy sisters scorn my boon; 
I, within these sacred cloister walls 
May raise a humble, nameless tomb to him, 
Who, but for one dark passion, one dire deed, 
Had claim’d a record of as noble worth, 
As e’er enrich’d the sculptur’d pedestal.  (V.iv.135-141) 
 
Should the religious sisters condone her sisterly request, Jane will erect a monument to 
De Monfort that will solidify her version of his story: he is “sacred,” “humble,” worth of 
entering the material “record” of history. But where Jane asks to sponsor this physical 
monument, we also might hear echoes to another kind of entombment: Jane will sacrifice 
her own reproductive fecundity in favor of preserving her brother’s legacy. The cadence 
of Baillie’s verse isolates Jane’s “I” such that we might hear how she, her “I” and her own 
identity, may now “raise” a nameless tomb to her brother by becoming cloistered within 
these walls herself. Though she does not invoke this fate explicitly, the doubled 
implication suggests that, much as the body of Beatrice’s brother Bernardo would endure 
as a memorial to Beatrice after her death, so too would Jane’s body become a living 
memorial that continues to honor her brother after he is gone. Jane makes a figurative 
second tomb of her own flesh: she will reproduce her dead brother, rather than reproduce 
heirs to the De Monfort name.  
 In this way, Jane De Monfort and Beatrice Cenci each bring their reproductive 




reproduction, Jane and Beatrice preserve one sibling in the body of the other, imagining a 
sibling kinship that provides a lasting form of self- and other-preservation by regenerating 
both past and present well into an unknown future. One sibling becomes the figurative 
child that reproduces the other for future generations. Such queer kinship requires an act 
of material self-sacrifice, a female protest performed not in the voice but in the body. Yet 
these deaths also imagine new life. While Beatrice Cenci utters a desire regarding both of 
her brothers—to be buried with the one in his death, and to give birth to the “child” of 
the other—Jane De Monfort regenerates her brother beyond his death. Both actions 
require the sacrifice of female procreation, an abdication of sexual generation in favor of 
another kind of material reproduction in likeness and in kind, in reflection and in 
mirroring. Normative storylines for the female body are overturned for queer applications 
of familial preservation. This reparative shift accesses a new mode of kinship situated in 
lateral bonds, throwing off the linear expectations of reproductive kinship in order to 
introduce a queer sibling love that fosters a new vision of futurity through non-
reproductive reproduction—a new vision that has its roots in quite an old story indeed. 
V. Antigone’s Sisters 
In longing to be aligned with their brothers in both life and death, Beatrice Cenci 
and Jane De Monfort reincarnate that progenitor of all theatrical sisters: Sophocles’s 
Antigone. When Beatrice first discovers that her brothers are dead, she expresses a 
subjunctive appeal to join them: “Oh God! That I were buried with my brothers!” (Cenci 
I.iii.153). Beatrice’s plaintive outburst echoes that of Antigone, her dramatic and feminist 




her brother Polyneices, “I shall lie by his side, loving him as he loved me… For there I 
shall lie forever.”37 This impulse to maintain sibling intimacy even beyond the grave 
stems from the fact that each sister’s identity is tied up with her brother’s. As Stefani 
Engelstein argues of Sophocles’s archetype, the plural subjectivity of siblings cannot be 
reduced to one character: “we must be careful,” she warns, “not to erect an Antigone 
complex but to recognize instead an Antigone complex”38—in other words, we must focus 
not on the solitary title character as a distinct personage, but rather on the network that 
surrounds her and constitutes the drama in its entirety. Acknowledging the “web of 
relationships” surrounding Antigone likewise acknowledges “the impossibility of locating 
an individual in this text” (39). As familial titles that name Shelley’s and Baillie’s plays 
indicate, the plural subjectivities of these collective family units inform the sisters’ desires 
to be united with their brothers—even if that necessitates their own deaths. 
In Baillie’s play, Jane De Monfort reflects upon the origins of this inter-subjective 
intimacy, fondly recollecting the intricate enmeshment of sibling relations. From a young 
age, Jane recalls, she and her brother had been bonded physically and psychologically: 
[He] Was the companion of my early days,  
My cradle’s mate, mine infant play-fellow. 
Within our op’ning minds with riper years 
The love of praise and gen’rous virtue sprung: 
Thro’ varied life our pride, our joys, were one; 
At the same tale we wept: he is my brother. (DM II.i.210-216) 
 
Having been constant companions and playfellows throughout childhood, the siblings 
developed so closely as to become almost the same person, unifying their subjective 
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perspectives, their “minds,” as well as their affective experiences of praise, virtue, pride, 
and joy. They have never been entirely distinct from one another, as Jane’s use of a 
communal “our” and “we” suggests. She discerns no separation here: they “were one.”  
 For Jane, this series of collective life experiences, from sharing an education to 
weeping at the same nursery stories, defines their relationship: for these reasons, she 
affirms, “he is my brother.” Without each other, Jane and De Monfort would no longer 
function—and the dread of losing this irreplaceable partner in his life is what has driven 
De Monfort to murder Rezenvelt in the first place. In her archetypal sibling role, 
Antigone explains the source of this fear of sibling loss, lamenting her own brother’s 
irreplaceability: 
 If my husband were dead, I might have had another, 
 And child from another man, if I lost the first. 
 But when father and mother both were hidden in death 
No brother’s life would bloom for me again.39 
 
While family members like spouses and children may be reproducible, siblings are kin 
that can never be replaced, since, once a parent is dead, no new sisters or brothers can be 
gained either through biological or legal processes of their own undertaking (even the 
acquisition of step-siblings or adoptive siblings depends upon the legal actions of parents 
rather than the siblings themselves). In other words: we have no agency in the 
procurement of siblings. Once her three brothers are dead—including Polyneices and 
Eteocles as well as her father-brother Oedipus—Antigone occupies an entirely distinct 
subject position from the one she has previously known: no longer one of five 
differentiated and multi-gendered siblings of her original network, she is now only one of 
                                                




two sisters. Antigone would rather die with her brother than face this altered kinship 
status. Jane De Monfort similarly embraces her brother for their mutual irreplaceability, 
having been one another’s sole support after their parents’ deaths—the point after which 
they could have found no more siblings for themselves. Jane reflects on the source of their 
shared intimacy: “So sadly orphan’d, side by side we stood, / Like two young trees, whose 
boughs, in early strength, / Screen the weak saplings of the rising grove, / And brave the 
storm together” (II.ii.23-26). Because of their circumstances, Jane remarks, she has always 
been her brother’s “intimate and adviser” (28) through myriad tempests. As such, they 
remain inextricable.  
 Wanting to maintain sibling relations after death, both Beatrice Cenci and Jane 
De Monfort have to reconstruct the systems of signification surrounding their own and 
their brothers’ actions. They challenge the ethical status quo in order to preserve their 
affective and psychological sibling bonds, hoping perhaps to revert to a time before one of 
the siblings had been corrupted by murderous drives. Before ever writing The Cenci, 
Shelley recognized the kind of ethical fluidity that would be required for exonerating such 
figures as Beatrice and De Monfort. In fact, he associated his own beliefs in ethical 
relativism with Antigone, the progenitor of questionable sororal morality. In a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson Hogg in May 1811, he asks, rhetorically, “But is the Antigone immoral? 
Did she wrong when she acted in direct…violation of the laws of a prejudiced society?”40 
Implying that we should indeed absolve Antigone, Shelley establishes the kind of 
philosophical and moral flexibility that would later give him, and us, the freedom to side 
                                                




with a woman like Beatrice, regardless of her alleged homicide. While Antigone opposes 
her society’s demands, for Shelley these actions must be evaluated on their own terms. 
Observing The Cenci’s resemblance to Sophocles’s drama, critic Stuart Sperry similarly 
offers Antigone’s connection to Beatrice, asking,  
was Beatrice wrong in planning the murder of her father, Count Francesco Cenci, 
or was she rather justified in following, like Antigone, the dictates of her 
conscience and in adopting violent means to relieve both her family and herself 
from the toils of an insupportable tyranny?”41 
 
Violence may be excusable, in other words, as long as it leads to freedom. 
 To access such freedom, however, both Beatrice and Jane—like Antigone—must 
rewrite the language of criminality. At the beginning of Shelley’s play, Beatrice attempts 
to overturn the structures of patriarchal language by using her father’s vicious words 
against him. When Cenci snarls at her, “Retire to your chamber, insolent girl!” (I.iii.145), 
Beatrice throws these words back in his face: “Retire thou impious man!” (146). This 
verbal echo inverts Cenci’s language as Beatrice attempts to wrest power from him. But 
this exchange also initiates Beatrice’s break with language, since, after these words fail to 
achieve any reasonable outcome, she begins to abandon linguistic communication in 
favor of other modes. Later, Beatrice will refuse to capitulate to the verbal demands of 
either her father or the legal system. She denies all accountability by verbally negating her 
crime: “’Tis most false / That I am guilty of foul parricide” (Cenci IV.iv.173-4). Beatrice 
rejects the term “parricide,” which names the crime of which she has been accused, since 
she believes the term “father” has itself ceased to function after Cenci violates her. In the 
                                                





courtroom, Beatrice will perpetuate this verbal defiance by avoiding making a direct 
admission or confession. “I shall deny no more,” she says. But as the judge recognizes, 
this is not an affirmative acceptance of responsibility, either: “She is convicted, but has 
not confessed” (V.iii.103). Beatrice defies her prosecutors by refusing to inhabit their 
language.   
 Accessing power through her body rather than through words, Beatrice embodies 
Antigone’s transgressive resistance: Antigone not only insists on burying her brother but 
also resists verbal acknowledgement of her crime. As Judith Butler has argued, Antigone 
challenges Creon’s semiotic system by inverting his legal paradigms. Antigone rejects her 
denial, stating, “I will not deny my deed.” With this rhetorical obfuscation, Butler 
suggests, Antigone articulates what amounts to an impossible utterance, thus lending her 
the power to overturn the political system from within. Butler explains:   
“Yes, I confess it,” or ‘’I say I did it”—thus she answers a question that is posed to 
her from another authority, and thus she concedes the authority that this other 
has over her. “I will not deny my deed”—“I do not deny,” I will not be forced 
into a denial, I will refuse to be forced into a denial by the other’s language, and 
what I will deny is my deed—a deed that becomes possessive, a grammatical 
possession that makes sense only within the context of the scene in which a forced 
confession is refused by her. In other words, to claim “I will not deny my deed” is 
to refuse to perform a denial, but it is not precisely to claim the act. To say, “Yes, 
I did it,” is to claim the act, but it is also to commit another deed in the very 
claiming, the act of publishing one’s deed, a new criminal venture that redoubles 
and takes the place of the old. 42 
 
Like Antigone, Beatrice refuses to perform a denial while simultaneously not claiming her 
act. Neither woman confirms the physical actions they have performed; they refuse the 
signifiers being imposed upon these material deeds from outside themselves. Because the 
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burial takes place off stage, without witnesses, Antigone cannot be connected directly to 
this crime without “linguistic assertion” (7); similarly, the off-stage murder of Count Cenci 
cannot be pinned upon Beatrice without such linguistic attachment—an admission she 
defiantly refuses to give to her accusers.  
Like Beatrice, Jane De Monfort rewrites the systems of signification surrounding 
the crime of murder, appending her own layer of ethical relativism onto her brother’s 
deeds. Shortly before the play concludes, officers arrive to arrest and punish De Monfort 
for Rezenvelt’s murder, but the man is already dead. Mourning over his deceased body, 
Jane performs the role of her brother’s eulogist by rewriting the history of what has just 
occurred. In an attempt to reconstruct her brother’s reputation for the future, Jane 
reinscribes his lamentable acts into an honorable legacy, stating: 
Tell them by whose authority you come  
He died that death which best becomes a man  
Who is with keenest sense of conscious ill  
And deep remorse assail’d, a wounded spirit.  
A death that kills the noble and the brave, 
And only them. He had no other wound. (V.iv.113-118) 
 
Authoring—and authorizing—De Monfort’s obituary with this speech, Jane designates 
the cause of her brother’s demise as his “deep remorse…[and] a wounded spirit,” thus 
ensuring that he be characterized as a victim of his own guilt and psychological injury. 
Turning her brother into someone whose deeds should elicit pathos rather than 
contempt, Jane elegiacally writes De Monfort into the heroic tradition: he died the kind of 
death that only takes down those whose courage and conscientious morality define him: 
“the noble and the brave”—“And only them,” she adds, for good measure. Jane shapes 




rulers with this information and to perpetuate this reconstructed narrative of her brother’s 
downfall. Jane creates a new legal narrative in order to defy the symbolic order, lending 
her brother a story that washes him of any guilt for murder and which preserves his 
legacy by demanding affective sympathy from its hearers. 
 In their final partings from their dear siblings, neither Jane nor Beatrice relies 
upon language to perform their ultimate reproductive and reparative moves. As discussed 
above, Beatrice installs her legacy in Bernardo’s brow, identifying his physiognomic 
likeness as the key to the material memorialization of her own history. Desiring to share 
bodily space with her brothers, Beatrice wants to be buried with her already-dead 
brothers, recreating Antigone’s ceremonial but rebellious act of laying Polyneices in the 
ground. While preparing for her own death, she solidifies this sororal-fraternal union by 
choosing to bury herself figuratively in her younger brother. Abdicating the normative 
roles of marriage and motherhood, Beatrice surrenders her own female body to death, 
but she preserves her lineage not in a material byproduct of her own sexual organs—that 
damned progeny that Cenci wishes to bury within her womb—but rather in a material 
transmission and extension of herself in the material body of her sibling. In Baillie’s play, 
Jane De Monfort is the sibling who survives, thereby shifting the impetus for 
memorialization from Bernardo’s preservation of Beatrice to an inverted sororal 
preservation of her brother. Yet, nevertheless, Jane enacts a similar replacement of a 
sexual generativity with a sororal-fraternal one. She, too, will preserve her brother’s 
legacy by abdicating the normative structures of kinship—marriage, childbearing—for a 




 Jane and Beatrice both live outside the terms of normative female sexuality. As 
Sarah De Sanctis has suggested of their progenitor Antigone, these women transgress the 
domain of kinship because each “consciously chooses her brother above her husband, 
refusing in this way heterosexual marriage and generational continuity as such.”43 
Antigone rejects motherhood. “Such a gesture is suicidal,” De Sanctis suggests.44 By 
straying from the virgin-to-bride-to-mother narrative, Antigone invites a kind of 
premature death: “Antigone will find her marriage chamber in her tomb.”45 Jane De 
Monfort and Beatrice Cenci similarly abandon normative sexuality by refusing to choose 
the reproductive route. Their death drives push them towards siblings rather than 
spouses; they resist being subsumed into the maternal paradigm of bodily generation. 
Instead of moving onto—and producing—the next repetitive generation, they step, 
reparatively, sideways.  
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William Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads and the Spots of Sibling Time 
When William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge conceived their 
“experiments” of the Lyrical Ballads, they envisioned a group of texts in which each poem 
would be distinct but relational.1 Writing to their publisher Joseph Cottle in May 1798, 
Coleridge described this collective as an integrated set, a constellation of disparate but 
similar pieces that should be understood in the form of a web or network—or family:  
We deem that the volumes offered to you are to a certain degree one work, in kind tho’ 
not in degree, as an Ode is one work—& that our different poems are as stanzas, good 
relatively rather than absolutely:—Mark you, I say in kind tho’ not in degree.2 
 
No work stands alone, he explains: the poems function relatively, not absolutely; 
individual pieces are not in fact individual, but must be read within the context of all 
others. In the following years, Wordsworth and Coleridge would each continue to turn 
repeatedly to this ideal mixture of unity with divergence, of likeness with contrast. In the 
1800 “Preface,” for instance, Wordsworth assigns aesthetic pleasure to the “perception of 
similitude in dissimilitude, and dissimilitude in similitude.”3 “Imagination,” for the 
Coleridge of the Biographia Literaria, involves a “reconciliation of opposite or discordant 
qualities” that blends “sameness, with difference.”4 For both poets, perceiving the whole 
requires simultaneously perceiving the inter-relation of its disparate but similar parts. 
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 In this way, the Lyrical Ballads materializes a kind of spatialized sibling logic. 
Constructed of layered and graduated distinctions between works—works that differ, in 
Coleridge’s words, only by degree rather than kind—the Ballads resembles the sort of 
constellation of identities, ages, genders, and power dynamics that make up any sibling 
network. The two volumes of the Ballads, born just two years apart from one another, 
mimic the kinship of brothers and sisters: as a diverse but inextricable unit of various 
pieces, they entertain the “coexistence of degrees of sameness and difference” amongst 
their parts that Stefani Engelstein links within sibling logic;5 they embrace those 
“quintessential attributes of both sameness and difference” that historian Leonore 
Davidoff identifies as inherent to the experience of lived siblinghood.6 Wordsworth’s 
poetic vision thus depends upon the kind of networked relationality that is found amongst 
siblings. This sibling vision not only sustains Wordsworth’s experimental project on a 
structural level, but also, and more importantly, evokes a brand of collective 
consciousness that sustains Wordsworth’s poetic self-fashioning—defying what critics 
following Keats have always assumed to be the poet’s “egotistical sublime.”   
 In Chapter One, I explored the ways that Shelley’s and Baillie’s dramas offer the 
non-reproductive potential of sibling kinship as a replacement for heteronormative 
structures of lineage and generational progression. These plays invest, in other words, in 
horizontal systems of queer sibling transmission and futurity that might repair the damage 
done by hierarchical and patriarchal sociality. In this chapter, I uncover the networked 
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paradigm of sibling logic that underwrites and enables Shelley’s and Baillie’s queer vision. 
By examining the sibling logic imbedded within and between Wordsworth’s lyrical 
ballads, I argue that the poet constructs his inventive poetic self upon the foundations of 
sibling inter-subjectivity—those foundations of psychoanalytic interdependence upon 
which Shelley’s and Baillie’s queer sibling futurity also stands.  
 Indeed, Wordsworth’s poetic commitment to sibling kinship extends far beyond 
his personal relations. Few scholars have noted this fact, however, since critical 
investment has primarily been given over to biographical nods to William’s allegedly 
incestuous cohabitation with Dorothy—or to defensively redeeming the siblings from this 
specter of taboo.7 Yet during the final years of the 1790s, Wordsworth incorporated 
sibling kinship into a range of works, including autobiographical pieces like “Tintern 
Abbey,” “To My Sister,” and “Nutting,” as well as impersonalized narratives like “The 
Brothers” and “We are Seven,” not to mention those written contemporaneously with the 
Lyrical Ballads such as “The Seven Sisters” and “When to the attractions of this busy 
world.” And while Wordsworth and Coleridge may have conceived the Ballads using a 
logic of relationality, readers have, for the most part, orphaned its members, analyzing 
them separately from the kinship fabric that knits them together. Thus the siblings of, say, 
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“We are Seven” have seemed unrelated to the more well-known sibling invocations of 
“Tintern Abbey.” Reading Wordsworths’ sibling-oriented poems together, however, we 
uncover an imbedded sibling logic in which the poet’s self-construction depends as much 
upon his “solitary musing” as it does upon an inter-relational and trans-subjective 
framework of self-construction. In other words, the “other” is always already part of the 
Wordsworthian self: she is always there, with him, now, upon the banks.  
I. In Defense of Siblinghood; or, Why “We” is “Seven” 
Wordsworth’s poetic sibling logic has long been overlooked because readers, 
much like the adult inquisitor of “We are Seven,” have been busy asking other questions. 
When the adult narrator of “We are Seven” meets a young eight-year-old girl near a 
country churchyard, he inquires how many siblings she has. She responds that they 
number “seven,” but that two of these have died. The adult then protests the inaccuracy 
of her math: her calculation should instead, he insists, total “five.” Pestering her with his 
repeated challenges—“How may this be?”; “I pray you tell… / how this may be,” and so 
on8—the speaker pits his numerical logic against hers, trying to convince this young child 
that her dead siblings no longer count. With these objections, the speaker introduces a 
fundamental epistemology that the poem’s readers have since followed. He insists upon a 
system of mathematically- and biologically-derived binaries—of seven versus five, yes 
versus no, living versus dead, child versus adult.  
Following this dualistic and arithmetical thinking, critics interpreting the poem—
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even those who support the little girl—have settled into similarly divisive camps, each 
with its own dichotomous reading stemming from this epistemological split. For some, the 
girl’s arithmetic appears to be right—the correct answer is “seven.”9 From her 
perspective, the two dead siblings remain spiritually alive through a kind of childhood 
innocence and spiritual naiveté that Wordsworth famously celebrates elsewhere. For 
others, however, the adult’s answer makes far greater sense;10 the siblings are, after all, 
dead. Readers of “We are Seven” have thus pursued a binary approach dictated by the 
numerical and hierarchical regime indoctrinated by the poem’s interlocutor. They 
continue to assume that the deceased children must, in one way or another, be accounted 
for—and, literally, counted—differently from the living. Adding to critical arguments 
defending one speaker’s form of numerical reasoning over the other’s, some scholars 
place the poem directly into the context of historicized acts of counting, situating “We are 
Seven” in the era of demography and census-taking. But these readings, too, draw binary 
and mathematical distinctions, such as that “between poetic counting and political 
counting”11 or between an “opposition of two kinds of representational logic.”12 Most 
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readers thus concur: something has to be subtracted.  
By adopting the speaker’s ideologically dualistic and numerically reductive 
inclinations, however, critics have tended to ignore other ontological possibilities 
presented by the poem. If we pay attention to the alternate voice, that of the young girl 
rather than of the speaker, we might be inspired to ask other kinds of questions 
altogether: Why, for instance, does she need all of her siblings to count in the first place? 
After all, the girl struggles not with whether her siblings are truly alive or truly dead—she 
does in fact acknowledge that they are deceased—but adamantly maintains that there be 
“seven” in total. Where the speaker fixates on excluding two from this count, we might 
focus instead upon the number of seven as a whole and consider what, for this young 
country maid, seems to be precisely at stake. 
Despite being manipulated into using the enumerative logic imposed upon her by 
the speaker, the “little maid” tries her best to say what she means using his discourse of 
numbering. While the speaker concentrates on a singular narrative—your brother and 
sister have died, so now we subtract and get five—the young girl describes her reality in a 
series of multiplying but equivalent explanations. Each time her interlocutor signals his 
failure to understand her by reiterating his sole query of “how many,” she tries to reach 
him with a new version of her story. At first, she explicitly echoes the speaker’s question 
with her reply, “How many? seven in all” (15), to demonstrate that she comprehends his 
meaning. When that response fails to satisfy, she describes the siblings’ geographic 
positions, with their implied occupational roles: two can be found “at Conway” (19), likely 
                                                                                                                                            





in apprenticeship or domestic service; two are “gone to sea” (20), in naval or merchant 
engagements. Next, she cites topographical information, locating the dead siblings “in the 
church-yard … Beneath the church-yard tree” (31-32). Then, she appends sensory details 
by plotting their precise cartographic points: their “green” graves “may be seen” a mere 
“twelve steps” from the cottage door (37, 39). This last moment reinforces her rhetorical 
strategy: not only does she invoke the freshness of the siblings’ still-“green” graves to 
prove their ongoing relevance, but she also invites the speaker to measure these 
quantifiable steps himself.13 She provides, in other words, the precise kind of empirical 
evidence—the exact counting—that her questioner demands. 
These dialogic responses never appease the adult speaker, however, so the girl 
submits lengthier narrative scenarios. Midway through their exchange, she switches to 
descriptive and chronological reports, first providing anecdotes of the siblings’ daily 
interactions (lines 41-44), then constructing a linear history that accounts for how, when, 
and in what order John and Jane each died (49-60). This storytelling mode fails as well, of 
course, and by the end of the poem the two figures must agree to disagree. Despite the 
adult speaker’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge her perspective, however, the girl has 
offered an array of verbal defenses, each with its own brand of evidence: from 
geographical mappings (at Conway, at sea) to observable data (green graves only steps 
away from where they now stand) to temporalized stories (when and why the siblings 
died). Since the man listens only for the single number that he has predetermined as valid, 
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the girl’s differentiated answers never register. But regardless of his protestations, her 
stories provide material and concrete evidence, rather than transcendent or spiritual 
justifications. Thus while the speaker seeks a reductive binary of subtraction, the girl 
multiplies the possibilities instead. 
This multi-faceted discourse in fact echoes the multi-faceted nature of the girl’s 
family. Her diversified recording illustrates her multidimensional sense of kinship: all of 
her siblings add up to define her selfhood as accretive and communal rather than 
detached or independent. She incorporates herself into this expansive sibling family of 
seven when, for example, she binds herself to the diverse sets of groups and pairs that 
make up her collective “two” and “us” in line after line: “And two of us… / And two 
are… / Two of us… / My sister and my brother” (20-22). Synecdochally, she fashions 
herself as one part of a whole that she herself reciprocally represents. These possessives 
convey her feeling of ownership and belonging with her other sibling constituents, while 
her echoic assonance of “and two” across these lines reinforces the interchangeable 
nature of the groups. Each sister or brother is bound to the others of differing ages, 
genders, and personalities, and any number or grouping of them might be mixed and 
matched at any given time or place—at Conway, at sea, in the grave. 
Synecdoche serves, in fact, as the literary modus operandi of Stefani Engelstein’s 
“sibling logic.” Describing siblinghood as a psychoanalytic network in which the subject is 
“multiply mediated” via relations to her siblings, Engelstein positions the inter-subjective 




others.”14 The lateral nature of such sibling kinship, she explains, “resists the metaphoric 
economy of castration [i.e. of Freudian psychoanalysis], instead following the model of 
synecdoche, a part-whole relationship that does not entirely relinquish the object it moves 
away from” (41). The young girl of “We are Seven” asserts this kind of synecdochal 
unification. Each member of her sibling network exists within the larger set, and the 
reiterated groups (“us”) and pairs (“two”) reciprocally constitute her singular identity 
(“me,” “I”). This logic permits the girl to expand her thinking beyond the dualities of 
dead and living.  
As Engelstein proposes, such sibling logic overcomes the reductive thinking of 
Hegelian dialectics or Freudian oedipal dyads, replacing these binary paradigms with a 
“complex modeled on the web of relationships,” a model of “transsubjectivity” and a 
“tenor of relatedness” that reveals the inherent “impossibility of locating an individual” as 
an entirely distinct entity (39). Binary logic, in contrast—the kind represented not only by 
the adult speaker in “We are Seven” but also by most twentieth-century poststructuralists 
and by readers of Wordsworth’s poem—“forecloses potentials for theorizing differential 
relationships and collective identities not only in the imaginary but also in the symbolic 
order.” Engelstein continues: 
The sibling as a model…allows us to move beyond both self-other dualisms and 
the mother-child dyad as the only grounds for intersubjectivity, and recognizes the 
subject as instead embedded in a network of partial others, whose subjectivities are 
nonetheless partially, though differentially, shared. (40, emphasis original) 
 
Thus even in death the young girl of “We are Seven” must not elide her siblings. Her 
network continues intact, for her own subjective existence depends upon theirs. The girl 
                                                




must preserve her original system: each sibling remains, regardless of whether they are 
now only remains.  
Affirming the interdependence of this transsubjective network, Wordsworth’s 
young maid roots herself within her group of siblings through shared material and 
affective interactions. All day long, each and every day, her activities are oriented towards 
a brother and a sister, as she describes:  
‘My stockings there I often knit, 
‘My ’kerchief there I hem; 
‘And there upon the ground I sit— 
‘I sit and sing to them. 
 
‘And often after sunset, Sir, 
‘When it is light and fair, 
‘I take my little porringer, 
‘And eat my supper there.’ (41-48) 
Reiterating “there” four times in these eight brief lines, the girl aligns herself to this 
communal physical presence: it is only there with her kin that her “I” can act and can be—
can knit, hem, sit, sing, and eat. Her siblings function as her recipients and her objects; 
she never performs alone. Even those items that she seems to possess independently (my 
stockings, my porringer) correlate to the domestic routines associated with this family unit: 
her stockings, kerchief, porringer, and supper that she, respectively, knits, hems, eats 
from, and eats with these two siblings. With present-tense verbs, the girl reinforces the 
perpetual nature of these interactions, painting a tableau of their ongoing engagements. 
Conducting her daily rituals around her siblings—and not, we should note, inside the 
cottage with her mother—the girl links her corporeal as well as her emotional essence to 




siblings are currently absent from the family home—the girl registers each brother and 
sister as a felt psychological and affective presence, regardless of whether they are 
distinctly not-present in the here and now. 
II. Kinship Beyond Death 
In maintaining the vivacity of this network, the young girl is, in historical terms at 
least, far from unique. At the end of the eighteenth century, any changes to the numbers 
or order of siblings in a family would have drastically impacted the structure of the sibling 
network. Sibling deaths were, of course, a common occurrence in an era of high mortality 
rates, when anywhere from one quarter to one third of siblings could be lost in early 
childhood.15 Sibling order and placement—variable, rather than stable, throughout the 
lifecycle of a family—would reorient each sibling’s material and economic realities, not to 
mention their emotional and psychological relationships. This was not merely an issue for 
aristocratic primogeniture, which for obvious reasons favored eldest sons to the detriment 
of younger siblings. Children in middle- and lower-class families would have been equally 
at the mercy of their uncontrollable circumstances of birth order. 
For folks in all ranks of society, trends in life trajectories typically accorded with 
one’s rank in the sibling hierarchy. “Certain differences in residence and marriage 
patterns and in occupational histories were associated with specific ranks of birth,” 
historian Richard Wall explains, because “the dynamics of the family’s own life cycle 
imposed its own constraints on the life chances of children born at different points in the 
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course of its development.”16 Middle-born children, for instance, were statistically less 
likely to remain in their neighborhoods of origin, whereas eldest children and youngest 
daughters tended to settle in the same parishes as their parents. The age when a child 
moved out of the parental residence also correlated to his or her place in the sibling order. 
Most would leave their childhood home temporarily and sporadically throughout their 
teen years and twenties in order to hold apprenticeships or service positions elsewhere. 
Rarely departing to establish their own independent households until their late twenties 
or thirties, only about one third of men and one quarter of young women would leave 
their parental abodes alone. Instead, most exited along with a small family group. Those 
who departed the parental home with their older siblings were typically younger than 
average. And until that final move, young adults would still consider their parents’ house 
to be “home.”17 Furthermore, as Naomi Tadmor points out, the term “family” itself was 
extremely malleable: it could refer interchangeably to a household’s immediate 
constituents, whether consanguineal or not (including servants and visitors), or to one’s 
entire extended network of kin scattered across the globe.18   
Historians assume that since siblings often suffered from an unequal distribution 
of wealth, goods, and status, these material realities must have produced bitter rivalries.19 
                                                
16 Wall, “Marriage, Residence, and Occupational Choices of Senior and Junior Siblings in the 
English Past,” The History of the Family 1, no. 3 (1996): 260. 
17 See Colin G. Pooley and Jean Turnbull, “Leaving Home: The Experience of Migration from 
the Parental Home in Britain since c. 1770,” Journal of Family History 22, no. 4 (1997): 390-424; 
and Richard Wall, “The Age at Leaving Home,” Journal of Family History 3, no. 2 (1978): 181-202. 
18 Tadmor, Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship, and Patronage (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
19 Linda A. Pollock, “Parent-Child Relations,” in The History of the European Family: Volume One, 
Family Life in Early Modern Times, 1500-1789, eds. David I. Kertzer and Marzio Barbagli (New 




Yet psychic dynamics often varied. Despite conflicts, siblings of the eighteenth century 
remained quite close, finding emotional and psychological solace in one another while 
also depending upon each other for financial and social resources. Therefore siblings 
remained quite sensitive to variations in the family tree, since losses or gains in sibling 
numbers affected all of its branches. As scholars like Linda Pollock have noted, families 
functioned as cohesive systems wherein individual members could experience a wide 
range of relationships and interactions that varied over time, being at intervals “both a 
constraint and a resource; a psychological sanctuary and a cause of deep emotional 
pain.”20 Moreover, sibling birth order and its resultant hierarchies and privileges could 
change at any time, thus shifting the tensions and affiliations within a given network. 
Prior to marriage, for example, “the combined impact of birth order and gender 
dynamics” structured a continually shifting set of “power machinations between siblings” 
and influenced the internal dynamics of the family at large.21 These power dynamics 
altered often, since birth order could be converted throughout childhood and adulthood 
as “the vicissitudes of health, injury, and medicine meant death was a constant 
possibility.”22 The sibling hierarchy could be reordered at any time. Even though 
inheritance rules suggest that eldest sons would be the unquestioned recipient of a family’s 
lineage and property, this “ever-shifting birth-order variation” meant that children might 
not know until well into adulthood, or even middle age, who would inevitably inherit the 
                                                
20 Pollock, “Rethinking Patriarchy and the Family in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of 
Family History 23, no. 1 (January 1998): 4; siblings were consistently “aware of the interwoven 
nature of their lives and that their standing in the family could be raised or lowered by the 
behavior of a sibling” (15-16). 
21 Amy Harris, “That Fierce Edge: Sibling Conflict and Politics in Georgian England,” Journal of 
Family History 37, no. 2 (2012): 156-157. 




family’s lot of goods.23 Even youngest daughters could become family heirs if the right 
circumstances (and deaths) created enough fluctuations. The sibling order into which one 
was born was not necessarily the order with which one died.  
In Wordsworth’s “We are Seven,” any changes in the cardinal number of the 
girl’s siblings—from “seven” to “five,” for instance—would revise her ordinal position 
within the familial system, just as it would have for any child of her era, affecting both her 
financial status and her future adult responsibilities as well as her juvenile emotions. 
Before John and Jane died, this girl may have been younger than, older than, or in 
between her brother and sister in age, but she was certainly one of the three youngest 
children, since these remained at home while the others had already departed for military 
or domestic service. In all likelihood, one of these three children would have been in 
charge of caring for the other two, since poor laboring workers not only had difficulty 
supporting the resources of their ever-increasing broods (hence why children were often 
sent out to service), but children were also frequently required to mind their younger kin. 
Working-class women with large families, in particular, such as the cottagers of 
Wordsworth’s poem, had neither “time [n]or energy for mothering or playing with their 
children.”24 If the girl’s two dead siblings are now to be removed from the overall 
“count,” as the poem’s adult speaker implies that they should be, then the girl herself 
would be re-cast in a new role: no longer caretaker nor companion of John and Jane, she 
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affected multiple times” and within just a few months “the birth-order hierarchy had been 
completely reshuffled.” 




becomes the baby of the family—and, with her other four siblings clearly absent, 
essentially the only child of the household.  
Displaced into this subordinate position of lone youngest, the girl of this newly 
reordered family of “five” would possess the fewest privileges and endure the most 
burdens. If, before her two nearest siblings had died, the girl had been fifth of the seven, a 
middle child more likely to depart from the neighborhood of origin, she now becomes 
trapped in her infantile status with its far more limited options, such as the daunting 
material and psychological obligation of caring for her aging mother in their shared 
cottage, a responsibility that would likely delay her own marriage and independence until 
well after her mother’s death.25 At the same time, having fewer siblings within her age 
bracket, with older siblings earning money for the household, the girl could also, after her 
two nearest siblings died, have had more familial resources allocated to her.26 But the loss 
of John and Jane could, equally likely, have significantly reduced the household income, 
since young children often garnered food from local sources or gained small monetary 
contributions through regional work that could add to the domestic coffers.27 Without 
these economic additions, this young girl and her mother might be more destitute now 
than before. Be that as it may, the girl’s willful obliviousness to these material alterations 
marks her greater preoccupation with the affective, emotional, and psychological 
                                                
25 See Wall, “Marriage, Residence,” 259; and Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family 
Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 346. 
26 See, for example, a study of latter nineteenth-century siblinghood and the influence on familial 
resources in northern European countries by Bianca Suanet and Hilde Bras, “Sibling Position and 
Marriage Timing in the Netherlands, 1840-1922: A Comparison Across Social Class, Local 
Contexts, and Time,” Journal of Family History 39, no. 2 (2014): 126-139. 




ramifications of these sibling deaths, rather than their financial, social, or physical 
consequences. But in either case, the threatening power of the speaker’s imposing “five” 
looms large.  
So when this girl adamantly insists that “we are seven” rather than “five,” she 
argues about far more than how to account for the dead. Rejecting her interlocutor’s 
arithmetical, binary logic does not mean she is naïve enough to believe that her siblings 
are magically somehow still alive, but that she recognizes how this new numbering would 
fundamentally modify her inclusive family paradigm and dismiss its members’ intrinsic 
interdependence. Accepting the speaker’s “five” would diminish her future prospects and 
rewrite her past history; “five” would indicate that she had never partaken in a small triad 
of kin who were raised together; “five” would mean that she no longer has any siblings in 
proximate age or location. “Five” signifies, most of all, that she is for all practical purposes 
an only child. “Seven,” in contrast, acknowledges the original hierarchy among her 
siblings, maintaining the various relationships shared within that network. “Seven” 
ensures that her own position remains the same, that she continues to live within the 
familial organization into which she was born: that she still occupies her given “spot.” 
And “seven” allows for epistemological expansion and new ontological relations—
affective, numerical, or otherwise.  
Ultimately, the girl’s logic of “seven”—a logic of multiplicity rather than of 
binaries—wins out over that of her stubborn interlocutor. But in contrast to what critics 
have previously argued, I would like to suggest that her victory is not to be attributed to a 




Nor does it derive from a child-like and transcendent spirituality, as we have seen. The 
girl succeeds in sustaining her sibling family, with all its positions intact, regardless of 
living status, because she understands the flexibility that sibling logic affords her—a fluid 
multiplicity that Wordsworth reinforces by welcoming it into his own rhythmic poetics. In 
each line where the little maid reiterates her claim that “we are seven,” the poem’s 
mechanical meter expands to accommodate her fluid thinking. Wordsworth’s alternating 
4/3 ballad line-pairs swell to furnish room for the odd number of syllables and irregular 
rhythms that the two syllables of “sev-en” demand. For instance, in her reply “‘How 
many? seven in all,’ she said” (15), the “seven” disrupts the middle of this four-beat line 
with an anapestic substitution. When one speaks the line without eliding “sev-en” into a 
single syllable—when, in other words, one lets each syllable count—the line conjures an 
awkward, almost stuttering break in the otherwise even tetrameter rhythm. The meter 
upsets its expected eight-syllable measure to shift into an irregular count of nine syllables. 
Moreover, her verbal reply itself (“How many? seven in all”) totals seven. With each of 
her other lines of argumentative proposition—“She answered, ‘Seven are we’” (18); 
“‘Seven boys and girls are we’” (30); “‘O Master! We are seven’” (64); and “And said, 
‘Nay, we are seven!’” (69)—this word “sev-en” refuses to fit the strict metrical count, 
extending each trimeter pace into seven syllables. With each utterance of the child’s 
reiterated “seven,” Wordsworth constructs the line as a literal count of that number. 
Flexing the binary march of the iambic ballad, the meter fluctuates to embrace the 
semantic weight of each iteration. Thus the poem embodies the same exact count from 




In the end, the girl’s “we are seven” performs what it promises. While the 
interlocutor demands a sum that would adhere to dualistic logic—yes or no, seven or five, 
stressed or unstressed, counted or uncounted—the girl’s utterances unleash a pluralized 
ontology. The speaker discards her statement as failed discourse, but we need not repeat 
his error. Glossing the young girl’s utterances as “performative” rather than 
“constative,”28 we can appraise her speech acts not as naïve attempts to bring the dead to 
life in literal (or even transcendental) terms, but instead as discursive invocations of the 
siblings in the present through consciously self-constructed—and self-constructing—
narratives. Without this linguistic embodiment, without the narrative variations that she 
offers, the siblings would no longer exist. Yet the girl knows this fact. Her defiant speech 
acts allow the siblings to endure at the level of poetic imagination. In her words, in her 
memories, and in her performative acts of counting, the girl’s sibling kinship continues to 
signify: it is in those words that her “we” can be—indeed, “are”—“seven.” 
III. The Set is Broken 
Despite the girl’s masterful poetic performance, however, the specter of sibling 
death lingers. Though I have argued that the girl sustains her alternative ontology at the 
levels of narrative, affect, and meter, Wordsworth’s own fears of sibling loss, and its 
resulting isolation, still threaten to destabilize this integrated system. Like several of 
Wordsworth’s other poems, “We are Seven” gestures towards the instability threatened 
by the removal of any siblings—a separation that the speaker’s “five” would make 
permanent. In a moment when the girl clings most adamantly to her kin, the poem 
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entertains the possibilities of division:  
‘Two of us in the church-yard lie, 
‘My sister and my brother, 
‘And in the church-yard cottage, I 
‘Dwell near them with my mother.’ (19-24) 
In these seemingly innocuous lines, wherein the girl connects herself to both her siblings 
and her mother’s cottage, the girl confirms her temporary divorce from them as well: the 
siblings are in pairs, she the odd one out; she remains at home, they live away together. 
But the gravest danger lies at the end of this stanza’s penultimate line, where the girl’s “I” 
dangles precariously apart from everything she knows. With an insidious comma, 
Wordsworth amputates this “I” from the girl’s immediate surroundings: she is 
orthographically severed from the protective shelter of her “cottage”; she hangs 
tentatively apart from the enjambed “Dwell” that would return her to her “mother.” 
Disrupting her proximity to these representations of home, the line plays with her 
estrangements, wrenching her subtly but dramatically from her comforting domestic 
contexts. Furthermore, this “I” rhymes disturbingly with the position of her dead siblings 
who “lie” in their graves nearby: the girl is pushed eerily close to the “church-yard” 
herself. Divided from her siblings and from her mother in this tenuous moment, the girl 
teeters upon a precipice where her “I” is—if for only an instant—starkly alone. This is the 
fate, one embodied in the speaker’s “five,” that the girl so urgently resists. 
By momentarily suspending the girl from her affective attachments, the poet 
alludes to a distress around sibling loss that resonated throughout the Wordsworths’ lives. 
Familial disruption had become an almost ubiquitous experience in William’s youth, such 




removed from the paternal home following their mother’s death in 1778, when she was 
only six years old. She remained separated from her four brothers, even after their 
father’s death five years later, in 1783, which orphaned the sibling clan. Not reunited fully 
until their early twenties, William and Dorothy chose to reside together over the 
subsequent half century throughout their entire adult—and, in William’s case, married—
lives. Sharing both domestic duties and financial and intellectual vocations, Dorothy and 
William hoped to recreate and preserve in adulthood what had been robbed of them in 
youth. The Wordsworth siblings were, in 1793, eagerly awaiting—and lamenting the 
constant delay of—what, as Dorothy put it to her childhood friend Jane Pollard, would be 
the “Day of my Felicity, the Day in which I am once more to find a Home under the 
same Roof with my Brother… and there is much Ground to fear that my Scheme may 
prove a Shadow, a mere Vision of Happiness.”29 Simply imagining this reunion seems to 
forebode its impossibility. In childhood they had “in the same moment lost a father, a 
mother, a home,” Dorothy records, afflictions that “have all contributed to unite us closer 
by the Bonds of affection notwithstanding we have been compelled to spend our youth far 
asunder.”30  
Both before and after the Lyrical Ballads were published, the threat of loss seeped 
deeply into the Wordsworth household. In 1805, this threat became reality when William 
and Dorothy’s younger brother John died unexpectedly at sea. In his mournful response 
to this traumatic event, Wordsworth announced that their sibling unit had now been 
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irreparably destroyed: “God keep the rest of us together!” he wrote to his eldest brother 
Richard, “the set is now broken.”31 A few years later, Wordsworth would again witness 
precisely the kind of devastation incurred by sibling separations, this time in his adopted 
Lake District community.  
In March 1808, an impoverished local Grasmere couple died accidentally after 
falling off a snowy cliff, effectively orphaning their eight children. William coaxed 
Dorothy to record the events in what would become her unpublished manuscript, The 
Narrative of George and Sarah Green. There Dorothy documents the community’s efforts to 
provide money, housing, nourishment, and, eventually, foster families for these destitute 
children. Though every effort was made to keep them within the community, the parents’ 
deaths resulted in the sibling network’s being broken, dismantled, and rearranged—
turning what was once a whole of “eight” into solitary ones and twos.32 While celebrating 
the community’s recuperative acts of kindness, Dorothy also reveals the resulting 
emotional distress, as when two brothers find themselves facing separation: 
The younger sibling sate upon her lap [i.e., Miss Knott, the lady who had fetched 
them on the day of their parents’ deaths] while we remained in the house, and his 
Brother leaned against me: they continued silent; but I felt some minutes before 
our departure, by the workings of his breast, that the elder Boy was struggling 
with grief at the thought of parting with his old Friend. I looked at him and 
perceived that his eyes were full of tears: the younger Child, with less foresight, 
continued calm till the last moment, when both burst into an agony of grief.33 
 
                                                
31 Written on 11 February 1805, after receiving news from Richard of John’s death; Letters, 540. 
32 The two eldest Green girls remained where they had been (one in domestic service, the other 
living with the Wordsworths), and a younger boy was adopted by a half-brother. Of the five 
remaining children who were placed under parish care, two boys were taken in by a farmer and 
his wife, one adopted by a friend of George Green, and two sisters housed by a local couple. 
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The depth of their “agony” at parting testifies to the strength of the boys’ sibling bonds. 
Removed from their original family, the Green children encounter significantly reduced 
sibling arrangements. While Dorothy’s Narrative applauds the community’s charitable 
efforts, she cannot escape the disturbance of such devastating sibling subtractions.  
Throughout his poetry of the 1790s, Wordsworth tries to defend against the 
reality of such traumas as the result of sibling loss, separation, and death. Whether or not 
beset by William’s and Dorothy’s own anxieties of familial fragmentation, the speakers of 
Wordsworth’s poems consider sibling relations to be intrinsic to self-consciousness, and 
are determined to maintain sibling connections in the face of loss, both tangibly and 
metaphysically. Where in “We are Seven” the little girl perceives her house and the 
sibling graves as synecdochal representations of her entire family unit, in Wordsworth’s 
other sibling-oriented poems the speakers confront relationships to place and home 
through sibling kinship, further preserving these relations beyond death.  
In the summer of 1800, Wordsworth ruminated on sibling attachments in another 
fictionalized tale of seven siblings, a short fable with a lengthy title: “The Solitude of 
Binnorie, or the Seven Daughters of Lord Archibald Campbell.” Composed in August 
and published in The Morning Post on October 14, 1800,34 this work was later retitled “The 
                                                
34 Carol Landon dates the poem’s composition to some time between February 26, when the 
Morning Post printed Mary Robinson’s Haunted Beach, from which the “Seven Sisters” draws its 
meter, according to Coleridge’s editorial note, and August 17, when Dorothy mentions it in her 
journal (“Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Morning Post: An Early Version of ‘The Seven Sisters,’” 
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“7 sisters on a stone,” Dorothy records that Coleridge had arrived “very hot” on the afternoon of 




Seven Sisters” for the 1807 Poems.35 Like “We are Seven,” it portrays a sibling group as a 
collective unit with interdependent identities, sustaining totality over individuation. The 
ethos of communal existence is so strong, in fact, that the seven sisters of this poem elect 
to engage in an act of group suicide rather than risk losing even one of their members. 
Death only draws them closer. 
When the poem begins, the sisters are indistinguishable, pictured as “[s]even lilies 
in one garland wrought” (5), preserved together in their idyllic scene of pastoral purity: 
“The Seven, in rural fashion, / Beneath a tree were sitting, free / From all unquiet 
passion” (24-26).36 This solitude is interrupted only by the arrival of foreign male 
“warriors” (18), who approach the virginal maidens “[w]ith menace proud, and insult 
loud” (36). The sisters escape this threat, first through temporary and chaotic separation 
(“Away they fly to left, to right” [29]; “Some close behind, some side by side” [45]), but 
then they choose to plunge to their mutual destruction: “in together did they leap” into 
the nearest lake (52), exclaiming as they go, “nay, let us die, / And let us die together!” 
                                                                                                                                            
Alfoxden Journals, ed. Pamela Woof [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008],15). Thus “Seven 
Sisters” coincides with the 1800 Lyrical Ballads, despite not being published in that volume.  
35 Though mostly overlooked today, this poem enjoyed popularity throughout the nineteenth 
century. Based on a German fable, “Die sïeben Hügel” (“The Seven Hills”) (1793), it was 
included in more than a dozen anthology collections and grammar books for children, including 
the following: Giraldus, Nightingale Valley. A Collection, including a great number of the choicest lyrics and 
short poems in the English Language (London: Bell and Daldy, 1860); Anon., Playtime with the Poets: A 
Selection of the Best English Poetry for the Use of Children. By a Lady (London: Longman, Green, 
Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1863); Coventry Patmore, ed., The Children’s Garland, From the Best 
Poets (Cambridge: Severs and Francis, 1863); Larkin Dunton, ed., The Land of Song. Book III. For 
Upper Grammar Grades (New York and Boston: Silver, Burdett & Company, 1899). Moreover, “The 
Seven Sisters” appears alongside “We are Seven” in a mid-century German-English reader, The 
English Reader, or, A Selection of Pieces in Prose and Poetry, from the Most Eminent Modern Writers…by Dr. H. 
M. Melford (Brunswick: Frederick Vieweg and Son, 1844). 
36 See reprint of the 1800 version in Landon, “Wordsworth and Coleridge,” 401-402; she also 




(47-48). These sisters choose a collective death “together” rather than face parting—
either by kidnapping, sexual violation, or enforced marriage, all of which seem likely 
outcomes of this abrupt male invasion. In both “The Seven Sisters” and “We are Seven,” 
seven siblings preserve their singularity in both life and death. For these young women, 
there can be no existence, either figurative or literal, outside conjoined sorority.  
In a more well-known poem from the Ballads collection, “The Brothers,” 
Wordsworth will narrate yet another version of sibling death, one that seems perhaps 
more destructive than are the deaths we find in “We are Seven,” but which, like that 
poem, similarly offers a restorative vision of sibling preservation. In the opening of “The 
Brothers,” the protagonist Leonard Ewbank has returned home to Ennerdale after twenty 
years at sea, having originally left to earn an income to support himself and his brother. 
Now Leonard comes back to his native village in the hopes of reuniting with this “only 
brother” whom “he so dearly lov’d.”37 He discovers, however, that James has since died. 
Upon this brother’s death, Leonard confronts revisions of his family story and of his own 
identity. He is not merely an only child now, but he is also the only Ewbank left.  
James’s absence shifts Leonard’s capacity to identify the sights of his hometown. 
Leonard’s original understanding of these native hills had been formed through a 
combined subjective experience with his brother, and he becomes unable to identify not 
only the anonymous graves in his family plot, but also the entire surroundings, including 
the natural landscape that was once so familiar to him. The scenery, formerly taken in 
with James by his side, now becomes illegible:  
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  …as he gaz’d, there grew 
Such a confusion in his memory,  
That he began to doubt, and he had hopes 
That he had seen this heap of turf before,  
That it was not another grave, but one 
He had forgotten…. 
  …He lifted up his eyes, 
And looking round he thought that he perceiv’d 
Strange alteration wrought on every side 
Among the woods and fields, and that the rocks, 
And the eternal hills, themselves were chang’d. (83-97) 
The longer Leonard lingers to “gaze” at these graves, the more perplexed he becomes. 
This confusion then spreads to his perceptions more broadly. When he draws his gaze 
outward and upward to the natural landscape, he wonders whether the material objects 
of the “woods,” “fields,” “rocks,” and “hills” have also changed. But no, he discovers; it is 
his own perception that has changed, not the physical objects themselves. His subjectivity, 
embodied in the things that he “thought” and “perceiv’d” with James, is what causes this 
“[s]trange alteration.”  
In other words, Leonard’s senses are transfigured because his original impressions 
of the natural environment had once been formed in co-consciousness with his brother. 
As the narrating Priest recounts, the brothers had been like two “brother fountains” (143) 
that “bubbled side by side” (141) as constant “[c]ompanions for each other” (142). These 
brothers “had much love to spare, / And it all went into each other’s hearts” (251-52). 
Rambling across the local landscape together, they had shaped their knowledge of the 
world through one another’s eyes: “Leonard and James! I warrant, every corner,” the 
Priest exclaims, “Among these rocks and every hollow place / Where foot could come, to 




These are the same rocks and flowers that now seem so alien to Leonard. Trekking 
everywhere together, Leonard and James had, at times, even shared the same body: 
“Would Leonard then…go staggering through the fords / Bearing his brother on his 
back” (261-63). Each brother’s encounters with the world had been filtered through the 
other’s, sometimes as literally as walking upon the same two feet. Now that his partner is 
missing, Leonard cannot access this inter-subjectivity. He can no longer process what he 
sees because his perceptions were never meant to be experienced in solitude.  
Each Ewbank brother suffers from the other’s absence. While Leonard had been 
away at sea, the Priest explains, James too had deteriorated for lack of fraternal kinship: 
“when his Brother / Was gone to sea and he was left alone / The little colour that he had 
was soon / Stolen from his cheek, he droop’d, and pin’d and pin’d” (347-350). In 
Leonard’s absence, James’s yearning disorients him into a weakened state that eventually 
kills him: he walks off a cliff in delusory pursuit of Leonard. Neither brother can 
comprehend the space of home without the other. In the end, Leonard chooses to depart 
rather than stay in this defamiliarized homeland. Finding he cannot linger in a location 
that will only remind him of his brother’s death, Leonard leaves behind “[t]his vale, 
where he had been so happy, seem’d / A place in which he could not bear to live” (439-
440). He returns, instead, to sea, the one place where James can continue to endure in his 
imagination. Like the young maid in “We are Seven,” Leonard chooses to preserve his 
sibling narrative of “we are two” in the only place he can.  
This paradigm of brotherhood shaping the physical and affective experiences of 




transparently autobiographical poem that Wordsworth composed during the same 
summer weeks of 1800 when he was also writing “The Brothers” and “The Seven 
Sisters.”38 In yet another rendition of sensory experiences of space being transfigured 
through the presence of a brother, Wordsworth invokes here the role of his own brother, 
John, who had been staying with him and Dorothy in Grasmere since January of that 
year. The poem opens with the speaker meditating alone in a wooded retreat. He depicts 
a particular spot, nicknamed the “Fir-grove,” a “cloistral place” where he would 
frequently retire by himself during the snowed-in winters, seeking quiet “refuge” from the 
“busy world.” Though he spends much time here, recollecting that “[f]ull many an hour 
/ Here did I lose,” the speaker is disgruntled by the limited room he finds amidst the 
dense foliage: “vainly did I seek, beneath their stems / A length of open space, where to 
and fro / My feet might move without concern or care” (36-38). Unable to mark out 
adequate pacing ground, he abandons this spot in search of a more welcoming (and 
penetrable) respite.  
Come springtime, however, the poet-speaker stumbles again upon this grove, only 
to discover that a fresh avenue has been cut through it: “there I found / A hoary pathway 
traced between the trees…that I stood / Much wondering how I could have sought in 
vain / for what was now so obvious” (47-52). Surprised by joy at the pathway’s sudden 
appearance, it occurs to Wordsworth that his own sea-faring brother was responsible for 
having worn this easy route during the weeks and months after the poet had himself 
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abandoned it. The “[p]leasant conviction flashed upon my mind, / That … / [John] had 
surveyed it with a finer eye, / A heart more wakeful; and had worn the track / by pacing 
here” (58-62). Much like the “flash” that defines his trek across the Alps in Book VI of The 
Prelude, this sudden recognition comes upon the poet with unexpected immediacy to 
reveal a necessary truth: his brother’s encounter with the place transforms his own.  
The speaker’s relationship to this location takes on new resonance. From being a 
spot he had “ceased…to frequent” (41), it becomes, after his brother’s revision, one in 
which he chooses daily to “sit at evening” (90). From despising the grove for its physical 
inconveniences and his personal inability to probe its secrets, the speaker now finds that 
the space holds particular appeal: “now / I love the fir-grove with a perfect love” (86-87). 
His brother’s presence has converted the speaker’s orientation. Even though the speaker 
thought he intimately “knew” Nature before, the poem displaces such assurances. It is 
only after his brother’s occupation of the hidden, cloistered woods that the poet can 
encounter his fullest understanding. Once thinking that he would best experience Nature 
while solitary, alone, and retreating from the external world, Wordsworth finds himself, at 
the end of the poem, even imitating his absent brother’s actions, walking both his own 
path and his brother’s in a sort of doubled communion: “Alone I tread this path;—for 
aught I know, / Timing my steps to thine” (105-6). His own subjectivity relies upon 
relations with his kin—his walk “Alone” is not, in fact, individual, but synchronous with 
another’s. 
Though John is not yet dead like the siblings in “We are Seven” and “The 




While the speaker misses his brother, he treads the same footpaths, marking steps as does 
the girl of “We are Seven,” who marches back and forth between her cottage and the 
siblings’ graves. This metaphoric overlapping of steps also recalls the parallel path cut by 
Leonard Ewbank as he carries James upon his back. Wordsworth further capitalizes upon 
this communal production of space in the closing subsection of the second volume of the 
Ballads, the “Poems on the Naming of Places.” Here, Wordsworth explicitly ties his ability 
to narrate the story of a place to his experience of companionship. In the prefatory 
advertisement to this group of poems, Wordsworth explains that there are often “many 
places [that] will be found unnamed or of unknown names, where little Incidents will 
have occurred, or feelings experienced,” and it is to these spots that he wishes to assign a 
personalized record. But he cannot do so alone. “Names have been given to Places by the 
Author and some of his Friends,” he remarks, for this process of naming must be a 
collective activity.39 Unnamed spaces might appear as blank tablets awaiting his 
inscription, but they cannot be identified alone.  
IV. “Tintern Abbey” and the Spots of Sibling Time 
John Wordsworth was, of course, not the only sibling to engage Wordsworth’s 
imagination and to influence his sense of both space and time, and no work perhaps 
captures the intricacies of siblinghood more quintessentially than “Lines written a few 
miles above Tintern Abbey.” But even though, as Coleridge conveyed to Cottle, the 
Ballads were conceived as a project of connections in kind, the magnum opus of “Tintern 
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Abbey”—and its closing address to Dorothy—has often been isolated. In particular, the 
final fifty lines are frequently plumbed for evidence of William and Dorothy’s real-life 
relationship and interpreted, alternately, as justification for the poet’s genuine homage to 
her,40 as an attempt to honor Dorothy while suppressing her individual growth,41 or as a 
sign of the poet’s narcissistic absorption of the feminine other.42 Most recently, scholars 
like Heidi Thomson have sought middle ground, in which Dorothy and William 
constitute a mutually constructive, collaborative relationship. As Thomson notes, in 
“Tintern Abbey” we find a “continuous necessity for a web of interlocution between 
Wordsworth and his sister” that sustains his poetic vision.43 But what Thomson and 
others have not recognized is that this web of interlocution can be found across the 
multitude of Wordsworth’s sibling poems—and in the inter-relationships between them.  
In fact, “We are Seven” and “Tintern Abbey” were intrinsically linked. When his 
travels up the Wye Valley took Wordsworth to Tintern Abbey in the summers of 1793 
and 1798, ultimately inspiring his famous “Lines,” he also visited the grounds of 
Goodrich Castle, a medieval fortification located 30 miles north of Tintern between the 
towns of Monmouth and Ross-on-Wye. There, in 1793, Wordsworth had met the young 
country girl who would become the subject of “We are Seven” five years later. 
                                                
40 Alan Grob, “William and Dorothy: A Case Study in the Hermeneutics of Disparagement,” 
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Wordsworth’s 1798 visit to Goodrich is often glossed over, however, perhaps because the 
poet mistakenly told Isabella Fenwick he would not revisit Goodrich until fifty years later, 
in 1841.44 His Memoirs, in contrast, offers a different account:  
We left Alfoxden on Monday morning, the 26th of June, stayed with Coleridge till 
the Monday following, then set forth on foot towards Bristol. We were at Cottle’s 
for a week, and thence we went toward the banks of the Wye. We crossed the 
Severn Ferry, and walked ten miles further to Tintern Abbey, a very beautiful 
ruin on the Wye. The next morning we walked along the river through 
Monmouth to Goderich [sic] Castle, there slept, and returned the next day to 
Tintern, thence to Chepstow, and from Chepstow back again in a boat to 
Tintern, where we slept, and thence back in a small vessel to Bristol.45  
 
Having first accessed the Abbey via the river route, Wordsworth, with his sister Dorothy 
in tow, trekked from Tintern to Goodrich the following day. The siblings stayed the night 
near Goodrich before returning by road to Tintern the next morning. In 1798, their treks 
to Tintern bookended a daylong sojourn to their northernmost destination of Goodrich, 
and while their interest there might have been literary in nature—contemporary 
guidebooks pointed to Goodrich as the “birth-place and residence of the ancestors of 
[Jonathan] Swift”46—their motivations were, one might presume, far more likely 
personal. Wordsworth would have been eager to show his sister the place where he had 
met the young girl of his recently completed poem, “We are Seven,” which was then at 
the printer’s along with the rest of the Ballads, and which Dorothy had transcribed. So 
while William began contemplating his lines to Tintern, the siblings were located, quite 
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literally, just a few miles above the Abbey at Goodrich. Whenever Wordsworth began to 
actually compose the lines, either while walking from Tintern to Goodrich, or on their 
way back to Bristol a few days later,47 he certainly would have had the earlier poem fresh 
in mind. If, as Coleridge put it, the Ballads collection should be considered “one work, in 
kind tho’ not in degree”—a group of related, sibling verses—then these two poems, “Tintern 
Abbey” and “We are Seven,” can be understood as particularly close kin. 
 As in “We are Seven,” “Tintern Abbey” explores the temporal and spatial 
structures of siblinghood, but “Tintern Abbey” explicitly layers the internalized 
temporalities that create the poet’s self-consciousness: the past, present, and future 
moments that are materially represented by the interplay between siblings. In particular, 
this poem combines the two modes of relationality that are enabled by sibling kinship: 
namely, the intra-generational framework of lateral, egalitarian, and equal positions with 
the inter-generational hierarchies implied by birth order and other vertical dimensions 
between particular brothers and sisters. In this way, the ending section of “Tintern 
Abbey” combines the spatial motif of a spreading network of horizontally-organized kin 
connections—a geographical displacement like that we see in “We are Seven”—with the 
temporal motif of differentiated “degrees,” to use Coleridge’s word descriptive of the 
Ballads as a whole. Wordsworth’s poem thus unfolds some of the structural ramifications 
of sibling logic as implied by, but not yet fully worked out in, Engelstein’s nascent theory.  
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To generate such a complex layering of inter- and intra-generational paradigms, 
Wordsworth positions Dorothy in three cotemporaneous positions: as present sibling, as 
past child, and as future progeny. When the poet-speaker first turns to her, Dorothy 
appears as his “Sister” and “Friend,” his un-chosen childhood equal and his selected 
lifelong companion. Then, her introduction as intra-generational kin, as sibling and 
partner, takes puzzling rhetorical turns: Wordsworth injects this fraternal-sororal union 
into the discourse of parent and child—a rhetorical move akin to Beatrice Cenci’s sororal 
transmission to her brother Bernardo, who functions as both her tender brother and her 
imagined child. Characterized with “wild eyes” (120), Dorothy as a poetic “Sister” 
personifies the kind of “wild” primitive that Wordsworth reflects of his own “boyish days” 
(74). She resembles that child from a past time, the poet’s earlier self, for he can “read” 
(118) and “behold” (121) in her current bodily presence an image of that “former heart” 
(117) and an incarnation of “what [he] was once” (121). Where Wordsworth proclaims 
earlier in the poem that he cannot “paint” his boyhood, by now, at the end of the poem, 
he finds himself able to do just that, for Dorothy provides the canvas upon which he can 
render this vision. The Sister-Friend figure represents an earlier stage of life, a prior 
generation, that produces the speaker in the here and now. She is, in many ways, the 
child who fathers the man. 
Dorothy is not only a child of the past, however, but a child of the future as well. 
Wordsworth fashions her into a progeny-like preserver of his legacy, invoking the same 
kind of rhetoric Coleridge adopts in his “Frost at Midnight,” where he bestows wishes for 




sibling descendant in a similar manner, William blesses Dorothy here with a generous 
future in which she might be in touch with Nature: “Therefore let the moon / Shine on 
thee… / let the misty mountain winds be free… / When these wild ecstasies shall be 
matured / Into a sober pleasure, when thy mind / Shall be a mansion for all lovely 
forms…” (134-141, emphases mine). With these willful invocations, William urges 
Dorothy to allow Nature to cradle her when he no longer can. She will be his child: he 
now fathers her.  
While siblinghood takes on the nurturing of parenthood in this moment, 
Wordsworth’s metaphorical re-positioning of Dorothy retains one important difference: 
there is no hierarchical investment in biological descent. And while this inter-generational 
rhetoric has been frequently noted, the interdependence between temporalities has been 
less so. The temporality of siblinghood is, indeed, much different from the linear 
progression associated with normative biological reproduction of successive generations. 
In sibling time, the present depends, reciprocally and perhaps even paradoxically, upon a 
temporal interchange between past, present, and future. In this closing sequence, for 
instance, the future anterior mode converts the siblings’ experience of the “now” into a 
backwards-looking projection from a future time that will be deferred by the present—but 
a present only accessible through an accumulated set of past memories and experiences.  
With phrases like “nor…wilt thou then forget,” uttered twice at the poem’s close 
(150, 156), Wordsworth constructs the present as being available to them only in 
retrospect, as a past that Dorothy must later, at some unknown future time, recall as the 




(152, 153, 159). Inscribing the present as a reversed projection from the future, 
Wordsworth rounds off “Tintern Abbey” by creating a present that is always destined 
never to arrive. Dorothy informs William’s perceptions in the present through their 
shared affective bonds, which have been shaped over their shared pasts and their 
imagined conjoined future. But this is a future that has not yet transpired for the speaker 
himself—and, from the stance of the present, perhaps never will. The brother-sister union 
becomes a dream deferred. Thus the poem’s temporal construction becomes cyclically 
interdependent: the current time depends upon memories of the past, deferrals of the 
present, and anticipations of the future—all of which are conjured and embodied in the 
figure of his sister.  
“Tintern Abbey” thus illustrates the multi-dimensional temporal workings of 
sibling logic. These temporalities are adumbrated, but not yet developed, in the birth-
order dynamics that inform the little maid’s anxieties in “We are Seven.” The speaker of 
“Tintern Abbey” embraces sibling logic by imagining his own past and future selves 
through the woman who stands with him, here and now, upon the banks of the Wye. 
Later, in The Prelude, Wordsworth would conceptualize this sibling-like inter-subjectivity as 
a meeting of “two consciousnesses,” a multilayered awareness that describes the growth of 
his own mind as the juxtaposition of intervals and differences between past, present, and 
future selves. As much as Wordsworth used this phrase to define his internal self-
reflections, the layered consciousness he describes aptly suits the relationship materialized 
between the poeticized Dorothy and his poetic speaker-self. These two consciousnesses of 




of some other being,” a being that is his past and prior, more youthful and naïve self—an 
other that is externalized in the image of his past, and present, sibling.48 As a poetic 
figure, Dorothy functions as the “other” with and against whom Wordsworth constructs 
his evolving self, one that manifests in a varied layering of times and places.  
Bound through memories and conversations and personal intimacies, William’s 
and Dorothy’s sibling dynamic expands both forwards and backwards, embodying 
regressions and progressions of time—a state of being simultaneously here and not-here, 
both now and not-now. Thus the Sister and Friend of “Tintern Abbey” becomes far more 
than a companion: she is the screen onto which these projections are cast, through which 
Wordsworth frames his multi-layered self-construction, which is formulated, essentially, as 
and through a recognition of divisions and cohesions amongst past, present, and future 
selves. Only a sibling can play this uniquely reflexive role, for only a sibling can be the 
visual mirror into which one gazes to view both oneself and another, both one’s past and 
one’s present, the other’s past and present, and a combination of imagined futures. 
Dorothy is Wordsworth’s essential mirror—his vital spot of time.  
That famous phrase of Wordsworth’s has, as Alan Richardson suggests, often 
been distorted, but my suggestion here that Dorothy acts as William’s “spot of time” can 
aid us in recapturing that phrase’s complicated multidimensionality. As Richardson puts 
it, critics have typically misconstrued the phrase as if it indicated a “spot in time,” 
privileging the spatial resonances over temporal ones: it is a moment, an image, a 
memory frozen in the past. But this misreading, Richardson argues, erases tensions 
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Wordsworth intended to retain by collapsing the two registers into one. “[M]uch 
Wordsworth criticism,” Richardson goes on, “presents the ‘spot’ as a pictorial scene or a 
single moment, even as a frozen tableau”; as such, it has been “detemporalized.” The 
phrase has drifted from its original meaning as a “conflation of time with space,” with 
which Wordsworth provoked a fluid “binding together of a place with temporal 
movement [that] suggests not a pictorial but a dramatic scene,” fostering not a frozen 
image but, rather, “a dialogic relation between poet and nature.”49 These spots, 
Richardson rightly implies, should be comprehended not as two-dimensional scenes but 
as moving and multiplying instances of time that reverberate between experience and 
memory: not spots in time, but spots of time. They signify not Wordsworth’s isolation 
from the physical world around him,50 but rather his engagement with it, rooted in 
collective evolution within and through these varying temporal and spatial fluctuations.   
Through his sister, Wordsworth works out this particular paradox: Dorothy 
embodies both a spatialization of time (a spot in time, a “pictorial scene” or “frozen 
tableau”) as well as a temporalization of space (a spot of time, a “dynamic relation”). 
While Dorothy continues to age and to grow, she embodies a series of past, present, and 
future “spots” in which the two siblings shift and change in their own selves and in their 
fluid relationship to one another. In “Tintern Abbey,” Dorothy’s immediate presence in 
the here and now combines with William’s imaginings of their future separation; this 
                                                
49 Alan Richardson, “Wordsworth at the Crossroads: ‘Spots of Time’ in the ‘Two-Part Prelude,’” 
The Wordsworth Circle 19, no. 1 (1988): 15.  
50 Jonathan Bishop links the spots of time with the motif of “the emergence of a solitary figure 
from the crowd” (“Wordsworth and the ‘Spots of Time,’” ELH 26, no. 1 (1959): 47), while 
Richardson remarks on their association with “the child developing a sense of autonomy” 




combination contains the movements, evolutions, and regressions of temporal and spatial 
experience—a multidimensionality enabled by sibling kinship and through which 
Wordsworth traces the growth of his own mind.  
V. Redefining Time:  
“To My Sister” and the Queering of Sibling Logic 
 
Dorothy thus represents the fluctuations inherent in sibling time: the similarities 
and differences between the two siblings define any—and every—given moment. This 
spectrum encapsulates Wordsworth’s sibling logic, a logic without which his poetic “self” 
would not be possible. While “Tintern Abbey” draws out this multilayered generational 
thinking, Dorothy’s embodiment of sibling temporality is already present in an earlier 
poem as well: the third piece in the 1798 Lyrical Ballads, “Lines written at a small distance 
from my House, and sent by my little Boy to the Person to whom they are addressed”—
later renamed, more simply, “To My Sister.” In this poem, Wordsworth urges his sister to 
abandon her domestic tasks and to join him in the wild: “your morning task resign / 
Come forth and feel the sun.”51 He coaxes Dorothy out of doors—not for her own good, 
necessarily, but for his reliance upon her presence, both imagined and real. Beckoning 
Dorothy with increasing urgency—“Make haste” (11); “Put on with speed your woodland 
dress” (14); “Then come, my sister! come, I pray” (37)—the poet recognizes that only his 
sister’s future emergence into the woods will allow him to fully embrace his own 
“idleness” and immersion in nature (40). In other words, Dorothy’s future arrival is 
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required for his spiritual encounter; he needs their shared subjective experience: “Our 
living calendar,” “Our minds,” “Our temper,” and “our souls.”52 And yet the poem itself 
can only be conceived in her absence. It is distinctly because she is not there, neither 
bodily nor temporally present, that the speaker can fantasize their future reunion; and he 
can do so only because he knows her so intimately as his sibling. 
In “To My Sister,” Dorothy’s temporal and spatial absences, in addition to her 
presence across their shared pasts and futures, instruct the poet’s present self-conception. 
Using their sibling sense of temporality, Wordsworth reinvents a subjective framework for 
Time itself. Disgruntled with objective quantifications of the passing minutes, days, 
months, and calendar years that have been inflicted upon them, Wordsworth 
conceptualizes a new set of measurements that he and his sister might foster together. 
Replacing arbitrary designations like the “March” of the Gregorian calendar, he hopes to 
institute a pacing that honors, instead, their personalized perceptions of seasonal and 
daily rhythms. On this “first mild day,” for instance, Wordsworth determines that “[w]e 
from to-day, my friend, will date / The opening of the year” (19-20).53 Together, 
Wordsworth imagines, he and his sister will form a new calendar entirely, one that springs 
from their own impressions of the changing weather.  
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They will reinvent other measures of the day as well, converting the arbitrary ticks 
of seconds, minutes, and hours into a temporal system that can account for their affective 
interactions. The typical markers of the day—the “morning meal” (10) or the “minute” 
(2)—are traded for an individualized temporality based on the siblings’ shared “Love” 
(21), the affective power of moments shared between them: their own “hour of feeling” 
instead of the hour constituted by an arbitrary and neutral 60 minutes (24). Minutes and 
hours can be as fleeting or as eternal as the siblings’ subjective experience thus demands: 
“One moment now may give us more / Than fifty years of reason” (25-26). Since Time 
can expand or contract based upon its emotional content, the only clock they now need is 
each other.  
This idyllic scene, however, will remain forever a dream deferred. Wordsworth 
speaks of this moment in the delayed future tense, a projection that is always yet to come: 
“We…will date,” “Our minds shall drink” (27), “Some silent laws our hearts may make, / 
Which they shall long obey” (29-30), “We’ll frame the measure of our souls, They shall be 
turned to love” (45-46). Thus it is through Dorothy that Wordsworth can imagine the 
paradox that defines his spots of time. She embodies a spatialization of time: her physical 
body represents the cumulative moments that the siblings have shared and will continue 
to share over time. But she also embodies at the same instant a temporalization of space, 
a spot of time, as the dynamic relation between poet and other. Temporal variations 
within sibling hierarchies, which “Tintern Abbey” and “We are Seven” render visible, 
define siblinghood as a concatenation of temporal moments experienced and spread over 




not. These variances mark the multiplicity of sibling kinship. Wordsworth’s conflation of 
Sister-Friend metaphors with those of ancestry and progeny is meant to illustrate, rather 
than to pervert, the nature of sibling kinship.  
I would like to propose, in closing, that this temporalized logic of sibling kinship 
embraces a kind of queer temporality. Dorothy’s status as a spot of time offers an 
alternative to clock time, one that embodies a non-normative, non-progressive, and non-
linear experience. Recent queer theorists have, in similar terms, rejected the 
“reproductive futurism” employed by heteronormative, reproductive hegemonies.54 This 
queer “turn toward temporality,” conducted by critics such as Lee Edelman and 
Elizabeth Freeman, examines the array of modes in which our conscious experience of 
time need not reify the forward momentum of generational reproduction. Queer 
temporality, instead, expands into “backward emotional affects, [and] lateral queer 
childhoods”; it inhabits a “time that is attentive to the recursive eddies and back-to-the-
future loops” that are undetectable in a linear sense of progression from past to future; 
and it thrives by “feeling backward” into negative affects like “nostalgia,” “despair,” 
“escapism,” “withdrawal,” and “loneliness.”55 Queer time, in other words, skews the 
experience of temporal progression to be something other than linear, progressive, and 
forward-marching.    
In such a framework, the past is never complete; it remains contingent and 
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relative, dependent on the present and even the future; it is never entirely passed, never a 
self-contained entity. In queer theorists’ terms, non-normative and non-reproductive 
relations embrace such regression into the past and its denials of futurity. This feeling 
backwards mashes together the past and present in an ever-reciprocal back-and-forth 
loop, an experience identified with queer sexualities; but for Wordsworth, feeling 
backwards is simply in the nature of siblinghood. In Elizabeth Freeman’s terms, queer 
subjectivity instantiates “particularly inventive and time-traveling forms of grief and 
compensation that neither the normalizing work of the ego nor the statist logic of 
sequential generations can contain.”56 For Wordsworth, this is merely sibling logic. 
Wordsworth’s time-traveling grief performs multiple roles, perhaps extending 
even queer temporality itself: not only does this feeling backwards project the poetic 
speaker into a past that continues to evolve with the present, but this affective relation 
also projects the speaker into a future that itself continues to be contingent on the present 
that it creates. Wordsworth’s impetus moves through time both backwards and forwards, 
both inter- and intra-generationally, both linearly and queerly. For Wordsworth’s poetics, 
sibling logic embraces both the generative futurity of the child—his sister, in a potentially 
non-reproductive formulation—as well as the backward-looking affect of nostalgic 
modernity. This uniquely fluid temporality resists normative progression, illustrating 
instead the “persistence of the past in the present,” making “entities past and present 
touch,” and recognizing, inherently, that “the past is never fully over and never fully 
                                                




known.”57 Wordsworth’s sibling poems conjure not a poet-speaker enveloped in sublime 
isolation, but rather a sibling-ed self, a pairing of inextricable inter-subjective psyches that 
have been and will always be interdependent, even beyond death. For Wordsworth, 
neither past, present, nor future can ever be fully known in a given moment. But they can 
be imagined, through the eyes, heart, and mind of the sibling. This Wordsworthian “self” 
turns out to be something far more deeply interfused indeed. 
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Building the Bildung of Sisterhood in Austen’s  
Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility 
 
One of the truths most universally acknowledged about Jane Austen’s novels is 
that siblings are “literally everywhere.”1 From the central clans of the Dashwood or 
Bennet girls to notable off-stage siblings like the admirable Georgiana Darcy or the even 
less prominent unnamed brood of Lady Middleton, sisters and brothers—at minimum, 
173 of them in total2—appear throughout Austen’s oeuvre. Sibling rivalries thus 
undergird many of the novels’ familial relationships: Edward and Robert Ferrars compete 
for maternal approval; Lydia and Kitty Bennet scramble for parentally-condoned 
socializing privileges; Elizabeth, Mary, and Anne Elliot vie for paternal affection. 
Whether they live in subtle competition or even in amicable companionship with one 
another, siblings in any of the “3 or 4 Families in a Country village”3 that constitute 
Austen’s novels tend to vary noticeably in both temperament and personality.4  
Importantly, such differentiations set apart the protagonist: her characterological 
“roundness” distinguishes her from “flat” characters from whom, many argue, she must be 
“extricated” and “quarantine[d]” in order for her story of maturation to unfold.5 In this 
secondary status, siblings establish a surrounding field of oppositional forces: relegated to 
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the periphery, they clear space for the primary narrative consciousness by being 
“continually contrasted, juxtaposed, and related” to her.6 Sibling differences and 
differentiation, if not outright rivalry, thus inform each heroine’s Bildung progression. 
For most readers, Jane Bennet serves as one case in point. In comparison with her 
younger sister Elizabeth, Pride and Prejudice’s more decisive and outspoken heroine, Jane 
exhibits a far more timid, unsure, quiet, and hesitant persona. When, for instance, 
Elizabeth reports to her sister the two conflicting versions that she has received of 
Wickham and Darcy’s backstory, Jane offers her standard tentativeness: 
‘They have both…been deceived, I dare say, in some way or other, of which we 
can form no idea. Interested people have perhaps misrepresented each to the 
other. It is, in short, impossible for us to conjecture the causes or circumstances 
which may have alienated them, without actual blame on either side.’7  
 
With characteristic candor, Jane displays her willingness to give everyone the benefit of 
the doubt, which requires her, paradoxically, to evaluate nothing at all. Her language 
vibrates with notes of indeterminacy: “I dare say,” “we can form no idea,” “perhaps,” “It 
is…impossible.” In refusing to take sides, Jane seems incapable of holding any opinion.  
Critics tend to write Jane off as being merely a receptive confidante for Elizabeth, 
but one whose role in the novel remains otherwise negligible. She is, as Felicia Bonaparte 
describes her, “the sweetest of sisters, [but], from a practical point of view, 
epistemologically the worst,” for “she will make no decision at all”; and though her 
hesitancy may make “her a very pleasant young woman” to be around, it also means that 
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she is “not a very useful guide through the complexities of life.”8 Jane’s usefulness rests, if 
anything, in her uselessness. Along with her three other sisters, each one functionally 
feeble in her own way, Jane embodies one more means of approaching the world that 
Elizabeth must learn to avoid. Even those who do see Jane as an informative entity limit 
her status to that of a temperamental contrast: her value lies, essentially, in “her 
counterexample, which includes an extraordinary degree of selflessness and restraint.”9  
In defining Jane by these traits of sweetness and pacification, however, critics have 
undervalued the epistemological rigor that informs her innocuous demeanor—the kind of 
rigor I argue underwrites many of the female Bildungsroman storylines that constitute 
Austen’s novelistic corpus. It is not simply that Jane acts differently from Elizabeth, but 
that she thinks differently, too. Her way of thinking, moreover, is one that Elizabeth could 
adopt, in a way that she could never adopt Jane’s gentle persona. Jane’s epistemology 
may be transferable, whereas her personality is far less contagious. Specifically, Jane 
embraces a skeptical caution that separates frameworks of “feeling” (emotion, affect, 
intuition, prejudice) from those of “knowing” (truth, fact, objectivity, certainty). Unlike 
Elizabeth, who leaps so easily from impressions to facts, Jane registers the impossibility of 
conflating the two. In the encounter noted above, as well as elsewhere in the novel, Jane 
adheres to her innate understanding that information gathered via hearsay, initial 
impressions, and biased storytellers cannot be converted into objective truths—no matter 
how much her younger sister may wish they could be.   
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This chapter explores Austen’s first two published novels, Sense and Sensibility and 
Pride and Prejudice, to suggest that sisters—and not suitors—lay the foundation for Bildung 
evolution. Each sister’s self-consciousness shapes, and is shaped by, her sororal dynamics, 
as each appropriates and internalizes features from the other’s behavior until their two 
formerly distinct epistemological approaches intermingle, creating new frameworks that 
permit both sisters to see—and to act within—the world afresh. Where in Pride and 
Prejudice Jane Bennet models an alternative skepticism for Elizabeth, in Sense and Sensibility 
Elinor and Marianne Dashwood partake in complementary modes, educating one 
another until they can learn to tailor their external performances of behavior in order to 
mediate between immoderate self-exposure and restrained silence. 
I propose these sororal exchanges as an element uniquely suited to, and made 
available by, the female version of the Bildungsroman. The intimate, interpersonal, and 
mutual evolution of women within these familial networks reveals a distinct feature not 
only of siblinghood but also of the process of self-development: the complicated nature of 
seeing oneself in a new way, and performing accordingly. By shifting their mental 
representations of both themselves and their sisters, Elizabeth Bennet and Elinor 
Dashwood complete a demanding project of transforming psychological constructions of 
both self and other. In doing so, they willingly embrace an expansion of the “self,” 
accepting their inter-subjective nature as something penetrable and malleable, rather 
than upholding the ego as contained, bounded, and protected. In Austen’s novels, men 
may be the motivators, but sisters become the models and agents of change. In short, Jane 




I. Exchanging Sororal Sensibilities 
Over the course of Sense and Sensibility, Elinor and Marianne Dashwood learn two 
distinct but interrelated lessons: first, how to blend the extremes of “sense” with 
“sensibility”; but second, and perhaps more importantly, how to mediate between the 
dynamics of internal affect and its external performance—a lesson they each imbibe by 
watching the sister whose approach to life had seemed, initially, to be entirely different 
from her own. With its polarizing title terms, Austen’s novel seems to install a binary 
division between the two girls, with each sister representing one of these two categories. 
Yet for the most part, the narrative itself signals that these terms are much less 
distinguishable. However, it will take the characters quite some time to learn this truism 
and, afterward, to seek an ontological middle ground between the terms. In the 
meantime, each sister observes the other’s oppositional behaviors: Elinor demonstrates an 
affective restraint that will, eventually, temper her younger sister’s wildness; Marianne 
performs an unabashed self-exposure that will train Elinor how to display emotions. This 
mutual Bildung proves that “affiliation does not necessarily need to be found or forged” in 
these novels; “it needs to be understood, valued, and maintained.”10 Sisterhood is the key 
to personal development, for each sister will assimilate elements of the other into herself.  
While “sense” and “sensibility” initially appear to represent “mutually exclusive 
categories,”11 Elinor and Marianne are not in fact introduced as exclusive contrasts but, 
rather, each inhabits both categories to varying degrees. When the narrator first describes 
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them, Elinor is portrayed foremost through her rational qualities: her “strength of 
understanding,” “coolness of judgment,” and “knowledge.” Yet she is also painted as an 
emotional being with an “excellent heart” whose “feelings were strong.”12 Marianne, the 
hyperbolic romantic, may be “eager in every thing,” and her sorrows and joys show “no 
moderation,” but she too is cast with elements of reason, fashioned as both “sensible and 
clever” (8). Together, the two sisters personify the full continuum that spans the 
philosophical spectrum between reason and sentiment. 
Despite the omniscient narrator’s implication that both Marianne and Elinor 
share overlapping skills and traits in this arena, however, the young women see 
themselves as diametric opposites. Accordingly, each becomes exasperated by the other’s 
behaviors. Elinor’s outward impenetrability, for instance, alienates Marianne, who 
proclaims in anger, “‘We have neither of us any thing to tell; you, because you 
communicate, and I, because I conceal nothing’” (120). Not only does Elinor refuse to 
speak aloud of her internal state, but she also in no way alludes to that state through her 
outward expression—she communicates nothing. Marianne rejects this approach 
because, as far as she is concerned, her older sister cruelly chooses not to offer anything to 
her, either verbally or visually. Marianne takes offense at this seeming indifference 
because her own belief system leads her toward a more transparent elision of boundaries 
between internal and external. She prefers there be no filter between thought and deed.  
In kind, Elinor finds Marianne’s oppositional traits to be perplexing: she criticizes 
Marianne’s default identity, labeling her naively unaware and immature because she 
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wishes that her younger sister would moderate her outlandish public behavior. When 
Marianne reacts wildly to Willoughby’s sudden appearance in London, for example, 
Elinor refuses to “‘go to him this moment,’” as Marianne begs her to do, and expresses 
instead her belief in patience: “‘How can that be done? No, my dearest Marianne, you 
must wait. This is not a place for explanations. Wait only till to-morrow’” (126). Led by 
her own “steady conviction” (142), Elinor cannot comprehend why Marianne must be so 
demonstrative and urgent, and she explains in her best schoolmarm imperative that 
Marianne must certainly “wait” before taking any action. Throughout the novel, the 
sisters’ perceived philosophical disparities shape a majority of their interactions, from the 
different ways they evaluate Colonel Brandon—Elinor believing him to be “well-bred, 
well-informed, of gentle address” and Marianne finding him to have “neither genius, nor 
taste, nor spirit” (40)—to the ways that they assess Marianne and Willoughby’s courtship, 
with Elinor wishing “that it were less openly shewn” while Marianne “abhorred all 
concealment” (41). 
In order for Marianne and Elinor to adopt features of the other’s personality, they 
must come to recognize that this apparent divergence is more about surface than reality. 
Their epistemological difference lies not so much in a stark binary between sense and 
sensibility, but rather in a differing set of opinions about externalized behavior. Their 
chosen performances, and not their innate characteristics, are what separate them. Elinor 
and Marianne both naturally embrace a mixture of reason and feeling, but they differ in 
their external representations of their internal reactions. For Marianne, anything less than 




melancholic destitution over Edward’s absence from Barton Cottage, for instance, the 
younger sister remarks, perplexed: “‘How strange this is! … Even now her self-command 
is invariable. When is she dejected or melancholy? When does she try to avoid society, or 
appear restless and dissatisfied in it?’” (31). Elinor’s stony silence and “self-command” 
resist the kind of outward manifestations that Marianne herself would happily wear—
dejection, melancholy, restless dissatisfaction—and which she believes are necessary in 
order to offer visible signifiers that others might read. As the narrator reflects, Marianne 
“expect[s] from other people the same opinions and feelings as her own, and she judged 
of their motives by the immediate effect of their actions on herself” (143). Marianne is 
concerned less with Elinor’s emotions than with her communicative display of them—or, 
more accurately, her refusal to display.  
Elinor’s stoic façade seems to be a personal affront to Marianne’s desire for 
sororal intimacy. Marianne cannot imagine how emotions could be so self-contained, 
how she herself, for instance, could ever “‘appear happy when [she is] so miserable’” 
(134). In contrast, Elinor contains her interior state, whether it is depressed or joyful. Not 
only does she resist displaying emotion in disappointing situations, such as Edward’s lack 
of visitation, but she also responds equally obtusely after Marianne’s happy recovery from 
illness. “[I]t led to no outward demonstrations of joy, no words, no smiles,” the narrator 
tells us. “All within Elinor’s breast was satisfaction, silent and strong” (223). Choosing 
stoicism over expressiveness, Elinor differentiates herself from her sister. But both perform 
at the extremes.  




middle ground. If their perceptions of one another are to change, however, some 
significant cognitive and emotional obstacles must be overcome in order to replace prior 
assumptions with new frameworks for understanding the other’s identity. One’s 
perceptions of one’s siblings, after all, carry psychological baggage: from a young age, one 
develops and then solidifies an intuitive understanding of one’s siblings (and one’s self in 
reciprocal relation to them). These understandings are cultivated over the course of a 
shared evolutionary history—a history unlike that which we share with friends, spouses, 
teachers, employers, or even parents. While both men and women of the Bildung tradition 
may venture into the world in order to seek mentors and mates, the particularly fluid 
mixture of “similarity and difference, commonality and complementarity”13 that defines 
female friendships becomes much more complicated when we turn to the family. Since 
one carries an ingrained cognitive image of the sibling “other,” changing that perception 
is as difficult as changing the perception of self, if not more so.   
These psychological investments in another’s identity stabilize from a young age 
and remain consistent throughout one’s lifetime. One psychological researcher explains 
the scenario in this manner:  
Imagine if you can, both your spouse and yourself as being 95 years old and 
married for 70 long years. After such a long time period, each knows fairly well 
what to expect of the other, what the other is going to say and do. Similarly, after 
many years of interacting and communicating, the siblings’ characteristics solidify, 
and may evoke stereotypic responses from one another during interactions; thus 
interaction has little likelihood of altering characteristics.14 
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Siblings become ingrained in their ways—not only in the ways they act with one another, 
but also in the ways they expect one another to act. Surmounting these expectations and 
approaching a sibling with a fresh mindset is an almost impossible feat. One’s ongoing 
concept of her siblings results from seeing them respond to a variety of situations, and 
sisters and brothers develop their personality characteristics relationally, in direct 
response to one another.15 Changing one’s view of a sibling also therefore requires 
changing one’s view of oneself. 
 Austen’s narrator hints that Marianne and Elinor are the ones responsible for 
creating this mistaken view of their polarities, having reified their own perceptions of one 
another again and again. For example, when Marianne reveals her conviction that she 
and Willoughby do not need to be secretive about their affections, the narrator describes 
Marianne’s thoughts as blending the rhetoric of both reason and sentiment: “to aim at the 
restraint of sentiments which were not in themselves illaudable, appeared to her not 
merely an unnecessary effort, but a disgraceful subjection of reason to common-place and 
mistaken notions” (41). Linking, rather than separating, affect and logic, Marianne 
equates the “restraint of sentiments” with the “subjection of reason”—and equates them 
both as “disgraceful” acts. To deny one’s emotions is the same as denying one’s logic. In 
moments like these, we witness the gap between Marianne’s self-conception and her 
reality: she understands both logic and emotionality, but rejects one for the other while 
thinking that she is defending both. Elinor cannot see that combination in her sister, but 
we can. 
                                                




Only after Marianne’s illness will both women finally come to realize the value of 
their counterpart’s viewpoints. As a result, they each begin to embody traits that had been 
exhibited by the other and that, previously, they had each disdained. By the end of the 
novel, each sister tailors her individual behavior to reflect a middle ground between her 
prior self and the other extreme, one she has learned from the model of her sister. They 
each settle somewhere between impassioned sentiment and dispassionate logic.  
After Edward arrives at Barton and reveals that his brother, and not he, has 
married Lucy Steele, Elinor finally exhibits an observable external response. While the 
catalyst for her reaction lies in Edward’s revelation, the manner in which Elinor shifts her 
behavior resembles the emotional disclosure of her sister. Overwhelmed with feelings, 
Elinor now permits herself to respond physically to this new information: 
Elinor could sit it no longer. She almost ran out of the room, and as soon as the 
door was closed, burst into tears of joy, which at first she thought would never 
cease. Edward, who had till then looked any where, rather than at her, saw her 
hurry away and perhaps saw—or even heard, her emotion… (254) 
 
The narrator seems to smirk at the irony of this situation: Elinor does not run, per se, but 
“almost” escapes quite as quickly; she does not cry in the same room, but still sobs loudly 
enough for Edward to hear her next door. Thus Elinor begins to express the gravity of 
her interior sentiments, while struggling to restrain them with her typical apathetic guise. 
Elinor attempts to remain impenetrable by hiding herself, yet her visible and audible 
actions betray her feelings nevertheless. After Edward returns to propose, Elinor more 
completely releases herself from her former self-monitoring, now permitting herself to 
become outwardly “everything by turns but tranquil” (256). Her feelings of being 




give sedateness to her spirits, or any degree of tranquility to her heart” (257). This brand 
of expressive intensity has, of course, been modeled for her, all along, by Marianne. 
Accepting this new state, in which reason and emotion can function together in 
informing her external behavior, Elinor must abdicate her strict faith in cool, rational 
judgment. Reflecting on her post-proposal high, the narrator informs us of this transition: 
“To her own heart it was a delightful affair, to her imagination it was even a ridiculous 
one, but to her reason, her judgment, it was completely a puzzle” (257). Logic fails her; 
only Elizabeth’s inquisitive curiosity and her sentimental heart can make “sense” of 
recent events, only her exploratory imagination and her delight of heart can help her 
process what is happening. But these are Marianne’s quintessential values. Elinor picks 
them up when her own epistemological allegiances prove to be inadequate.   
In turn, Marianne qualifies her own prior “opinions” and “favourite maxims” in 
order to accept her second attachment to Colonel Brandon—a development that requires 
her to adopt some of Elinor’s performed traits, including the more reasoned, tempered 
state that had so frustrated her previously. But she does not swing to the other extreme 
completely; rather, Marianne finds a contented sweet spot between the recklessness of a 
life of romance spent in “irresistible passion” and a sexless life of spinsterhood spent “in 
retirement and study” (268). As the narrator informs us, Marianne’s unique fate will see 
her settle between the two possible oppositions: 
Instead of falling a sacrifice to an irresistible passion, as once she had fondly 
flattered herself with expecting,—instead of remaining even for ever with her 
mother, and finding her only pleasures in retirement and study, as afterwards in 
her more calm and sober judgment she had determined on,—she found herself at 
nineteen, submitting to new attachments, entering on new duties, placed in a new 




“Instead of” choosing an either/or course of action in which she pitches a tent at one end 
or the other of this spectrum, Marianne accedes to the roles of kinship: duty, obligation, 
propriety, and an awareness of social standards and expectations. These are paradigms 
that her sister Elinor has already prepared her to understand by modeling those standards 
herself. In the end, both sisters land at an epistemological midpoint: committed neither to 
the world of sense nor to the realm of sensibility exclusively, they demonstrate what was, 
for Austen, an “ideal state of affairs”: “when reason and feeling possess equal strength.”16 
To arrive at this happy equilibrium, the two adopt the performed traits of the other: 
Marianne tames her over-reactivity with Elinor’s calming brand of acceptance, while 
Elinor takes a cue from Marianne’s repertoire of sentimental display.    
II. Sisterly Self-Knowledge in Pride and Prejudice 
In Sense and Sensibility, the majority of Elinor and Marianne’s interactions take 
place in the public areas of the home, such as parlors, which is an appropriate setting 
given their novel’s concern with the public performance of emotion. In contrast, 
Elizabeth and Jane Bennet in Pride and Prejudice often enjoy the more private 
conversational space of their shared bedroom. As John Mullan observes, the two eldest 
Bennet girls seek one another’s listening ear a total of twelve times in the novel, compared 
with only five one-on-one conversations held between the Dashwood sisters. These 
frequent “sisterly chats”17 transpire after each major plot point, punctuating the narrative 
with conferences between Jane and Elizabeth as if they formed a joint consciousness 
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through which to filter the novel’s events: after she is introduced to Wickham, “Elizabeth 
relate[s] to Jane the next day” the events at her aunt’s home;18 when Jane receives news 
of Bingley’s departure, she “very soon communicated the chief of all this” to Elizabeth 
(89); after Elizabeth endures Darcy’s first proposal, her “impatience to acquaint Jane with 
what had happened could no longer be overcome” (146); following Darcy’s second 
proposal, “[a]t night she opened her heart to Jane” (243). The physical re-location from 
the parlor to the bedroom emblematizes the slight shift in focus between the novels from, 
on the one hand, external performance and public appearances in Sense and Sensibility to, 
on the other, internal self-perception in Pride and Prejudice. As with the Dashwood girls’ 
mutual evolution, Elizabeth learns to change her opinions in relation not only to herself 
but also to her sister as well—and, as this novel demonstrates, the one cannot be possible 
without the other.  
As the pinnacle of her Bildung learning process, and as the climax of the novel, 
Elizabeth arrives at a shocking realization: everything she has known before is wrong. 
After pondering Darcy’s confessional letter, Elizabeth registers her own prior ineptitude, 
marking this internal transition with a sudden exclamation, “‘Till this moment, I never 
knew myself’” (137). In a chapter that unfolds chiefly via free indirect discourse, this direct 
speech interrupts not only the cadence of the narrative but also Elizabeth’s own thoughts. 
Here, and now, she makes a rapid conversion, not just to a new understanding of the 
world but also, and more substantially, to a new understanding of herself. Now aware of 
her own formerly prejudiced assumptions, Elizabeth can, through this acquired self-
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knowledge, begin to evaluate other people based on new criteria: she commits to no 
longer being “blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd” (137). 
As many readers recognize, Elizabeth’s relinquishing of her previously prejudiced 
nature forms the foundation of her self-transformation. In order to arrive at that point, 
however, she must come to know herself differently, through a course of self-actualization. 
In what Lorna Ellis deems Elizabeth’s moment of “dramatic and decisive self-revelation,” 
our protagonist comes to “learn the…lessons of the Bildungsroman heroine” by “learn[ing] 
to regulate her wit, her sarcasm, and her appearance.”19 In another reading, Elizabeth is 
said to accumulate this necessary self-awareness through “systematic self-examination” 
that takes place “in solitude,” guiding her to correct her prior self-deceptions.20 In a 
further assessment by Felicia Bonaparte, Elizabeth’s self-directed learning is fashioned as 
the key to unlocking this narrative: “Elizabeth only, of the sisters, will learn, as she learns 
to read [Darcy’s] letter, the skill required to read the world. Her arriving at this skill is the 
bildung of the novel.”21 In all cases, Elizabeth learns something new. 
But whence does this learning originate—a learning that is so crucial to 
Elizabeth’s Bildung achievement? Despite critics’ insistence on the fact that Elizabeth 
learns a vitally new way of approaching the world, there has not yet been an adequate 
explanation as to the precise source of this learning. While the motivational catalysts for 
her transition may be quite clear—Darcy’s letter; her own past mistakes—the manner in 
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which Elizabeth changes appears to manifest as if from within a psychological and 
ideological vacuum. In other words, we know what she learns, and when and even why, but 
the how has remained distinctly unaccounted for. I wish to propose that the model upon 
which this self-transformation occurs is not Elizabeth’s own solitary, introspective self: it is 
Jane. Jane Bennet models an epistemological worldview that informs how Elizabeth’s 
Bildung takes shape. Whereas Elizabeth erroneously collapses her impressions into 
verifiable facts, Jane remains cautious of funneling feelings directly into knowledge, in a 
manner that Elizabeth must come to discover—the crux of her Bildung transformation.     
Thus Elizabeth is not the only person that Elizabeth begins to re-think and re-
read during her pivotal moment of self-awareness. Until now, she may have never known 
herself, but she also never knew her sister. Following Elizabeth’s initial outburst, “‘I never 
knew myself,’” she continues to frame her self-analysis around a new appreciation of her 
older sibling. In this sequence, she swerves from herself to Jane and back again, 
seamlessly, within just a few animated clauses:  
‘How despicably have I acted!’ she cried.—‘I, who have prided myself on my 
discernment!—I, who have valued myself on my abilities! who have often 
disdained the generous candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in useless or 
blameable distrust…’ (137) 
 
Finally claiming responsibility for her own subjective perceptions, Elizabeth reinforces her 
new position of self-critical awareness in a series of rapidly accumulating personal 
pronouns: “I” (thrice), “myself” (twice), “my discernment,” “my abilities,” “my sister,” “my 
vanity.” But while she turns inward, she also looks outward. In the single moment where 
Elizabeth does not explicitly reiterate her self-reflexive “I” pronoun, her reflective impetus 




Jane’s presence becomes folded into the most climactic of Elizabeth’s personal 
realizations. Elizabeth’s “I” is not the only one under consideration here. 
While Elizabeth verbally criticizes her own character (“How despicably have I 
acted”), she turns promptly to Jane’s personality (“generous candour”) as well as to her 
own prior misperception of that personality (“with disdain”). Jane is incorporated into the 
midst of this intensely self-directed introspection, and this speech centers Elizabeth’s 
despicable pride and vain distrust—her worst default traits—around Jane’s best quality—
that feature of “candour” which Elizabeth formerly ignored by dismissing what appeared 
to be Jane’s tempered and indifferent persona. Realizing that she has always cast aside 
her sister’s approach to the world, Elizabeth sees now not only that this dismissal has 
prevented her from seeing her sister clearly, but also that it has stopped her from learning 
anything from her sister’s underlying motivation. Despite her own conscious rejection of 
Jane, however, Elizabeth has in fact been learning from her the entire time. As if to 
reinforce this inclusion of Jane into her new persona, the narrator informs us that, directly 
after her verbal outburst, Elizabeth travels mentally “[f]rom herself to Jane.”  
As a dividing point in the novel, this scene of self-realization separates Elizabeth’s 
previous behaviors from her new, more balanced perspective. The way in which this 
balance manifests sprouts from Jane’s epistemological instincts, ones that she has been 
exhibiting for her sister throughout their shared childhood. As Elizabeth’s thought 
process and verbal communication shift, they begin to reflect the kind of thinking and 
speaking that Jane has been modeling. This influence is in the nature of sibling relations: 




when one sibling learns certain characteristics, expectancies, or skills from another sibling 
that in turn influences future learning or behavior.”22 While Elizabeth may not be 
actively aware or conscious of this influence at the time, Jane’s consistent behavior 
infiltrates her young mind until the moment that the effects become clear later on. 
Elizabeth learns from her older sister an important epistemological distinction 
between feeling and knowing. While one cannot accept perceptions as if they were facts, 
this is a tendency towards which Elizabeth leans all too readily. She has always been 
willing to trust her immediate sensory impressions, but Jane cautiously resists drawing 
such speedy conclusions. Thus Jane’s skeptical doubt provides a roadmap for Elizabeth’s 
Bildung development. Prior to her scene of self- and sisterly-transformation, Elizabeth 
mistakenly exchanges one epistemology for the other, never pausing to consider that they 
are separate registers. Blending subjective and objective information, she draws 
judgments out of impressions. This tendency begins early on, when Darcy’s “forbidding, 
disagreeable countenance” (8) causes Elizabeth to assume anything he says or does in the 
future confirms this earliest verdict. When he begins showing her more attention, for 
instance, she dismisses it, remaining committed to her pre-conceived notions: “to her he 
was only the man who made himself agreeable no where” (16). Later, she informs him 
directly of this adherence to her own preordained assumptions:  
‘From the very beginning, from the first moment I may almost say, of my 
acquaintance with you, your manners impressing me with the fullest belief of your 
arrogance, your conceit, and your selfish disdain of the feelings of others, were 
such as to form that ground-work of disapprobation, on which succeeding events 
have built so immoveable a dislike…’ (148) 
 
                                                




From their first meeting, what Elizabeth witnesses of Darcy’s behavior only reinforces her 
initial opinions. For Elizabeth, Darcy’s character is decided in the first night of his 
appearance. Wickham, too, will fall subject to a similar assessment. In their initial 
meeting, Wickham’s appearance casts him with a favorable “person, countenance, air, 
and walk” (52). As such, Elizabeth assumes him to be rational, logical, and honest—a 
conclusion she reaches based solely upon subjective sensory input: she “honoured him for 
such feelings, and thought him handsomer than ever as he expressed them” (55). Her 
thinking is guided by her physical impressions of his external appearance: “there was 
truth in his looks” (59). 
But whereas Elizabeth readily jumps from appearances to facts, remaining blind 
to her willful prejudices, Jane embodies another approach altogether: she refuses to elide 
feelings into certainties. The sisters’ clash of perspectives becomes apparent during the 
girls’ first shared dialogue. Elizabeth teases her sister for being “a great deal too apt…to 
like people in general” (10). Since Jane “never see[s] a fault in any body,” Elizabeth 
censures her for what she believes to be Jane’s optimistic naiveté: “‘All the world are good 
and agreeable in your eyes. I never heard you speak ill of a human being in my life’” (10). 
Elizabeth dismisses Jane’s “candour”—her capacity to see the goodness of other people—
because, for her, this represents weakness.23 Yet this interchange reveals Elizabeth’s own 
flawed hastiness in drawing facts from impressions. Elizabeth declares universal truths 
about Jane’s behavior: she hyperbolically laments that Jane “in general” “never” sees fault 
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and values “all” the world as good, having “never” spoken ill of anyone. Elizabeth links an 
expression of the moment to enduring and irrefutable truths. Such extreme rhetoric 
speaks more to Elizabeth’s shortcomings than to Jane’s. Jane even rebuffs Elizabeth’s 
judgment, retorting, “‘I would wish not to be hasty in censuring any one; but I always 
speak what I think.’” Seeing Elizabeth’s hastiness in leaping from impression to judgment, 
Jane reaffirms that she does in fact “always” speak her mind, defying Elizabeth’s 
assumption that she has no evaluative opinions at all. In her stubbornness, of course, 
Elizabeth ignores Jane’s opinions: “Elizabeth listened in silence, but was not convinced” 
(10). 
Jane consistently embodies an alternative that eventually Elizabeth will respect. 
Jane delineates distinctions between perception and truth by occupying the realm of 
potential knowledge. When Elizabeth reports Wickham’s story to Jane, for instance, she 
weights belief, understanding, and expressions against fact. As noted in the opening to 
this chapter, Jane acknowledges the potential for misrepresentation, and when Elizabeth 
challenges her as speaking only positively of everyone, Jane declares her position as one 
that is reasoned from multiple perspectives:  
‘Laugh as much as you chuse [sic], but you will not laugh me out of my opinion. 
My dearest Lizzy, do not consider in what a disgraceful light it places Mr. Darcy, 
to be treating his father’s favourite in such a manner,—one, whom his father had 
promised to provide for.—It is impossible. No man of common humanity, no man 
who had any value for his character, could be capable of it. Can his most intimate 
friends be so excessively deceived in him? oh! no.’ (58) 
 
In response, Elizabeth reinforces her proclivity for believing her own impressions, 
expressing that she could “more easily believe” that Bingley had been erroneous than that 




affirming instead her one-sided commitment to Wickham’s story as verifiable: “a history” 
of “names, facts, every thing.” But where Elizabeth feels secure in her own evaluation, 
Jane inhabits the middle ground between certainty and uncertainty, allowing for 
indeterminacies and inconclusiveness: “I dare say,” “in some way or other,” “perhaps.” 
Jane’s hesitation is not a refusal to judge; rather, her hesitation marks her recognition that 
the sisters cannot deduce truth from their own personal feelings. Therefore, she tells 
Elizabeth, “we can form no idea” and it is “impossible for us to conjecture.” No verifiable 
ideas or conjectures—no valid knowledge, in short—can be drawn from impressions. The 
ending of this exchange epitomizes this perspective clash most vividly. Jane reiterates her 
cognitive vacillation, concluding the conversation with a distinctly non-conclusive 
comment: “‘It is difficult—it is distressing—One does not know what to think.’” But 
Elizabeth feels otherwise: “‘I beg your pardon,’” she retorts, “‘one knows exactly what to 
think’” (59).  
Thinking that she knows just what to think is Elizabeth Bennet’s foremost liability, 
of course. Elizabeth’s evolution across the novel will hinge upon her increasingly Jane-
directed recognition that there are, indeed, two separate modes of perceiving the world: 
trusting one’s momentary emotional responses versus trusting one’s reason. When 
Elizabeth thus undertakes her “second perusal” of Darcy’s letter, after she has registered 
and taken in a new view of both herself and her sister, everything appears to her to be 
“[w]idely different” (137). Recalling Wickham’s behavior by bringing it now “fresh [to] 
her memory,” she places it under new scrutiny, suddenly sensing the delusion and the 




interpretations: “what she meant to be impartiality” was in fact guided by a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (136).  
Now, in her reappraisal of these memories, Elizabeth adopts Jane’s language of 
skepticism. Finding it to be “impossible” to ignore the “duplicity” of Wickham’s words, 
she replaces her former certainties with indeterminacy. There had never been real 
knowledge derived from their conversation, Elizabeth realizes, and she observes that 
“nothing had been known” and that “she could remember no more” (136). Moreover, 
she observes the important transition that has taken place, for she is only “now” being 
“struck with the impropriety of such communications to a stranger, and wondered it had 
escaped her before” (136). Before, of course, Elizabeth remained under the delusion of 
her own epistemological assumption that one’s affective reactions provide as much 
information as factual truths derived from logic and reasoning. Now, having discovered 
the flaws in such biased perceptions, Elizabeth’s foundations begin to crumble. 
In this letter-reading episode, feelings cease leading to facts. Elizabeth becomes 
overwhelmed by emotions that do not seem to offer her any understanding of the 
situation she faces. Following the moment when Darcy announces how ardently he 
admires and loves her (125), Elizabeth spins into a state of emotional “tumult” (128): her 
“astonishment was beyond expression. She stared, coloured, doubted, and was silent” 
(125). The next morning, she “could not yet recover from the surprise” and finds it 
“impossible to think of any thing else” (128). Darcy’s proposal and subsequent letter leave 
her with “a contrariety of emotion” (134): she is, in turn, excited, frustrated, anxious, 




“anger” (125, 126), “amazement,” “shame,” “eagerness,” “impatience” (134), 
“astonishment,” “apprehension,” “horror,” (135), and agitation. She becomes, at various 
times, “angry,” “roused to resentment,” “shocked,” and “exasperated.” By emphasizing 
the wide range of emotional spaces that Elizabeth inhabits during this self-reflexive scene, 
Austen’s narrator communicates that the mode of “feelings” no longer serves as the route 
to knowledge—a route that Elizabeth had previously followed with confidence and even 
gusto. Like Elinor Dashwood, Elizabeth must abandon her faith in her particular brand 
of logic. 
Amidst this great “contrariety” of feelings, both Elizabeth and the narrator begin 
to solidify a boundary between knowledge and emotions, ideas and affects. Where 
Elizabeth had previously collapsed these together, the narrative now separates them. 
When Elizabeth contemplates the letter, her thoughts are described as being between the 
objective and the subjective, in an inconclusive mediation, with verbs like “understand,” 
“believed,” “persuaded,” “resolved,” “expressed,” and abstract nouns like “explanation,” 
“account,” and “belief” (134). Elizabeth sits amidst the language of belief on the one hand 
(emotion, heart, instinct) and knowledge on the other (truth, assurance, decisiveness). Like 
Jane in her skeptical caution, Elizabeth measures the indeterminate space between 
sensory perceptions and reasoned explanations, for she does not link one to the other, but 
rather lingers in the kind of skepticism that Jane inhabits. It is impossible, she now sees, to 
know anything from her emotional reactions. Thus Elizabeth registers neither complete 
doubt nor complete certainty. Her epistemology recalibrates to the search for potential 




witnessing it in Jane.    
Importantly, while Darcy’s letter provides a stimulus for these contemplations, his 
rhetoric continues to exemplify the kind of one-sidedness that Elizabeth’s once had. 
Where Elizabeth’s default would be to collapse the distinction between emotions and 
facts, Darcy relies affirmatively upon his own biased judgments as the source of truth. 
Despite the fact that he is trying to remedy his prior misconceptions, he still adheres to 
one end of the epistemological spectrum. He concludes his letter, for instance, with the 
language of truth and certainty: “to know,” “revealed,” “truth of every thing,” 
“testimony” (134).  For now, at least, Darcy remains committed to the notion that reason 
and feeling are not separate concepts, for his own power of perception, he believes, can 
lead him to “impartial conviction” which he assumes to be “as truly as I wished it in 
reason” (130). Blending his own impressions with reason, Darcy closes his epistolary 
confession by explaining his perspective as sticking close to logic, with no consideration of 
the biases of his own subjectivity. He applies such language of reasoned logic and 
objective knowledge as “[d]etection,” “know,” “truth,” “assertions” (134). To Darcy, his 
own understanding equals truth. The irony, of course, is that his perceptions are just as 
biased as Elizabeth’s. Thus she cannot be learning much from him at all. 
III. Change over Time; or, The Bildung of Slow Growth 
The female Bildungshelden in these novels change in ways profoundly influenced by 
what they witness in their siblings, a process that is complicated by the feat of coming to 
see differently those intimate family members who had once been so familiar to them. Yet 




encounters with both Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility have, for the most part, 
remained situated within the context of the novels’ heterosexual marriage plots. Whether 
readers want to interpret these teleological narratives in line with Austen’s commitment to 
social conservatism or as a trope that grates against her rebellious feminist tracts,24 
readers cannot avoid the fact that wedded bliss ties up each novel in a pretty conjugal 
bow. As such, these idealized marital conclusions have far overshadowed examinations of 
other familial dynamics. Male figures like Darcy, Willoughby, and Edward have 
functioned as far more vital signifiers of Austen’s allegiances than, say, a Jane Bennet, 
Anne Elliot, or Margaret Dashwood. As I have been suggesting, however, each of 
Austen’s protagonists are situated within kinship networks that inform her worldview—
and whose evolution alongside hers contributes vitally to her own.  
The tendency to overlook siblings in favor of suitors becomes a particular liability 
when scholars locate these novels within the Bildungsroman genre. Often, the successful 
development of the female protagonist becomes marked only by her preparation for, and 
acceptance of, the social rite of passage invested in matrimony. Franco Moretti, for one, 
assures us that Elizabeth Bennet’s Bildung successfully culminates once she accedes to her 
position as a married woman.25 Joseph Allen Boone similarly aligns Elizabeth’s courtship 
storyline to her Bildung achievements, noting that “[a]s the subject of a female 
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bildungsroman, therefore, Elizabeth remains inscribed within the one arena, the one 
destiny, permitted by the mechanics of love-plotting.”26 Such a prescription, however, 
presupposes that the Bildung quest either squelches the heroine’s individualism or deprives 
her of a fulfilled Bildung journey. As Rachel Blau DuPlessis puts it, “the energies of the 
Bildung were incompatible with the closure in successful courtship or marriage” novels, 
and therefore the “plot of self-realization was…subordinate to, or covered within, the 
magnetic power of that ending.”27 All theorists of the female Bildungsroman must grapple 
with the ways the marriage plot has been folded into this critical inheritance. 
In reframing the Bildungsroman to contain women’s narratives, several scholars 
have tried to identify what women’s novels of development have in common with—and 
what distinguishes them from—the classical, male, and German-derived tradition. 
Typically, these readings move away from a focus on the individual hero in order to open 
space for a heroine situated within communal and social contexts. This “dialectical 
relation to historical events, social structures, and other people”28 centers, however, 
around an individual’s internalized “process of learning to understand and work within 
the limits of society.”29 Even for those who suggest the female Bildungsheld embraces a 
fragmented rather than holistic (i.e., male) sense of personhood,30 the individual “I” 
continues to divert us from the kind of interpersonal interactions that constitute such an 
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identity in the first place. Readings of Elizabeth have followed suit: the “I” of her self-
analysis has diverted our attention away from the “we” upon whom she actually focuses. 
Thus the Bildungsroman’s integral notion of individualism and personal evolution, 
set against the expectations and lessons of the social world, have shifted attention away 
from familial inter-subjectivity in favor of the “hero’s self-realization,” which requires “a 
delimitation, indeed, a constriction, of the self”31 so that the Bildung takes his “place in the 
order of things.”32 The course of progression towards an enclosed ego applies differently, 
of course, to women, whose situations were necessarily much more private and 
domesticated: women did not have the same educational opportunities as men;33 they 
could not form sexual liaisons outside the institution of marriage;34 and they could not 
embrace the opportunities of working culture and the upward social mobility offered by 
the “myth of bourgeois opportunity” so integral to the male tradition.35 Rather than 
seeking individualization through work, apprenticeship, and urban living, women evolved 
within the home. This was a process, most readers have concurred, that culminates with 
the wedding bells. 
Yet as I have been outlining here, heroines of Austen’s novels, such as Elizabeth 
Bennet, endure internal battles that require them to struggle not only with their own 
subjectivity but with that of their sisters as well. Elizabeth recognizes her enmeshed 
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dynamic with her sisters, suddenly coming to see her similarities and differences from 
them, which requires a unique opening up of her own ego boundaries: it takes quite a 
cognitive accomplishment to change one’s perspective not only of oneself but also of one’s 
intimate kin, for whom one has already hardened a cognitive and psychological image. 
By shifting our focus from the marriage vows to the paradigms of sisterhood, I suggest, 
the project of the Bildungsroman appears differently: the sororal Bildungsroman shapes 
multiple characters at once, requiring a mental flexibility that a conventionally 
determined (male) ego does not traditionally conceive.  
For women like Elizabeth and Jane Bennet, as well as Elinor and Marianne 
Dashwood, the Bildung evolution is both more dynamically interpersonal and inter-
subjective than the heterosexual romance plots—and the measure of marriageability—
have led critics to imagine. What I wish to suggest is that the female Bildungsroman of 
Austen’s novels does not cultivate women who are socially indoctrinated and prepared for 
marriage but, rather, women who are, like their male counterparts, cultivated to be both 
epistemologically and ethically evolved—yet in such a way that they can never return to 
their prior self-conceptualizations as entirely self-contained. Their interdependent sororal 
exchanges, in other words, ensure that each woman’s Bildung process is both ego-forming 
and communally-bound, both boundaried and permeable. Thus Austen’s novels integrate 
elements of both the traditional male Bildungsroman form and the more fragmented, 
indeterminate, and inconclusive features of what feminist scholars have recently theorized 
as being unique to the canon of “female Bildungsromane.”   




feeling, between sense and sensibility—Austen’s novels offer a paradigm of “sibling logic” 
that combines elements across supposedly gendered divides. The “self” that we find in 
Austen’s sororal Bildungsromane challenge heuristic binaries to advance two features of 
female self-development: first, that change is acquired slowly, over time, through gradual 
progression; and second, that change brings us towards epistemological equilibrium, 
balancing extremes into moderation.  
Situating Austen within eighteenth-century philosophy, J. A. Kearney has 
suggested that Austen dramatizes this search for moderation between antithetical 
extremes. Her novels arrive at a compromise between the polarities of reason and 
feeling—a dichotomy drawn frequently in political and philosophical discourse. Adhering 
neither to John Locke’s faith in logic nor to Adam Smith’s faith in sentiment, Austen 
instead combines both frameworks, since “each needs the support of the other, each is 
equally fallible when trying to act independently.”36 Neither reason nor feeling can 
function well in isolation. Rather, these terms must come together into a more integrated 
and cohesive ontology, as Kearney explains: “Both are needed for an adequate 
understanding of the truth about human affairs and experience. Many of the difficulties 
experienced by Jane Austen’s characters result, in fact, from attempts by reason or feeling 
to act independently of one another, or for one power to try to usurp the other’s domain” 
(111-12). Reason and feeling must be intrinsically intertwined, just like siblings. 
Austen’s sisterhoods materialize this segue from a phenomenology of extremes to 
one of moderation. Since nothing can be known without the combined input of both 
                                                




affective and logical filters, Jane and Elizabeth Bennet together demonstrate a balanced 
approach that considers all aspects of cognitive and psychological processing. Likewise, 
since neither complete self-exposure nor complete self-containment allow one to 
communicate in social situations, Elinor and Marianne together forge an approach 
wherein both factors can be at play, in which one’s successful engagement with the world 
requires a moderated performance of both affect and sense.  
By blending and blurring epistemological polarities through the slow procedural 
experience of learning new behavior and perspectives from one’s kin, Austen’s novels 
explore the role of slow growth over time. As an allegory for political change, this growth 
perhaps sheds light on one of Austen’s underlying ideologies: that historical change 
should not be radical nor revolutionary, but gradual and incremental. Women like Elinor 
and Elizabeth do not transform themselves suddenly as the result of proposals of 
marriage; they do not embrace revolutionary and cataclysmic change, in other words. 
Rather, while they may be instigated towards change by their male suitors, the manner in 
which this change takes shape happens as the result of a lifetime of learning. The carefully 
orchestrated influence of women upon one another offers a paradigm of political 
evolution framed by gradual awareness, the kind that comes with mutual respect and 
appreciation for the differences and similarities shared between parties. For Austen, 
change should be progressive—not in the sense of being ideologically liberal, necessarily, 
but in the sense of evolving over time in incremental stages towards a moderated 
perspective. Austen’s distinctive sibling logic thus provides a model of effective transition 




* * * 
As Ruth Perry has noted, eighteenth-century narratives have typically been 
interpreted along conjugal, rather than consanguineal, lines: “Social historians and 
literary critics often pass over sibling relationships as irrelevant to the ‘real story’—which 
they assume to be the development of the conjugal family and an emphasis on romantic 
love between husbands and wives.”37 Pride and Prejudice has been subject to the same fate. 
Yet Perry claims, overall, that women’s roles as daughters and sisters were diminishing at 
the end of the eighteenth century as their place as mothers and wives increased in both 
financial and material importance—and that the fiction of the period represented this 
cultural shift by morally testing out “good brothers” to care for their sisters. As she 
discusses elsewhere,38 Perry suggests that fictional sibling pairs offer only a fantasy of what 
people could no longer access in their everyday lives: the material and emotional support 
of birth families, including siblings. Yet I believe Austen’s novels contest Perry’s claims, 
since her marital endings confirm the opposite remained true. Throughout Austen’s 
novels, female characters evolve in tandem with their siblings, and these mutual 
relationships mold women into their proper state as inter-subjective entities—no longer 
grasping their own immature egoistic notions of self-reliance, they become open to the 
influence of others. And while the wedding bells do ring, so do their sisters’ doorbells.  
When Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility come to a close, both novels affirm 
the importance of maintaining sibling relationships as cotemporaneous bonds paralleling 
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matrimonial ones. The two novels conclude, after all, not with the culmination of 
women’s young adult lives as the acquisition of a husband and property. They end with 
the culmination of women’s young adult lives in the settling of their family members close 
by, in the rectifying and then embracing of nearly-fractured relationships with their 
sisters, and in establishing these familial connections by affirming close geographical 
proximity to follow the proximity gained even closer to home: that assimilation of the 
other’s personality into one’s own.  
As Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility end, Austen’s narrator sums up the 
unified kinship networks that will enfold the newly married couples into an intimate social 
fabric—the text’s ultimate goal of “uniting them” within the lateral family system (PP 
254). As part of their marital settling, “Jane and Elizabeth, in addition to every other 
source of happiness, were within thirty miles of each other” (PP 252); and “[b]etween 
Barton and Delaford”—between the new Mr. and Mrs. Brandon and Mr. and Mrs. 
Ferrars—“there was that constant communication which strong family affection would 
naturally dictate;—and among the merits and the happiness of Elinor and 
Marianne…they could live without disagreement between themselves” (SS 269). But 
along with these closing gestures, as we have seen, the sisters affirm their transformation 
from singular and bounded egoistic selves into open and malleable members of a complex 
inter-related system. Siblinghood has shaped them into the women who enter these new 
conjugal partnerships, and these marriages, in turn, take place only by enabling an 
ongoing connection to their originating sisterhood. Both novels require not just a double 




IV. Conclusion:  
The Swing toward Sisterhood in Austen Adaptations 
  
Jane: You two have always been so alike. 
Lizzie: What world are you living in? 
Jane: One where I have two wonderful, stubborn sisters who spend 
more time talking to thousands of people they’ve never met than to 
each other. 
    Episode 86, “Sisterly Support,” The Lizzie Bennet Diaries 
 
For the most part, the Austen we are inhering today, both in literary criticism and 
in popular culture, is an Austen of the marriage plot. The most well-known recent filmic 
adaptations confirm this legacy. Take, for instance, Joe Wright’s Hollywood production 
of Pride and Prejudice (2005), in which a steamy Matthew Macfadyen as Darcy clashes 
heatedly with the nubile Keira Knightley: in one particularly memorable scene, the two 
holler at one another while underneath a thunderous rainstorm, their erotic tensions 
building throughout the rain-soaked spat—punctuated, literally, by strikes of lightning. 
Playing up the overt sexuality, the film’s ending further fetishizes the romantic teleology 
by revealing Elizabeth and Darcy in an intimate, half-dressed, apparently post-coital 
embrace, adorned with a backdrop of Pemberley’s candlelit decadence—an ending that 
was added specifically for American audiences. Even the more ascetic and historically 
accurate BBC miniseries (1996) still heightens the romantic impulse by luxuriating in 
physical displays of the central couple’s sexual friction. Actor Colin Firth was, after all, 
catapulted into stardom once his Darcy emerged from a lake in soaked undergarments. 
This version ends, likewise, with the visual consummation of heterosexual love and 
marriage: as the wedding carriage pulls away from the church, the film’s final frame 




While the majority of modern adaptations and spin-offs indulge the marriage plot 
of Austen’s classic, however, one recent version has placed the Bennet sisterhood front 
and center. Hank Green and Bernie Su’s YouTube sensation The Lizzie Bennet Diaries 
aired from April 2012 to March 2013 as a 100-episode video diary log, or “vlog,” made 
up of 3-minute clips recorded by a modern Lizzie Bennet, “a 24-year-old grad student, 
with a mountain of student loans, living at home, and preparing for a career.”39 A 
quintessential millennial, Lizzie (played by Ashley Clements) presents a first-person 
narration of her daily life. She is often accompanied on-screen by her two sisters Jane 
(played by Laura Spencer) and Lydia (Mary Kate Wiles). Like Austen’s novel, The Lizzie 
Bennet Diaries (LBD) highlights the turbulent nature of twenty-something relationships: the 
ups and downs of Jane and Bing Lee’s on-again/off-again courtship; Lydia and George’s 
intense but fractious fling; Darcy and Lizzie’s fomenting but repressed desires. But while 
LBD incorporates these romantic storylines, the true emotional crux of the series falls on 
the love affair between sisters, rather than lovers.  
With poignant self-awareness, the three Bennet girls occupy almost comically 
stereotyped sibling roles. Lydia is the bubbly, overly exuberant, and scandalous youngest, 
about whom Lizzie jests that she is “very proud she’s now too old to be on any reality 
shows about having babies in high school.” In stark contrast, Jane plays the excessively 
sweet oldest child, whom Lizzie labels as “practically perfect in every way.” With self-
deprecating humor, Lizzie casts herself in yet another typified sibling position: “That’s 
right, I’m the dreaded middle child! Doomed to a life of drug addiction, irresolute 
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drinking, and out of wedlock pregnancy!” (Episode 2: “My Sisters: Problematic to 
Practically Perfect”). (Austen’s Mary Bennet appears a few times in the series as the girls’ 
depressive Goth cousin, and Kitty Bennet is, well, a kitten.) As the series unfolds, the 
plotlines revolve around the three redheaded sisters’ individual experiences as well as 
their shared encounters, from the everyday foibles of sisterly squabbles over who annoys 
whom more at a party to a heart-wrenching drama in which the older sisters must 
comfort Lydia through a very public online sex-tape scandal. The show acknowledges the 
originating sororal differences that manifest in Austen’s novel, but raises them to newly 
visible heights with self-conscious and hyperbolic delight.  
With the ability to represent Lizzie’s internal thoughts through her first-hand 
verbal narration—something that other film and television renditions have previously 
omitted in favor of traditional objective perspectives—LBD builds to a climax that 
revolves around Lizzie’s pivotal realization: she has made many errors in interpreting not 
only herself but also her sisters. Rather than focusing on the girls’ suitors and their shifting 
romantic dynamics, the series lands its emotional impact on the intricate dynamics of 
sisterly inter-subjectivity. As I have been arguing is true for Austen’s original text, this 
Lizzie Bennet will not only rethink her “first impressions” of her new acquaintances such 
as Darcy and Bing Lee, but, more importantly—and with much more cognitive and 
affective difficulty—she will reframe her opinions of both herself and her sisters.  
Revising many of her own long-standing assumptions about the girls’ childhood 
personas, and the adult persons sprouted from those origins, Lizzie reconsiders her most 




‘I went back and watched all of Lydia’s videos. I don’t know that girl. It’s like my 
sister is a person I’ve never met. And then I thought about it. And how could I not 
have seen her when she was standing right in front of me?’ (Episode 87: “An 
Understanding”) 
 
Crying at the sheer shock of this realization, Lizzie comes to terms with the fact that she 
has imposed her own ingrained mental version of her younger sister upon the now-adult 
Lydia, and, as a result, slowly begins to see that she has not only misunderstood her sister 
but that she has also misunderstood her own position in relationship to her: 
‘I thought I knew how to be a big sister. I mean, I know how to do all the dumb 
stuff, like take her out to a bar for her birthday and fight over who does the dishes 
and give her a hard time about… everything. There’s a lot more to it than that, 
isn’t there? [Lydia enters] Lydia, I want you to know, how sorry I am about the 
things I said to you, on and off the Internet. I don’t think I really … I didn’t really 
know you, I guess.’ (Episode 88: “Okay”) 
 
The resolution of Lydia and Lizzie’s fight—which had sent Lydia “offstage” for a number 
of episodes to record her own personal vlog as retribution—precedes any resolution to the 
romantic storylines. Lizzie’s siblinghood thus takes center stage, as her self-understanding 
circulates around changing perceptions of her siblings. As in Austen: until this moment, 
Lizzie did not know herself; but she also did not know her sisters. With its focus on the 
complementary features of sisterly affection and sororal turmoil, LBD presents a Lizzie—
like Austen’s original Elizabeth—who must uncover the ways in which she is both more 
similar to and more different from her sisters than she had ever previously imagined. 
Only through this acknowledgement of their evolving relationships can Lizzie begin to 
transform. Green and Su’s YouTube adaptation thus makes visible something that has 
resisted being universally acknowledged throughout the long history of Austen criticism: 





“I am Alone, and Miserable”: 
The Failures of Fraternity in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein  
  The sounding cataract 
Haunted him like a passion: the tall rock, 
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood, 
Their colours and their forms, were then to him 
An appetite; a feeling, and a love, 
That had no need of a remoter charm, 
By thought supplied, or any interest 
Unborrowed from the eye.1 
 
Early in the third volume of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), Victor 
Frankenstein quotes the above passage from Wordsworth’s “Lines written a few miles 
above Tintern Abbey.” In citing this lyrical ballad, Victor amends Wordsworth’s original, 
changing the poet’s self-reflexive, first-person “me” into a third-person “him.” In doing 
so, Victor defers the intimate experience with nature onto someone else entirely—“[t]he 
sounding cataract / Haunted him like a passion”; “colours and their forms, were then to 
him / An appetite.” Ruminating on pleasures that are distinctly not his own, Victor 
proclaims enviously that his friend Henry Clerval (the designated him) is still able to relish 
the beauties of nature in a way that Victor’s “me” no longer can. Unlike Victor, Clerval 
retains the tools necessary for fostering communion with nature: a “wild and enthusiastic 
imagination,” “ardent affections,” and, most importantly, “human sympathies” (166). 
Using this allusion to “Tintern Abbey” to register his own sense of alienation, 
Victor invokes here the two readings of Romantic subjectivity that I have been 
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contrasting. On the one hand, Victor’s quotation exemplifies the kind of isolated 
interiority that has conventionally been associated with the Romantic ideology—an 
independence of mind that Shelley depicts through both Victor Frankenstein and 
Captain Robert Walton, who each finds himself attracted to those “poets whose effusions 
entranced [his] soul” (52). While the text gestures elsewhere to similarly solipsistic 
Romantic figures like Samuel Taylor Coleridge as well as Mary’s husband Percy Shelley, 
Walton nostalgically describes such poets’ creative solitude as one that led to his own 
intellectual and psychological narcissism: “for one year [I] lived in a Paradise of my own 
creation,” he recounts (52). However, Victor’s self-imposed distancing from the “him” 
who experiences this sublime state disconnects him from the alternate register of “human 
sympathies” that Wordsworth’s poem equally invokes—a register of interconnection 
which, as I have been arguing, supplants Romantic solipsism with a more relational 
dynamic. This multiple, collective, and sibling-based inter-subjectivity is what unites 
Clerval with other people. So while Victor may no longer be able to access this 
interconnected kinship for himself, Shelley affirms the need for such sympathetic 
attachments—a need communicated explicitly through Victor’s failure to recognize it.  
Where Wordsworth acknowledges the sibling “other” whose presence sustains his 
self-comprehension, Victor Frankenstein misses these potential connections—particularly 
those with women—by pursuing his own monomaniacal self-containment. In this 
chapter, I culminate my discussion of Romanticism’s sororal and fraternal “sibling logic” 
by suggesting that Victor excludes women from the world of Shelley’s novel, and that, by 




solipsism—a state that has led him to ignore the lived experiences of relational sibling 
exchanges that Shelley’s other two male narrators, Robert Walton and the creature, both 
recognize and respect.  
Sisters, whether biological, adoptive, or figurative, are indeed ever-present in the 
novel: Elizabeth, Justine, Margaret, Agatha, Safie—these women model bonds of 
sympathetic kinship. But Victor erases these sororal figures from his ontological horizons. 
In previous chapters, I have been exploring the ways in which horizons of fraternal and 
sororal kinship have indeed expanded rather than contracted our sense of inter-
subjectivity: surpassing the traditionally hierarchical paradigms of reproductive relations, 
these works by Percy Shelley, Baillie, Wordsworth, and Austen open radical possibilities 
for queer sibling kinship, for non-reproductive propagation, for temporalities rooted in 
multiplicity, and for subjectivities situated in networks. Illuminating these applications of 
lateral sibling logic even further, Shelley’s novel demonstrates what happens when 
possibilities for plurality, expansion, and proliferation are foreclosed. Instead of honoring 
his surrogate sisters, Victor collapses them. Shunted from the affective and discursive 
spaces they might otherwise occupy, women are reduced to tales themselves, to 
circulating objects of exchange that can be traded between men in their efforts to forge 
homosocial bonds. In the world of Frankenstein, men construct a narrative “traffic in 
women,” to cite Gayle Rubin’s phrase, converting women’s histories into transferable 
stories. But by overlooking the sororal sympathies available to him through lived brother-
sister relations, Victor abandons the exact human interdependence he seeks. In his hunt 





I. Sympathetic Reciprocity: Agatha and Felix De Lacey 
While domestic ideology itself has become a center point for one strand of 
scholarship on Shelley’s novel, siblings have factored far less into critical discussions of the 
text—perhaps exemplifying the influence that Victor’s dominating consciousness has had 
upon his audience, both inside and outside of the novel proper. From Anne Mellor’s 
Romanticism and Feminism onward, gender-based criticism of Frankenstein has understood the 
De Laceys to serve as the representatives for Shelley’s bourgeois domestic fantasies. As 
such, the De Laceys appear to be an ideal that can never be achieved, and one that differs 
significantly from the Frankensteins’ model of patriarchal relations. The tripartite 
household of Agatha, Felix, and De Lacey père, as Mellor explains, represents a utopian 
view of cooperation amongst daughter, son, and father that “constitutes Mary Shelley’s 
ideal, an ideal derived from her mother’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.”2 “In the 
impoverished De Lacey household,” Mellor continues, “all work is shared equally in an 
atmosphere of rational companionship, mutual concern, and love.” But, as Mellor 
astutely observes, this “egalitarian and interdependent” (229) family rooted in “justice, 
gender equality, and mutual affection” simply cannot succeed within the world of 
Shelley’s novel—or in Shelley’s England.3 This vision of an “alternative nuclear family” 
is, Mellor claims, altogether “lost in the novel.”4 It is lost because Shelley’s idyllic 
arrangement requires a maternal figure to make it whole: the De Lacey home “lacks the 
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3 Anne K. Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (New York: Methuen, 1988), 118. 




mother who might have been able to welcome the pleading, pitiable creature” into the 
fold.5 Without this mother-figure to ground its sympathetic center, the De Laceys’ 
“egalitarian, benevolent, and mutually loving” kinship remains only a hypothetical 
(im)possibility,6 a castle in the air conjured by the daughter of progressive philosophers, 
but a castle not constructible in her actual universe. 
By looking to the absent mother as the lack whose presence would otherwise 
redeem this family, however, Mellor and other critics have merely repeated Victor’s own 
interpretive errors.7 Relying as they do on a paradigm of psychosexual desire for the 
symbolic but absent mother, these oedipal-inflected readings reify the patriarchal 
placement of women into roles of reproductive helpmates: as wives and mothers, rather 
than sisters. This is Victor’s miscalculation as well. Instead of searching for what Mellor 
calls a missing maternal ethics of care I propose that what Shelley’s novel seeks most is a 
sororal ethics. Brother-sister paradigms enable a unique reciprocity that the 
unidirectional frameworks of mother-and-child exclude. The problem is that Victor can 
think of women only in the limited terms of patriarchal relations—in terms of verticality, 
inheritance, lineage, and reproduction. He sees wives where he should, in fact, see sisters.  
At the heart of Shelley’s novel, the interdependent sister-and-brother pair of 
Agatha and Felix De Lacey exemplifies the reciprocal nature of these “human 
sympathies” from which Victor feels dissociated. The De Lacey siblings perform a dance 
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of true reciprocity: they exchange their domestic roles throughout the day, with one 
sibling picking up where the other leaves off. The creature explains this elegant 
interchange of labor tasks: 
[She] walked along, seemingly incommoded by the burden, [when] a young man 
met her, whose countenance expressed a deeper despondence. Uttering a few 
sounds with an air of melancholy, he took the pail from her head, and bore it to 
the cottage himself. She followed, and they disappeared. Presently I saw the young 
man again, with some tools in his hand, cross the field behind the cottage; and the 
girl was also busied, sometimes in the house, and sometimes in the yard. (125) 
 
Agatha and Felix partake equally in the chores around the house, dividing what must be 
done between the two of them: the brother labors outdoors while the sister busies herself 
with things closer to their abode, either inside the cottage or in the nearby yard. 
Importantly, neither sibling needs to request the help of the other; nor do they seem 
incapable of accomplishing any of the tasks on their own. Rather, each sibling could carry 
out his or her activities independently. Agatha might be temporarily “incommoded” by 
her burden, but she does not require physical assistance from Felix to carry on that job. 
She does not ask directly for her brother’s assistance either, but instead voluntarily 
endures the intense bodily exertion demanded by these tasks inside and outside the home. 
Felix, in turn, conducts his work independently as well, moving easily between the cottage 
and the woods. The key is that while each of them can work alone, they do not. At 
moments when they come together, their innate compulsion is to provide mutual support: 
Felix lifts Agatha’s burden; they retire into the house together. Their instinct is to work 
collectively and reciprocally, rather than separately; yet they are capable of doing either. 
 Defying the rubric of a strictly gendered division of labors, Agatha and Felix move 




with little complaint. Importantly, this ethical sharing of physical work translates 
additionally into their shared affect. Material burdens are not the only ones the siblings 
swap. Felix’s state of “deeper despondence” and “air of melancholy,” for instance, are 
readily apparent to the creature who observes the siblings because Felix’s affective state 
can be compared to Agatha’s: where they are both relatively depressed, Felix is more so. 
In this scaled comparison, the two close family members perform some degree of a similar 
emotion; and it is only through such juxtaposition with Agatha’s state that the observer 
can discern Felix’s emotions to be, at this time, “deeper” than hers.  
 Moreover, Agatha and Felix’s complementary sibling dynamic—their shared 
work as well as their shared suffering—is neither uni-directional nor one-sided. It features 
a key element of sympathy that distinguishes sibling relations from other kinds of inter-
generational kinship structures: reciprocity. In texts examined thus far, including 
Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” as well as Percy Shelley’s The Cenci and Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice, siblinghood contains a degree of implied hierarchical power dynamics between 
older and younger siblings. Yet, like Frankenstein, these texts also demonstrate how 
siblinghood balances such birth-order structures with the inherent egalitarianism invoked 
by sibling status. In Frankenstein, Shelley capitalizes upon the equivalency of sibling kinship 
in order to test out its ontological possibilities as a model for equal sympathetic 
reciprocity.  
So even though some hours or days might see Felix bearing the material weight of 
a milk pail along with the psychological burden of his family’s financial and psychological 




Before long, Agatha releases her brother from his own strenuous cargo:  
Soon after this the young man returned, bearing on his shoulders a load of wood. 
The girl met him at the door, helped to relieve him of his burden, and, taking 
some of the fuel into the cottage, placed it on the fire; then she and the youth went 
apart into a nook of the cottage, and he shewed her a large loaf and a piece of 
cheese. She seemed pleased; and went into the garden for some roots and plants, 
which she placed in water, and then upon the fire. She afterwards continued her 
work, whilst the young man went into the garden, and appeared busily employed 
in digging and pulling up roots. After he had been employed thus about an hour, 
the young woman joined him, and they entered the cottage together. (126) 
 
This scene extends the siblings’ familiar and effortless pas de deux: at first, Agatha meets the 
returning Felix at the threshold of the cottage, takes the logs, and moves them to the fire; 
then the siblings confer together over their newly acquired victuals, sharing in their joint 
pleasure over the gathered goods; third, Agatha retrieves vegetables from the garden, 
and, when she returns inside the house, Felix goes outside to take over the gardening 
tasks; lastly, Agatha comes out to meet him, and they go inside as a unit once again. Their 
choreographed dance is well rehearsed, representing a series of movements that the two 
have practiced repeatedly over time. The siblings know instinctively when to perform 
independently, when to come together, when to separate, and when to switch roles. Their 
dance—their sympathetic reciprocity—passes these domestic tasks back and forth 
between them, until finally they both retire to enjoy the products of their individual and 
communal undertakings. 
 As we have already seen in Chapter One, the late-eighteenth-century concept of 
sympathy infiltrated both the philosophy and fiction of the period. Incorporated by 
Joanna Baillie in her “Introductory Discourse” as what she terms “sympathetick 




in ethical bonds that would bridge the space and distance between separate hearts. “The 
highest pleasures we receive from poetry,” Baillie explains, “[…] are derived from the 
sympathetick interest we all take in beings like ourselves.”8 Through the careful 
observation of others, Baillie suggests, particularly those on the stage, we can contemplate 
the ways in which we might respond in parallel situations. It is through this process of 
identification with the emotions, reactions, and behaviors of other people that we become 
more just, compassionate, and merciful ourselves. In his popular treatise on the subject, 
Adam Smith similarly defines sympathy in the mode of observation combined with 
imagined feelings: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can 
form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation.”9  Moreover, Smith suggests, our approval of 
others’ sentiments derives from our own accordance with their responses: if we react the 
same way that they do, we confirm that their response is just. Sympathy registers as 
synthesis.  
 Frankenstein’s creature models this route to sympathy when he describes his own 
experience of mirroring the De Laceys’ affective states. Learning what human sympathy 
looks like from the outside, the creature finds himself responding in kind as a reflection of 
the De Lacey siblings’ emotions: “when they were unhappy, I felt depressed;” he recalls, 
“when they rejoiced, I sympathized in their joys” (129). Here, as Smith and Baillie 
propose, sympathy takes the form of internalized identification: the creature projects his 
                                                
8 Joanna Baillie, “Introductory Discourse” (1798), in Plays on the Passions, ed. Peter Duthie 
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own emotions to overlap with the De Laceys’, imagining himself in their shoes, and 
sensing that he, too, might feel the same way if placed in their situation. But the creature’s 
response—feeling precisely what these other humans feel—points to the principally 
unidirectional nature of Baillie’s and Smith’s theories. While this scenario allows the 
creature to learn about the experience of emotions, as he feels his own cognitive and 
physiological reactions aligning precisely with what the De Laceys deem unhappiness and 
joy, this affective experience is one-sided: the creature observes and then feels the De 
Laceys’ emotions, but they have no awareness of his presence. They do not feel what he 
feels in return. Like an audience watching actors upon the stage, the creature can 
sympathize with their performance, but they cannot even see him.  
 For theorists like Baillie and Smith, this is precisely what sympathy looks like: an 
individual visualizes himself in the place of another in order that he might determine 
whether he would respond similarly to a stimulus and, in turn, permits himself to feel 
empathy for that other soul who is currently experiencing that emotion. This mode of 
sympathy is, in fact, spectatorial—though, of course, as Smith expands, we do enjoy when 
the direction reverses and our friend sympathizes with our own current state. But 
sympathy happens in the mind of only the one observer. What the creature—and, I 
would suggest, Mary Shelley as well—seeks to institute is something that goes beyond this 
one-directional sympathetic identification. What the De Laceys model, and what the 
creature subsequently values after learning from this model, is a sympathetic exchange 
conducted through the kind of reciprocated actions, behaviors, and feelings that play out 




connects two souls continually over time. In other words: the reciprocity of siblinghood. 
II. Domestic Doubling: The Waltons and the Frankensteins 
In Frankenstein, Agatha and Felix are not the only siblings to model sympathetic 
reciprocity. Indeed, the younger Waltons and young Frankensteins embody a similar 
paradigm. The problem for Victor is that he will later try to replace this sororal-fraternal 
intimacy with surrogate fraternity, whereas Walton recognizes that he owes his notion of 
brotherhood to an earlier sisterly companionship. Walton builds his search for male 
friendship upon that earlier foundation. In both men’s original childhood homes, 
sympathetic reciprocity served as the basis for brother-sister relations, particularly as it 
was developed within a complementary course of early educational development. Despite 
these parallel origins, these two men will later diverge in their sororal allegiances.  
In the outermost frame of the narrative, Captain Robert Walton famously writes 
to his sister, Mrs. Margaret (Walton) Saville, of his nostalgic ties to their once-intimate 
childhood relationship, an experience that they shared together in the communal Walton 
household. Despite his current distance from her, Walton invokes the affective intimacies 
that continue to bind them, regardless of how far they may now be geographically 
dispersed. Childhood experiences, and the later recollection of these experiences as 
memories in adulthood, forge an inseparable attachment between the brother and sister. 
The sympathetic reciprocity cultivated in childhood seems capable of connecting siblings 
regardless of how far apart they might now be.  
In his letters, Walton draws upon this earlier intimacy in order to construct an 




remember, that a history of all the voyages made for purposes of discovery composed the 
whole of our good uncle Thomas’s library” (52). Walton finds solace not only in the fact 
that his sister will remember the contents of their uncle’s library but also that she will 
recall the time they spent exploring the stacks together. Margaret knows the physical 
books as well as the history of voyages that both of the siblings perused inside them. In 
addition to recalling her uncle’s bibliophilic repository, Margaret should also, Walton 
assumes, retain a memory of his interests and affinities, the psychological passions he 
associates metonymically with these books: he had once wanted to become a sea voyager, 
then a poet, and again an explorer. Walton surmises that Margaret should easily 
remember these aspirational vacillations: “You are well acquainted with my failure [i.e., 
at becoming a poet], and how heavily I bore the disappointment” (52). It is as a result of 
their intimacies during these primary stages of life that Walton believes the two siblings 
could now, as adults, access the emotional synthesis they enjoyed in childhood. He speaks 
to her, after all, in the present: “you are well acquainted,” he remarks, rather than “you 
were.”   
Even at great distance, these shared childhood encounters help Walton to imagine 
and reconstruct Margaret’s sympathetic availability, not only in their collective past, but 
also in their separated present. Yet this “present” moment in which he imagines Margaret 
reading his letter is a present that will only be realized in his future, once she has received 
his letters in England after he sends them from the arctic. “Do you understand this 
feeling?” he asks her hopefully (and rhetorically, since she cannot answer his inquiry). 




his own present that he is attempting to evoke for her in words. The basis for this 
sympathetic understanding would be, for Walton, their shared childhood emotions: if 
Margaret knew him then, she should also know him now.  
Upon such reasoning, Walton continues to plead for his sister’s affective 
identifications: “And now, dear Margaret, do I not deserve to accomplish some great 
purpose” (53); “Ah, dear sister, how can I answer this question” (53); “You may deem me 
romantic, my dear sister” (54). Calling attention to the immediacy of his unanswerable 
requests in the “now,” Walton uses the fluidity of their early sibling relationship to cycle 
through a conceptual layering of temporalities—a present self that conceives the past and 
future of a sibling’s reception. Walton hopes his sister will identify with his present in her 
future, just like she did in their joint past. Thus Walton conceives a similar temporality as 
that which Wordsworth assigns to siblinghood: a mixed temporality in which past, 
present, and future meld together into an interdependent system—a system embodied in 
the figure of the sibling herself.  
Accepting this nonlinear temporality, Walton also imagines himself capable of 
characterizing his sister’s reactions in that as-yet unknown future: they would likely echo 
his own present emotions, since he believes he knows her past self well enough to project 
her character and her demeanor into that future reception. “Margaret, if you had seen 
the man who thus capitulated for his safety,” he ponders, “your surprise would have been 
boundless” (59). Through his intimate knowledge of her former reactions to similar 
events, based upon their shared childhood, Walton presumes to know Margaret’s 




had been with him during the experience, and in reading about the situation later she will 
be surprised in the future. Imaginatively projecting her responses, Walton writes of those 
hypothetical reactions by moving from the conditional past of “if you had seen” to the 
future and future-conditional tense of “Will you” and “if you do”: “Will you laugh at the 
enthusiasm I express concerning the divine wanderer? If you do, you must have certainly 
lost that simplicity which was once your characteristic charm” (62). Although it seems 
tangible to him, Walton’s connection to his sister lies solely in his imagination, and yet 
that imagination comes alive for him through memories of who his sister once was. 
Walton draws upon their past in order to project his sister’s acceptance of him into the 
future: in this way, he can still feel her sympathies resonating in his own here and now, 
despite her actual distance.  
Like Robert and his sister Margaret, Victor too once enjoyed the intimacies of a 
shared sibling childhood where bonds were forged both in the nursery and the library. 
The collective “we” that joins him with Elizabeth Lavenza shapes Victor’s early life: from 
a young age, he explains, Elizabeth Lavenza was “my playfellow, and, as we grew older, 
my friend” (66). Victor and his close associate enjoyed both recreational and educational 
pursuits together: “Our studies were never forced,” he reflects, although “we always had 
an end placed in view, which excited us to ardour in the prosecution of them” (67). Never 
cajoled into following a specific curriculum, the pseudo-siblings were left to their own 
devices in the Frankenstein home, with little parental oversight. Instead, Elizabeth and 
Victor encouraged one another, forging ahead in their cotemporaneous development by 




might read the writings in those languages” (67).  
Undertaking this communal project, the young Elizabeth and Victor sought 
knowledge for its own sake: “we loved application, and our amusements would have been 
the labours of other children,” Victor recalls (67). And while their rubric may have been 
lax, it followed a pursuit of passions: “Perhaps,” he suggests, “we did not read so many 
books, or learn languages so quickly, as those who are disciplined according to the 
ordinary methods,” but, in the end, “what we learned was impressed the more deeply on 
our memories” (67). The pleasures that Elizabeth and Victor feel derive from their shared 
encounters with these texts. For Victor and Elizabeth, as for Walton and Margaret and 
for Felix and Agatha, reciprocal education, shared domestic tasks, and communal 
recreation substantiate the ongoing emotional, intellectual, and physical bonds of their 
sibling units. It is this source of intimacy that sustains them even when separated.  
As does the young Margaret and Robert Walton’s exploration of the treasures of 
their uncle’s library, Victor and Elizabeth’s mutual educational pursuits represent an 
ideal Wollstonecraftian scenario. As Shelley’s mother famously laments in her Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman (1792), women’s subordination to men had become culturally 
instituted through the suppression of women’s intellectual and rational education, their 
minds sacrificed for superficial training in domestic finery. “The minds of women are 
enfeebled by false refinement,” Wollstonecraft writes; “they spend many of the first years 
of their lives in acquiring a smattering of accomplishments; meanwhile strength of body 
and mind are sacrificed to libertine notions of beauty,” and, moreover, “the instruction 




objects of desire.”10 For Wollstonecraft, the solution to this sociocultural imbalance lay in 
mutual education that would strengthen women’s minds and bodies. Her “main 
argument,” she writes, “is built on this simple principle, that if [woman] be not prepared 
by education to become the companion of man, she will stop the progress of knowledge 
and virtue; for truth must be common to all” (304). To accomplish this “revolution in 
female manners” (321) and seek rationality for all creatures, both male and female, 
Wollstonecraft demands the introduction of equal education for young boys and young 
girls together, rooted not just in public institutions but in the private home as well.  
In the home, Wollstonecraft believes, children might be educated in tandem, with 
the development of natural domestic affections balancing that of rational philosophy, 
before they are sent to school—where, Wollstonecraft argues, the sexes should still 
comingle rather than be educated separately:  
My observations on national education are obviously hints; but I principally wish 
to enforce the necessity of educating the sexes together to perfect both, and of 
making children sleep at home that they may learn to love home; yet to make 
private support, instead of smothering, public affections, they should be sent to 
school to mix with a number of equals, for only by the jostlings of equality can we 
form a just opinion of ourselves. (270) 
 
Once sent to school, young women and young men should be educated in similar 
subjects, so that their minds might be equally developed, neither one taking precedence 
over the other: 
In public schools women, to guard against the errors of ignorance, should be 
taught the elements of anatomy and medicine, not only to enable them to take 
proper care of their own health, but to make them rational nurses of their infants, 
parents, and husbands… It is likewise proper, only in a domestic view, to make 
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women acquainted with the anatomy of the mind, by allowing the sexes to 
associate together in every pursuit… (274) 
 
Thus with their communal childhood curricula, the brother-sister pairs of Robert and 
Margaret Walton and Victor Frankenstein and Elizabeth Lavenza exemplify 
Wollstonecraft’s vision of equal education in which boys and girls are trained together at 
home and school. Their collective learning is balanced so much so that Victor and 
Elizabeth even study Latin together, a subject typically denied to young girls, even when 
their brothers might have been tutored in the subject—an inequality that any reader of 
George Elliot’s Mill on the Floss will vividly recall.  
III. Desperately Seeking Siblings  
 Altogether, the shared domestic activities of both leisure and education constitute 
the unique source of reciprocal sibling sympathies. As Alan Richardson has pointed out, 
late-nineteenth-century anthropologists theorized that sibling closeness arose from their 
shared physical environments in childhood.11 In his History of Marriage (1891), for instance, 
biological anthropologist Edward Westermarck suggests that a tabooed aversion toward 
sexual incest in siblings develops out of the close proximity of their communal childhood 
home—and not, as Sigmund Freud would have it, as something that arises from natural 
biological drives that are innately rooted within a sexualized family system. As 
Westermarck demonstrates proximity serves as the primary preventative to future sexual 
congress between children. Regardless of their biological status, Westermarck finds, 
children who raised in the same home do not desire one another. In his survey, children 
                                                
11 Richardson, “Rethinking Romantic Incest: Human Universals, Literary Representation, and 




reared from infancy together but contracted for future marriage have a much higher rate 
of divorce and infertility than those in cultures where endogamic marriages such as this 
are discouraged. Even children not related by blood or familial ties develop a natural 
aversion toward future sexual relations with pseudo-, foster-, or surrogate siblings since 
“early and regular domestic exposure triggers some sort of negative sexual imprinting in 
young children.”12 This co-socialization is why quasi-siblings raised together, even cousins 
or adopted kin, can feel as intimately united as siblings birthed by the same two parents.  
Turning from anthropology to literature, Richardson finds a parallel phenomenon 
occurring in Romantic texts: “Indeed, so strong is the power of shared childhood 
experiences that adopted siblings, or foster siblings, or even neighbors who grew up 
together tend to have the same valence in Romantic narratives as do siblings by blood.”13 
In Shelley’s novel, both the creature and Walton honor the power of these reciprocal 
learning dynamics: they feel the strength of reciprocal childhood bonds forged out of 
shared experience. For Walton, these experiences are with his biological sister; for the 
creature, they are witnessed in the De Lacey siblings. As a result, each narrator later 
hopes to find male-male bonds that resemble the originating female-male relationships 
that first cultivated their understanding of sympathetic reciprocity. In contrast, however, 
Victor Frankenstein does not respect the brother-sister foundations of sympathy in quite 
the same way. Having grown up alongside Elizabeth Lavenza, his cousin and adoptive 
sibling, Victor oversteps the taboo Westermarck suggests should separate them from 
engaging in conjugal relations. Victor tries to turn Elizabeth from sister to wife, which is 
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an error that Walton and the creature do not make.  
 Captain Walton’s frame narrative, for instance, reveals not only his bond with his 
sister Margaret but also the ways in which he grounds his current search for a new 
companion upon their primary sororal-fraternal dynamic. In the deserted arctic 
wasteland, Walton seeks a replacement for the female sibling he left behind in England, a 
replication of the model of intimacy he cultivated with her. Explaining his dissatisfied 
longing to that same sister, Walton writes in his letters of his unfulfilled hopes for an 
acquaintance—or better yet, a friend—who could engage with him in this sacred bond of 
communion. In Walton’s imagining, this man would partake equally in his woes and 
successes, but he lacks such a figure: “I have one want which I have never yet been able 
to satisfy,” he laments; “I have no friend, Margaret” (54). To date, Walton has found no 
one that meets him on the same affective, psychological, or intellectual platforms. 
What Walton truly yearns for is a male partner whose similarity to himself might 
go beyond the platonic roles of friendship: “I desire the company of a man,” he writes to 
Margaret, “who could sympathize with me; whose eyes would reply to mine” (54). Using 
language that resonates as more erotic than collegial here, Walton hopes to “satisfy” his 
“want” and “desire” of that one “man” whose “eyes” would reflect the mirror to his own 
soul. He longs for someone to understand his motives without judgment or critique: “I 
greatly need a friend who would have sense enough not to despise me as romantic, and 
affection enough for me to endeavour to regulate my mind” (55).  
Walton seeks a brother. And, in fact, he uses that word only after the man who 




wastelands of the arctic, Walton believes he has now found his match. Having hungered 
for something more intimate and familiar—and familial—than those relations offered by 
his fellow shipmates, Walton defines for Margaret this longed-for relationship as one of 
siblinghood: “For my own part, I begin to love him as a brother. … I said in one of my letters, 
my dear Margaret, that I should find no friend on the wide ocean; yet I have found a 
man who, before his spirit had been broken by misery, I should have been happy to have 
possessed as the brother of my heart” (60-61, emphases added). Twice referring to Victor as his 
“brother” and associating that term with the romantic and intimate “love” of his own 
“heart,” Walton links brotherhood not only to heightened emotional intensity but also to 
the models of sympathetic reciprocity that his own sister had developed with him: 
someone who elicits “sympathy and compassion” (60), who inspires his own “affection” 
(61), and who returns his own “admiration” and “pity” (61). Walton idealizes his budding 
attraction to Victor so much, indeed, that he projects onto Victor a sympathetic 
attachment that the man himself may not be capable of reciprocating. Walton tells 
Margaret that Victor “interests himself deeply in the employment of others” and 
“instinctively takes in the welfare of those who surround him” (61). While Victor may 
have fundamentally altered his personality by the time he reaches the arctic wastelands, it 
seems far more likely that Walton fantasizes Victor’s emotional availability —like any 
good lovelorn suitor would do.    
In his infatuation with Victor, Walton accentuates this brotherly adulation with 
the trappings of a romantic obsession: “even now in wreck [he is] so attractive and 




although his words are culled with the choicest art, yet they flow with rapidity and 
unparalleled eloquence” (61). Walton’s obsequious language belies the accuracy of his 
report: he watches Victor always through his own rose-colored glasses tinted with 
aspirational love. Yet while the language of brotherhood is clouded with the delicacies of 
affection, for Mary Shelley and her husband Percy such intensity of identification would 
have been paramount to sympathy, an intimacy that resembles the idealistic “antitype” 
Percy Shelley conceptualizes in his essay “On Love” and in poems like “Epipsychidion.”  
Written during the summer in which Frankenstein was published, Percy’s “On 
Love” proposes a model of psychological and spiritual mirroring embodied in one’s 
relation to another person who resembles one’s own self. What we yearn for most, Percy 
suggests, is the discovery of our self in another, someone whose “eyes…reply to” our own. 
The yearning rests so deep, he claims, that there is inherently “something within us which 
from the instant that we live and move thirsts after its likeness.”14 Hoping to surmount 
our sense of personal alienation, Percy explains, we seek this “antitype” who would be a 
mind, heart, and soul that beats alongside our own. What we thirst for is a  
meeting with an understanding capable of clearly estimating the deductions of our 
own, an imagination which should enter into and seize upon the subtle and 
delicate peculiarities, which we have delighted to cherish and unfold in secret, 
with a frame whose nerves, like the chords of two exquisite lyres strung to the 
accompaniment of one delightful voice, vibrate with the vibrations of our own. 
(504) 
 
We long for someone whose intellectual understanding meets ours, whose imagination 
enters the same fanciful spaces, and whose feelings can vibrate with that of our spirit. 
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Almost as an exemplar of this search for an “antitype,” the notion of “sibling logic” 
implicitly aspires towards a similar dynamic of reciprocated self-other relations. As Stefani 
Engelstein notes, “[s]ibling love…both evokes and revokes the narcissism onto which it is 
so frequently read.”15 While self-love might require the dissolution of the other, sibling 
love maintains the other’s separation while aligning self and other based on their innate 
likeness: “far from re-presenting an integral self with which to identify, the sibling hinders 
the illusions of both autonomy and integrity,” Engelstein writes, since sibling logic favors 
a joining of multiple souls rather than a subsuming of one within the other.16 Unlike a 
narcissistic obsession, sibling logic does not allow us to feel entirely autonomous in the 
first place. 
Like Walton in his hunt for an antitype, for that “brother of my heart,” 
Frankenstein’s creature, too, seeks a sibling whose eyes will reply to his own. He yearns 
for one whose love will enable true reciprocity. Unlike Walton, the creature seeks this 
match in female form, though his model for such a relationship is parallel. Much as 
Walton bases his understanding of a brother-like antitype upon the model of his earlier 
brother-sister relationship with Margaret, the creature bases his search for a sibling-like 
relationship upon the reciprocity he has witnessed in the dynamic between Agatha and 
Felix. The De Lacey siblings become the creature’s primary reference point for human 
interactions, and his conception of sympathetic attachment derives from their practice of 
physical and emotional reciprocity. When first learning about the concept of feelings, for 
instance, the creature develops his mode of psychological reciprocity with the two of 
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them, as a third party. As observed earlier, the creature understands his own 
psychological responses as a direct reflection of the De Laceys’ emotions: “when they 
were unhappy, I felt depressed; when they rejoiced, I sympathized in their joys” (129). 
The creature mirrors their emotions, using parallel syntax to reinforce the imitative 
nature of this inter-subjective experience.17 In his own way, the creature feels he might be 
helping to carry the siblings’ burdens as well.  
Thus, at the climax of the novel, when the creature asks Victor to manufacture a 
female companion for him, he draws upon this example of Felix and Agatha’s intimate 
reciprocity: he asks for a sister. Victor, however, cannot comprehend the creature’s 
request for the human sympathies of siblinghood, and he assumes instead that the 
creature’s demand must be reproductive in nature. Critics of the novel have made similar 
assumptions, insisting on the apparent truism that the creature seeks an Eve to his Adam, 
a sexual partner with whom to propagate a post-human world. What the creature hopes 
to find, however, is a female “other” just like himself. He wants one with whom he might 
share his physical and psychological burdens, much as Felix does with his sister Agatha 
and the young Robert Walton with his sibling Margaret.  
Sounding uncannily like Walton writing to his sister, the creature laments his 
isolation, lacking a friend whose eyes might reply to his: “I am alone, and miserable;” the 
creature bemoans, because “man will not associate with me” (155). The lack of shared 
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sharing and in the creature’s reflection. They apparently model misery externally with more 
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their excitement, whereas when they perform unhappiness, he feels himself lowered into the pit of 
depression right along with them. At either extreme, however, the creature finds pleasure in his 




sympathies has twisted him into a miserable soul, he believes: “My vices are the children 
of a forced solitude that I abhor,” he explains, “and my virtues will necessarily arise when 
I live in communion with an equal” (158). To end his loneliness, the creature yearns not 
for a sexual partner but a sympathetic one: he wants an equal with whom he can live in 
direct “communion,” a “sensitive being” that will share in his “affections” (158). With this 
fellow creature, he assures Victor, he will “become linked to the chain of existence and 
events, from which [he is] now excluded” (158). The creature echoes Walton’s hope for a 
man who will show him both sympathy and compassion. Having come to understand 
human kinship from observing the De Laceys, the creature registers his own destitution in 
comparison; he knows he is removed from a society that rejects him based upon his 
shocking exterior appearance. But recognizing how important that reciprocity of shared 
affect can be, the creature requests that Victor build him a sister who is made of the exact 
same stuff as he, for “one as deformed and horrible as myself would not deny herself to 
me” (155). If the female were to be as deformed and horrible as himself, “of the same 
species” and having “the same defects” (155), then she would treat him just like a sibling. 
And they would, after all, both be Victor’s offspring. 
Agatha and Felix’s elegant dance of affective and physical reciprocity inspires the 
creature’s imagining of a future time in which he and a female partner might forge a 
similar relation based upon mutual aid, collective labor, and emotional empathy. Like 
Agatha and Felix’s collective domestic work, the creature believes his companion will be 
“of the same nature” as himself with the same cognitive assumptions about their needs for 




“shall make [their] bed of dried leaves” (157). Like the De Lacey siblings toiling inside 
and outside of their home, the creature and his partner will forage in the woods and 
cultivate their garden together: in the “vast wilds,” he dreams, they will not kill other 
creatures, they will not “destroy the lamb and the kid, to glut [their] appetite,” but rather 
they will seek innocuous nourishment in “acorns and berries” (157). With one another’s 
support, these sibling-creatures will be gatherers rather than hunters; they have no need 
for violence when they can support one another in cultivating a homestead by favoring 
agriculture over animalistic predation. The creature hopes that they will create a 
“peaceful and human” home, uniting into a familial “we” and “us” that will release him 
from his current misery of isolation (157). Guided by the De Lacey siblings as the “only 
school in which [he] had studied human nature” (143), the creature yearns for a shared 
domestic economy and emotional reciprocity that will draw him back into the fold of 
humanity. He yearns for an Agatha to his Felix, not an Eve to his Adam.  
IV. Victor’s Kinship Miscalculations 
 When his wretch makes the “demand” upon Victor that he construct a “creature 
of another sex” (157), Victor fundamentally misconstrues the request. Drawing upon his 
own experience of women and of kinship relations, Victor assumes that what the creature 
desires most urgently is a spouse—likely because he, too, yearns to turn his platonic quasi-
sister, Elizabeth Lavenza, into a sexualized wife. Victor’s heteronormative assumptions 
about women’s primary role as reproductive kin lead him to be wary of the generative 
ramifications that would be incurred by introducing this female creature: he wonders, 




(174). Believing that “one of the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon 
thirsted would be children” (174), Victor supposes that the creature adheres to the same 
strictures of reproductive futurity as does his own linear thinking: i.e., the concatenation 
of a symbolic Child along with a literalized offspring that would shape the determinacy of 
the future itself. In other words, Victor thinks (in line with the likes of queer theorist Lee 
Edelman, as discussed in Chapter One) that we can have no conception of the future 
without a conception (both figurative and literal) of children—at least, not in 
heteronormative paradigms.18 Yet by associating the creature’s request with a hungering 
for this ability to orchestrate his own future reproduction in the form of children—and 
fearing those children’s impact on “everlasting generations”—Victor indeed projects his 
own desires: he is the one, after all, who attempts to manufacture his own offspring. This 
self-propagation is Victor’s hungering, not the creature’s. He believes the creature wants 
to populate the world with its own monstrous kind, and thus he fears what he deduces to 
be the only logical outcome of this situation: a monstrous reproduction of the wretch’s 
progeny. The creature, however, is asking for something entirely different.  
 As we have seen, the “daemon” requests a fellow-creature not for the purposes of 
reproduction but for those of sympathetic reciprocity. From equal hideousness will 
emerge the female’s identification, and, in his final command to Victor, the creature 
gestures towards this goal: “Let me see that I excite the sympathy of some existing thing; 
do not deny me my request!” (157). Mutual sympathies serve as the basis for the 
creature’s conception of the female. Conveying this intention to Victor, the creature 
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draws explicitly upon that language of “human sympathies”—language that Walton, too, 
had used to describe his hunt for brotherhood: the creature yearns for the “interchange of 
those sympathies necessary for my being” (156). The creature thirsts for a family structure 
in which a back-and-forth “interchange” of “sympathies” between the two can serve as 
the foundation for affective intimacies and physical wellbeing—the minimum means of 
support he desires for both mind and soul. Following his meticulous observation of the De 
Lacey siblings, the creature craves not sexual union nor reproductive offspring but, 
rather, the interchange of mutual support between siblings. He desires that particular 
mode of sympathetic reciprocity that seems to be imbedded innately between brothers 
and sisters who share, in part, both blood and body.  
Victor, however, misinterprets the creature, assuming that what he craves is a 
spouse. For Victor, women’s roles are always reproductive; they must be situated within 
the vertical modes of reiterative kinship that preserves the patriarchal line. His story 
begins, after all, with an affirmation of genealogical structures, and his own position 
within them: “I am by birth a Genevese; and my family is one of the most distinguished of 
that republic. My ancestors had been for many years counsellors and syndics; and my 
father had filled several public situations with honour and reputation” (60). Just as Sir 
Elliot in Austen’s Persuasion inscribes new members of his family into the local Baronetage, 
so too does Victor begin composing his oral autobiography by ensuring that everyone 
(including Walton as well as the novel’s reader) knows precisely where he might fall within 
the hierarchies of heritage clans.   




families, Victor assumes the creature’s conceptualizations of kinship to be the same as his 
own. Ironically, Victor overlooks even the biblical parallels of the creature’s actual 
request: Adam and Eve, before becoming sexual partners and future parents, were once 
siblings. Clouded by his own God-complex, Victor translates the creature’s demand—as 
have the novel’s subsequent commentators—into the plea for a reproductive partner, for 
a “female companion, an Eve to comfort and embrace,” as Mellor puts it.19 But it is 
Victor, not the creature, who compulsively turns sisters into wives.  
Victor indeed intends to convert Elizabeth Lavenza from his paternal cousin and 
non-biological pseudo-sister (what Shelley will call his “more than sister” in the 1831 
version) into his conjugal mate. Raised in childhood together, Elizabeth and Victor 
develop the connections of early youth that, according to anthropologists like 
Westermarck, should deter the siblings, whether they are blood-related or not, from 
desiring copulation. Within the novel itself, Shelley signals the problematic nature of this 
conversion of Elizabeth from cousin and pseudo-sister to wife. In several letters sent to 
Victor from home, other family members—including Elizabeth herself—question 
whether Victor might now be reconsidering his intended marriage. Using these 
characters’ voices, Shelley flags Elizabeth’s transformation from the consanguineal to the 
conjugal as, at the very least, something potentially unwise.  
Richardson notes this shift as well, suggesting that “Mary Shelley comes close to 
suggesting [Westermarck’s] hypothesis herself as Alphonse Frankenstein, Victor’s long-
                                                




suffering father, seeks to account for his seeming coolness to Elizabeth.”20 In a letter to his 
son, Alphonse alludes to the possibility that Victor may have changed his mind about 
marrying Elizabeth, thereby calling attention to a new rationale that Victor might be 
using in order to move away from the pseudo-siblings’ prearranged status. It is not just 
that Victor may have found a new lover in Europe, Alphonse considers, but also that such 
an exogamic, extra-familial attraction to a stranger might, in fact, be the more acceptable 
option. “I confess, my son,” writes Alphonse,  
that I have always looked forward to your marriage with your cousin as the tie of 
our domestic comfort, and the stay of my declining years. You were attached to 
each other from your earliest infancy; you studied together, and appeared, in 
disposition and tastes, entirely suited to one another. But so blind is the experience 
of man, that what I conceived to be the best assistants to my plan, may have 
entirely destroyed it. You, perhaps, regard her as your sister, without any wish that she might 
become your wife. Nay, you may have met with another whom you may love; and, 
considering yourself bound in honour to your cousin, this struggle may occasion 
the poignant misery which you appear to feel. (162) 
 
In showing his concern that Victor may choose not to marry Elizabeth after all, he gives 
Victor a moment to consider the ramifications of translating Elizabeth from cousin-sister 
to wife. In fact, Alphonse registers his own prior misconception: now, he sees that siblings 
and future spouses should not mix. As Westermarck’s theory predicts, Victor should be 
romantically averse to Elizabeth as a sexual partner, for they should be predisposed in 
adulthood against marriage, since their intimate shared childhood environment should 
lead them to find one another unsuitable as sexual partners. Victor’s father appears to be 
concerned that his son might in fact consciously now choose to cross lines that should not 
even be approached.  
                                                




Importantly, Alphonse’s statement differentiates between Elizabeth’s dual kinship 
positions as cousin and sister. At first, he acknowledges his original desire that the two 
children would unite in marriage as cousins (“I have always looked forward to your 
marriage with your cousin”), and, toward the end of this passage, reiterates how their bond 
as cousins would have brought him great joy (“considering yourself bound in honour to 
your cousin”). While a marriage of cousins would satisfy Alphonse’s utmost hopes for 
“domestic comfort,” however, a marriage of siblings gives Alphonse pause. Reflecting the 
reasoning of a Westermarckian thinker, Alphonse raises the alternate possibility that 
Elizabeth might be too close for comfort, since she and Victor had spent so much of their 
young lives together before Victor departed from his parental home: “You, perhaps, 
regard her as your sister,” Alphonse prompts Victor, “without any wish that she might 
become your wife.” Alphonse wants Victor to marry his “cousin,” but is not sure that 
marrying his “sister” would be a good idea. 
While Alphonse does not explicitly warn Victor against marrying Elizabeth, 
neither is it simply the momentary lamentation of a grieving father. Moreover, Alphonse’s 
cautionary observation is repeated by Elizabeth herself, who raises similar anxieties about 
her shifting place in the family home. Writing to Victor after his sojourn on the continent, 
Elizabeth echoes Alphonse, wondering, as does her prospective father-in-law, whether 
Victor has found a woman better suited for his marital bed: 
You well know, Victor, that our union had been the favourite plan of your parents 
ever since our infancy. We were told this when young, and taught to look forward 
to it as an event that would certainly take place. We were affectionate playfellows 
during childhood, and, I believe, dear and valued friends to one another as we 
grew older. But as brother and sister often entertain a lively affection towards each other, 




Victor. Answer me, I conjure you, by our mutual happiness, with simple truth—
Do you not love another? (191, emphasis added) 
 
While Elizabeth is concerned, of course, that Victor may no longer love her, her 
interrogatives suggest she retains doubts of her own: should he not, by now, love someone 
else? Shouldn’t their sibling love prevent their sexual love? Indeed, taken in isolation, 
Elizabeth’s remark registers as almost bizarre—could there be, in contrast to her 
statement, “some” siblings who do in fact desire a “more intimate union”? Would not 
such a union amount to incest? Elizabeth asks Victor to examine his preordained 
commitment to her as spouse, wondering, “may not such...be our case?...Do you not love 
another?” She seems almost to instigate him: shouldn’t you love another? Perhaps their 
unique sibling-like intimacy, she considers, threatens to blur differentiations of kinship 
that should be more clearly maintained.  
Insisting that he write a new script for Elizabeth regardless, transposing her from 
consanguineal to conjugal status, Victor further diminishes the significance of Elizabeth’s 
original role as a lateral equal by replacing her with Henry Clerval—who, in turn, 
replaces Victor’s actual, biological siblings as well, the two younger brothers who function 
only marginally in Victor’s life. In essence, Victor transfers Elizabeth out of her sororal 
role entirely. Instead of building his desire for male-male relations with Clerval upon the 
originating brother-sister reciprocity he enjoys with Elizabeth—as Walton might do, for 
example—he writes her out of that script almost as soon as she enters it. He moves into 
an obsessive search for Clerval-as-brother at the same time that he shifts Elizabeth as past 
sister into a projected future wife. Victor supersedes his sororal bond by retroactively 




in a mutuality that, we will recall, resembles the reciprocal sibling kinship of Agatha and 
Felix De Lacey. But Victor’s was never a doubled but always a tripled relationship. After 
describing at length the “we” and “us” of his shared adventures with Elizabeth, Victor 
revises the “description of our domestic circle” to “include Henry Clerval,” who was, he 
inserts in retrospect, “constantly with us” (67). Furthermore, Victor ignores biological 
siblinghood altogether. He treats his younger brothers like children, since they were 
“considerably younger than” him, and finds that his schoolmate Clerval “compensated 
for the deficiency” of these juvenile siblings (67). Displacing his biological kin with his 
chosen pseudo-siblings, Victor adopts a Westermarckian model of childhood intimacy, 
locating “siblings” in his surrogate family, Elizabeth and Clerval, rather than in those 
who share the same biological parentage—all the while corrupting that surrogacy with an 
attempt at forging legal and reproductive obligations.  
Finally, while Victor desperately pursues Henry’s friendship across land and sea, 
he rejects other offerings of surrogate brotherhood placed in front of him. Walton indeed 
makes repeated overtures towards developing a close companionship with his newfound 
“brother of my heart,” telling Victor directly of “the desire [he] had always felt of finding 
a friend who might sympathize with [him]” (61). Confessing his deepest yearnings to 
Victor, Walton explains his search for an elder-brother figure: “‘I wish therefore that my 
companion should be wiser and more experienced than myself, to confirm and support 
me; nor have I believed it impossible to find a true friend’” (61). In return, Victor rebuffs 
Walton, shuffling aside Walton’s pleas for union entirely: 
‘I agree with you,’ replied the stranger, ‘in believing that friendship is not only a 




creatures, and am entitled, therefore, to judge respecting friendship. You have 
hope, and the world before you, and have no cause for despair. But I—I have lost 
every thing, and cannot begin life anew.’ (61) 
 
Victor ascetically and even antisocially rejects Walton’s overtures by reducing Walton’s 
efforts to dry philosophical principles. While Victor may be willing to “judge respecting 
friendship,” he will not enter into that vulnerable state. Ignoring the pleas of Walton’s 
heart, Victor speaks mechanically in intellectual terms of “believing” in the “possible 
acquisition” of a “noble” “creature” and “friend.” Because Victor has already removed 
himself from “every thing,” he does not accept the hand of fraternity being extended his 
way.  
V. Fraternity’s Failures 
The consanguineal intimacy that Walton desires in this “brother of his heart” 
cannot be located in Victor, in the end, for the two men seem to speak different 
languages. Oblivious to the brotherly friendship that Walton offers him, unable to solicit 
the fraternal intimacies he seeks from Clerval, and rejecting his biological brethren in the 
young William and Edward, Victor abandons the biological and surrogate brotherhood 
presented to him. Each attempt at manufactured kinship fails because Victor ignores the 
sympathetic reciprocities introduced to him by that original sororal figure, Elizabeth. By 
transforming this lateral, quasi-sibling relation into an affinal one, Victor problematically 
blends multiple kinship frameworks into one.21 In parallel with his own recurring 
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nightmare, which replaces the image of his own dead mother with that of Elizabeth, 
Victor consciously substitutes his sister for his parent. In other words, he never allows 
Elizabeth to occupy her primary sibling role, but instead conflates her with the positions 
of wife and mother.  
Moreover, by selecting this pseudo-sibling as his marriage partner, Victor 
collapses the heteronormative paradigm he seeks to maintain: by marrying his quasi-
sister, he generates no new kinship ties that would ensure the continuity of his own 
lineage. Kinship depends, after all, upon external exchange. As Claude Lévi-Strauss 
suggests, kinship relies upon the movement of a daughter or sister from one clan to 
another, in an act that forges connections between two previously unrelated cohorts. This 
exchange thereby strengthens patriarchal bonds between the male giver (father or 
brother) and the male recipient (husband). In selecting Elizabeth, Victor creates no new 
exogamous ties outside of the Frankenstein tribe. In acting as Elizabeth’s giver as well as 
her recipient, he gifts her only to himself.  
Elizabeth’s value for Victor does not even function in the realm of lived kinship. 
Where she does partake in a particular cultural transaction between men is as a story 
herself, a tale that can be “given” from one man to another, through an exchange process 
that erases her lived reality. Victor converts Elizabeth’s story—along with those of Justine, 
Agatha, and Safie—into narratives that he can “sell” to his eager recipient, Walton, as he 
attempts to solicit one-sided sympathy from that audience. He selfishly hopes to find in 
Walton the help he needs to hunt down the creature on the ice. Victor’s motivation 
                                                                                                                                            
and his inability to accept a more diversified model of kinship—and not necessarily the multiple 




becomes clear when, for instance, he concludes his own retelling of Elizabeth’s version of 
Justine’s story by fashioning himself to be the pitiable victim: “But I—I was a wretch,” 
Victor announces as the close of Volume II, “and none ever conceived of the misery that 
I then endured” (110). When, later, he tells Walton about Elizabeth’s death, he similarly 
dramatizes his own suffering, hoping to garner further sympathetic allegiances: “Great 
God! why did I not then expire! Why am I here to relate the destruction of the best hope, 
and the purest creature of the earth” (198). Presenting these women’s stories as verbal 
currency, as a means by which to shape his own victimhood, Victor hopes to elicit 
Walton’s sympathy as remuneration for this narrative offering. He attempts to gain 
Walton’s identification—the same thing that the creature, indeed, has asked him to 
provide in the form of a sibling. 
But Victor neglects the lived presence of his various “sisters”—and women in 
general—in favor of turning them into, on the one hand, reproductive bodies, and, on the 
other hand, discursive histories that he can retell to other male listeners. In this concentric 
multi-layering of narratives, Victor tells his own tale, but inside that tale lie stories of 
Elizabeth and, further inside hers, Justine Moritz; while he re-narrates the creature’s 
elegant autobiography, inside of that story lie those of Agatha De Lacey and, in the 
innermost core of the entire novel, Felix’s prospective wife Safie. Women’s stories are 
exchanged while the women themselves are erased. At the outskirts, Margaret Saville’s 
ghostly presence sits as recipient of all—a sister to hold the stories of so many others.  
Conclusion: Sibling Stories 




oral narratives from their originating speaker. As Beth Newman helpfully notes, this 
story-within-a-story structure tears stories from their characters, such that “a story can be 
cut off from its origin in a particular speaker,” and, moreover, from the life which that 
story depicts.22 And, since the “production and transmission of narrative” acts as 
“compensation” for a sympathetic exchange that fails elsewhere, this novel depends upon 
such discursive relationships as generated between auditor and audience.23 A story, once 
separated from its ontological roots, “achieve[s] autonomy”; as Newman explains, “it 
now functions as a text.”24 For Shelley, it is women’s stories in particular that suffer this 
fate: stories of women’s lives are separated from the minds, bodies, and voices from which 
they come. It is women who are traded as narrative commodities, converted into the 
currency that men exchange in their economy of sympathy. It is women’s stories that can 
cross the boundaries between alienated men. But in Victor’s world, these discursive 
transactions work only in one direction.  
Victor interpolates women into a kind of “traffic” in which their value replicates 
the complaint Gayle Rubin famously makes of kinship and culture: “A woman is a 
woman,” Rubin remarks, “She only becomes a domestic, a wife, a chattel, a playboy 
bunny, a prostitute, a human dictaphone in certain relations.”25 In Frankenstein, a woman 
is a woman, but she becomes a wife and mother through Victor’s miscalculated 
appropriation of his surrogate siblinghood. She also becomes a story, and, as such, she 
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serves the purpose of aligning a male storyteller with his male audience—resembling, 
perhaps, a similar erotic triangulation that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick observes in Between 
Men, in which homosocial male bonds are solidified through this trafficking, via the “use 
of women as exchangeable, perhaps symbolic, property.”26  
Trading Elizabeth’s story—and “trafficking” her into his own marriage prospect 
—fails to work for Victor, however, since Shelley wants to critique his narcissistic 
rejection of the lived kinship that surrounds him. Victor’s monomaniacal obsession with 
manufactured rather than biological relations places him in the role of God and Creator, 
a transgression against “human sympathies” for which Shelley will not stand. By choosing 
his own artificial constructions of kinship, rejecting the sororal frameworks modeled by 
Elizabeth and other pseudo-sisters in his life, Victor relies upon patriarchal models of 
reproduction and replication, for he comprehends the family as turning upon genealogy 
and generation. In his search for a sympathetic listener, Victor seeks a paradigm of 
sympathy that parallels his paradigm of kinship: uni-directional, linear, reiterative, and 
passed from one man to another. But in the figures of Walton and the creature, and in 
the story of Agatha and Felix De Lacey, Shelley offers us an alternative: a model of 
sympathetic reciprocity imbedded in the complementary dynamics of siblinghood—an 
interchange of physical and emotional support that even Baillie’s and Smith’s notions of 
sympathy do not fully embrace.  
Thus at the center of Frankenstein’s concentric narratives lies the story of a woman. 
                                                




The innermost tale, “the smallest doll in the set,”27 as it were, is not an oral history recited 
by a man, but a written document penned by a woman: the letters written by Safie. As a 
tangible symbol of the women’s narratives that have been circulating inside this text, the 
packet of Safie’s letters passes from one male speaker’s hands to another’s. Through this 
process, the letters move from the innermost heart of the narrative’s many layers to the 
outermost frames of the book, traveling “from the geographical, psychological, and 
narrative center of Mary Shelley’s novel out to its margins.”28 The letters acquire 
meaning through these interactive exchanges between men: the creature records them, 
hands the material objects to Victor as evidence of the veracity of his own tale; Victor 
delivers them to Walton; Walton sends them to his sister back in England, along with the 
package of his own journals. Transacted as payment by men who are hoping to gain 
sympathy back in exchange, Safie’s letters accumulate signification as they migrate from 
one writing desk to another, gaining sense only from the stories told about the story written 
inside.  
Why, then, does the creature ultimately choose to first record and then retain the 
transcription of Safie’s letters as material evidence of his own experiences in the woods? 
Indeed, as I have been arguing, the model of kinship that the creature hopes to recreate 
for himself is that of Agatha and Felix, the brother and sister whose sympathetic 
reciprocities so inspire his infatuation with humanity in its most pristine condition. For 
what reason does he then choose Safie’s letters, the representation of an affinal 
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relationship between future husband and wife, as the visible proof of his true history?  
In the end, the creature’s exchange of Safie’s letters perhaps serves as an ultimate 
confirmation of Victor’s corruptive influence over the world of this novel. Attempting to 
write himself into a paradigm that Victor—and other humans like him—would 
understand, the creature allows his own self-identity to disintegrate, and attempts instead 
to interpolate himself into a culture and a language that has always already rejected him. 
Retaining the letters as a translated artifact, the creature tries to inscribe himself into 
kinship using Victor’s frameworks. Having been rejected from the world that he 
understands, that of the physical and the observed and the sympathetic—that world of 
Agatha and Felix’s reciprocal sibling exchanges, in other words—the creature struggles to 
render himself legible in a world familiar to Victor, a world of heteronormative 
genealogies. He does not recognize, of course, that this is a world even Victor fails to 
embrace.  
But where the creature understands himself best is in the world of the De Laceys, 
and it is this model of kinship that the creature represents. As a blank slate, uncorrupted 
and un-socialized by the human realm, this manufactured “being” chooses to shape his 
identity through sibling kinship, even though he feels obligated to sacrifice this story in 
favor of Safie’s, whose letters might purchase him entry into a world fallen into language, 
culture, marriage, and reproduction. Where he truly feels at home is in relation to 
siblings. Despite the fact that Victor can never hear his request—despite the fact that 
Victor will respond only to the records of marriage rather than to the stories of siblings—it 




sympathetic sibling reciprocity that the novel, freed from Victor’s influence, most desires. 
And it is, in the end, this fraternal and sororal inter-subjectivity that Romanticism itself 
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